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5 PREFACE 
Following the  establishment  of  the  European Economic 
Community,  a  Committee  of Experts  was  set up  under the 
Chairmanship  of Pierre Uri to prepare  studies of the  economic 
conditions of the  member  countries.  The  "Report  on  the  economic 
situation in the countries of  the  Community"  was  published in  1~58. 
Following the  accession in 1973  of Denmark,  Ireland  and  the 
United Kingdom,  the  Commission of the European Communities  considered 
that it would be valuable  to  supplement  the  Uri Report  with  a  study 
on each of the  new  Member  States.  On  this occasion,  however,  the 
Commission  followed  a  somewhat different procedure  and  commissioned 
separate studies  from  independent institutes in each of the  three 
countries. 
The  present study of the United Kingdom  was  prepared at 
the National Institute of Economic  and Social Research,  London. 
The  authors of the various chapters are  named  on  the title page, 
but,  in addition,  mention  should be  made  of  the  contributions of 
Miss G.I.  Little,  who  prepared the  text for publication and  compiled 
the  bibliography,  and Miss S.  Colwell,  who  typed the draft chapters 
as well  as the  final text.  Thanks  are  due  to Miss Patricia Brown 
of HM  Treasury and her colleagues in government,  as well  as  to 
Mr.  H.R.  Wortmann  of the  Commission of the European Communities,  for 
valuable comments,  and criticisms,  of draft chapters.  The 
responsibility for the final version remains with the  authors. 
7 
G.D.N.  Worswick 
National Institute of 
Economic  and Social Research CHAPTER  1 
GENERAL  FEATURES 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the nineteenth century the British economy  was  expanding in 
production,  trade  and  overseas investment both in absolute  terms  and 
in its relative importance  in the  world.  fr~ring the twentieth 
century,  notwithstanding the  setbacks  of  two  world wars  and  the 
great depression,  the  upward trend in production and trade has been 
maintained,  but outward  investment has been increasingly offset by 
inward  flows.  In relation to the  rest of the  world,  however,  the 
story of production  and  trade has been  one  of fairly steady relative 
decline.  Partly this is a  simple  matter of  demography~which can 
most  vividly be  seen by comparing the  populations of the 
United Kingdom  and the United States over the whole  period as in 
table 1.1.  Pop~lation movements  alone  made  relative economic 
decline  inevitable;  but,  in addition,  the  growth-rate of output per 
head in Britain has  tended frequently to be  somewhat  lower than the 
average  for other industrial countries of Western Europe  and for the 
United States.  This poor relative performance has been very much 
emphasised in the past twenty years,  during which statistics of 
national product  on  aiEasonably comparable basis have  become 
increasingly available. 
Britain was  a  pioneer,  and for  a  long time  the leader,  in 
the  process  of industrialisation which began at the  end  of  the 
eighteenth century.  Already by the middle  of the nineteenth century 
its urban population was  as large  as that remaining in the 
countryside,  and  from  then  on  food  and  raw material needs for a 
growing population in industry were  increasingly supplied from 
overseas in exchange  for manufactured goods.  By  the end of the 
nineteenth century British exports provided one  third of the world's 
trade  in manufactures.  Throughout the nineteenth century there was 
also  a  net export of capital,  at times  a  trickle, at others  a  torrent. 
To  begin with it went mostly  to Europe  and  the United States,  then to 
Canada  and  India,  and at the  end of the century to Australia and 
Latin America.  In the earlier stages money  was  invested mainly in 
public works,  utilities and,  above  all, railways;  later it was 
9 extended  to  industry  and manufacturing enterprises.  Besides  money 
there was  an  increas~ outflow of iron and  steel,  engineers, 
contractors  and  technology.  In the  decades before  the 
First World War  British overseas  investment  was  of the  same  order,  in 
absolute  amount,  as American private  investment  abroad in the  1960s. 
But  already,  at the  height  of its economic  dominance,  comments  were 
being made  which have  become  a  commonplace  today,  that British 
industry was  technically backward  and  was  being  overtaken by  other 
countries,  notably the  United States and  Germany. 
The  two  world wars  and  the  great depression administered 
great  shocks  to  the  world  economy  and  to  the British economy  in 
particular,  so  that twentieth century economic  development  cannot be 
easily summarised in a  few  simple  trends.  In particular,  while 
the period between  the  two  wars  was  one  of  small  growth  and  high 
unemployment,  the period after the  Second World  War  was  one  of full 
employment  and  gradually accelerating growth.  A single  instance 
must  suffice  to illustrate this uneven  development.  In 1901  British 
steel output  was  just short of  5  million tons  and in 1913 it had 
risen further  to 7.7 million tons.  Output fell immediately after 
the  war,  but this level was  again  surpassed in the  late 1920s. 
However,  in the  early  1930s steel output  was  once  again down  to 
5  million tons,  no  higher than it had been  30  years before.  In 
contrast,  after the  Second  World  War  the  expansion  of steel 
production,  as  indeed  of many  otherindustries,  was  strong;  with 
output at 13 million tons  just before  the  Second  World  War,  it was 
over  20  million tons by  the  end  of the  1950s. 
Exports  of  manufactures  reached  a  peak volume  in 1913. 
The  war  sharply curtailed them  and,  even in the  boom  year of 1929, 
they had still not recovered their prewar level.  The  great 
depression dealt  a  further blow,  as it did  to  world  trade  in general, 
so  that British export levels in the  early 1930s  were  little more 
than half those of 1913.  But after the  Second  World  War  the 
recovery  of exports  was  strong  and  continued;  1913  levels  were 
surpassed in the early 1950s  and  since  then there has  been continuous 
growth.  This  uneven  development  in the  twentieth century was,  of 
course,  matched in many  other industrial countries.  The  share in 
world trade  of British exports of manufactures  started to fall at 
10 the beginning of this century;  it received  a  temporary impetus 
immediately after the Second  World  War  while  Germany  and  Japan were 
largely out  of  the picture.  Thus,  in 1950  the British share  in 
exports  of the main  industrial countries was  still 25.5 per cent, 
little short of the  27.3 per cent  taken by the United States.  But 
as  Germany  and Japan began their spectacular recoveries,  the 
United Kingdom  share  started to fall,  so  that by  1960 it was  down  to 
16 per cent  and  in 1973  for the first time it fell below 10 per cent. 
The  massive  overseas  investment at the beginning of this 
century dried up  between the two  wars,  although it was  to revive 
again after the  Second World War  ·until the  most  recent period. 
Meanwhile,  dividends  and interest  from past investments played a 
significant role in the  1920s  and  1930s in paying for necessary 
imports  at  a  time  when  exports were  performing none  too well. 
During  the  Second  World  War  large  amounts  of the  capital itself were 
disposed  of to pay for  arms  and  when  the  war  was  over it was 
apparent  that from  then  on current earnings  from British exports, 
visible  and  invisible,  would need to be  at least sufficient to pay 
for current  imports.  The  balance  of payments has been  a  matter of 
concern for  the  economy  in the past  30  years to  a  much  greater extent 
than in the previous century. 
Judged by its own  historical standards the  economic 
performance  of the  United Kingdom  in the past  quarter of a  century 
has been  good.  Unemployment  has been maintained at  very  low 
levels  and  the  productivity of those  employed has  risen steadily at 
an  annual  rate  of the  order of  2  per cent in the  early 1950s  towards 
a  rate  of  3  per cent in the  early 1970s.  This  performance,  however, 
appears  in a  different light when  set against that of other 
indusbrial COlintries,  most  of which have  had  growth-rates greater or 
considerably greater than that of the United Kingdom. 
The  dominant  economic  philosophies in nineteenth century 
Britain were  laissez-faire  and  free  trade.  The  major exception was 
in the  monetary  fiel~ in which the Bank  of England,  though nominally 
remaining  a  private institution,  emerged  in a  strong position of 
central control.  Although  m~rgers and industrial concentration were 
causing  some  concern at the  end  of  the nineteenth century,  there  was 
1 I no  legislation laying down  rules of competition of  any general 
application until the 1950s.  In the  1930s,  however,  there  were 
several instances of specific  government  intervention to alleviate 
the problems  of particular industries,  especially the  staple 
industries of the  previous great industrial expansion,  such as coal, 
cotton and  shipbuilding,  which were  in decline.  This growth of 
government  intervention was  closely associated with the  abandonment 
of free  trade in the  1930s.  Since  the  Second World  War  there has 
been a  considerable  further increase in the  role of the State in 
industry;  important  sectors such as transport,  public utilities, 
coal  and steel have  been nationalised and various  forms  of 
intervention and  assistance for the  private sector have been 
developed,  especially in the context of regional policy;  at the 
same  time  there has  emerged  a  more  systematic  policy towards 
monopolies  and restrictive trading agreements. 
From  the  end of the Napoleonic  Wars  until the  outbreak of 
the First World  War  the  pound  sterling was  convertible into gold at 
·a fixed rate which  remained unchanged.  After wartime  suspension, 
convertibility was  restored at the  old rate in 1925,  but this 
restoration was  short-lived,  the final break between sterling and 
gold being made  in 1931.  The  gold  standard,  combined with complete 
freedom  of movement  of goods,  services and people  into  and  out  of the 
country,  had  encouraged the  growth in London  of specialist banking, 
insurance  and  shipping firms  able  to  arrange  for the  financing  and 
movement  of goods in almost  any part of the  world.  In addition 
there  developed important markets in many  commodities.  The  business 
of the City of London has been,  and still remains,  an  important 
influence  towards internationalism in British economic  policy. 
The  interests of industry and agriculture have  not  always 
pointed in the  same  direction.  To  begin with the  advantage  to 
industry of cheap  food  for the working population,  drawn  especially 
from  the  newly developing agricultural regions  of North  and South 
America  and Australasia,  outweighed  any  arguments in favour  of 
protection.  But  thetwo  world wars  have  put  a  premium  on protection 
of agriculture  and  the experience  of mass  unemployment  in the  1920s, 
and especially the  1930s,  reinforced other arguments in £avour  of 
protection for industry,  which  was  finally introduced  soon after the 
12 abandonment  of  the  gold  standard. 
One  consequence  of  the British decision to  leave  the  gold 
standard was  torequire  those  countries which had previously held 
their reserves in sterling (and thus indirectly in gold)  to  decide 
whether  they wished  to continue  to  hold reserves in sterling or to 
remain  on the  gold  standard at the  old rate.  In the case  of British 
colonies it was  possible  for this decision to be  taken in London. 
The  independent  dominions,  with the  exception of  Canada,  decided to 
stay with sterling and  so,  for example,  did the  Scandinavian 
countries.  This sterling block was  the  forerunner  of  the Sterling 
Area,  which was  formalised under the exchange  control  systems 
introduced during the  Second World War.  Partially overlapping with 
this Sterling Area  was  the  Imperial Preference  Area  (subsequently 
Commonwealth Preference Area)  created at negotiations in Ottawa in 
~932, the  effect of which was  to  increase  the  share  of both British 
exports to  and British imports  from  Commonwealth  countries. 
Several,  not  always consistent,  lines  of thought lie behind 
British international economic  policy in the  past  30  years.  The 
first was  a  desire to restore  the  City of London  to  a  position of 
major importance,  if not primacy,  in the world's monetary  system. 
This  led to  support  of  the  Bretton Woods  monetary  agreement  and  of 
the  pa~allel Havana  Charter of International Trade  which ultimately 
emerged  in the  more  modest  General Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT).  A premature  attempt  was  made  to restore full convertibility 
of sterling in  ~947, but failed within  a  matter of weeks.  Thereafter 
even  the  most  ardent British advocates  of  the  principles of 
Bretton Woods  and  GATT  accepted that it might  take  some  years before 
the  various wartime  controls  of  imports  and  monetary transactions 
could  safely be  removed  altogether.  It was  not in fact until  ~958 
that one  can  say  Britain was  observing the full principles of the 
International Monetary  Fund  and  GATT. 
A  second strand  of  opinion was  towards  the  maintenance,  and 
if possible  the  strengthening,  of  the  Commonwealth  connection. 
Although many  colonies were  achieving political independence,  it was 
thought  that their economic  development  would be  assisted by 
maintaining a  close  association with  one  another  and  the 
13 United Kingdom.  This  Commonwealth  approach was  in some  degree  in 
conflict with the  GATT  philosophy which,  while  tolerant of customs 
unions,  was  hostile to preference  areas. 
The  third line of thinking was  the desire  to  secure  closer 
economic  relations with Europe,  especially Western Europe.  The 
idea of  a  free  trade  area for manufactures  caught  on  quite early, 
particularly as it was  felt to be  consistent with other objectives, 
such  as  those  of  GATT.  There  was  less universal  support for other 
aspects  of the original EEC  such as  the  Common  Agricultural Policy, 
partly because it was  thought  that it would  favour  the  abandonment 
of  a  historic policy of cheap  food,  also that it was  in conflict 
with  the  Commonwealth  commitment. 
There  are still conflicting tendencies in the formation  of 
British international economic  policy at the  present  time  and  the 
rise in the  price  of oil in the past year has  added  a  new  dimension, 
as it has  for the  rest of the  world.  There  seems  now  to  be  fairly 
general  agreement  that  the  attempt to maintain  a  major key  currency 
role for sterling was  a  burden  on  the British economy  too  great for 
it to  stand  and that future British external policies should have 
more  modest  aims. 
British domestic  policy since  the  war has been to  secure 
the  establishment  of  a  welfare  state.  The  first requirement  of this 
was  the maintenace  of full  employment,  an  objective  which  seemed 
never to be  seriously threatened  until the  1970s, but  which  has been 
put in question by the  energy crisis and  the  sharp increase  in the 
rate  of inflation which has  occurred  throughout  the industrial world. 
There  has been  a  great extension of social services,  in health and 
education especially,  while  industrial policy has  been based  upon 
the  concept  of  a  'mixed  economy'  of  private  and public  enterprises. 
For  a  long  time  after the  war  the  two  major political parties, both 
of which  formed  several governments,  appeared in practice tacitly 
to  accept  a  common  central programme  with differences of emphasis. 
In  the  past five  years,however,  the  power  in the  two  main parties may 
have  been shifting  away  from  the  centre in opposite directions. 
The  yGars  ahead will  show  whether  some  radical transformation in 
British industry and  society is about  to  occur or whether  some  new 
14 consensus will emerge. 
2.  DEMOGRAPHIC  TRENDS 
The  population 
In comparison with the  very rapid expansion  of population which  took 
place in the nineteenth century,there has  ~een a  relatively slow 
increase  throughout  this century.  From  ~80~ until  ~9~~ the 
population increased in each  decade  by at least  ~0 per cent,  but 
since  ~9~~  the  increase in each  decade  has never been more  than 
about  5  per cent.  The  natural increase in population was  at its 
highest in absolute  terms  from  ~90~ to  ~9~~,  when births exceeded 
deaths by 4.7 million.  In tne  interwar years  the net increase fell 
to  2.0 million  (~92~-3~)  and  then  ~.8 million  (~93~-4~).  Since  the 
war  the net decadal  increases have been  2.5 million  (~95~-6~)  and 
2.8 million  (~96~-7~).  The  increase in population over those  last 
ten years was  5.3 per cent,  which isffiightly higher than the  increase 
of 4.9 per cent in the  ~950s (see  table  ~.2), but official 
projections of the  population over the next four  decades  from  ~97~ 
expect  a  slower  rate  of increase  of  3.~ per cent  (~97~-8~), 4.4 per 
cent  (~98~-9~), 4.4 per cent  (~99~-200~) and  5-~ per cent  (200~-
20~~).~  These  projections mean  that the population of the 
United Kingdom,  estimated to be  56.~ million in  mid-~974, will 
increase  to  57.3 million by  ~98~  and 62.4 million by  200~.  However, 
these  projections are  constantly changed.  The  birthrate in recent 
years has been falling much  more  sharply than expected by those  who 
prepared the  official projections,  so  that with  each  successive fall, 
the  projections of future  population have been brought  down.  The 
laws  concerning abortion have  recently been changed,  and  the 
principle  of the  free  provision of contraceptives has been  spreading. 
It is therefore highly uncertain what  the  eventual  average  completed 
family  size will be  for  couples  in their twenties  and thirties  and 
it is certainly not  impossible that these projections of  future 
popQlation will be  heavily revised downwards  in future years. 
~  Central Statistical Office,  Annual Abstract of Statistics,  ~973, 
London,  HMSO,  ~973, table  ~3. 
15 Migration,  both inward  and  outward,  has  been  an  important 
influence  on  United Kingdom  population.  For the first 30  years  of 
this century there  was  an  average  net emigration of almost  100,000  a 
year;  in the next  ten years  (1931-41)  there  was  a  net  inflow of 
600,000.  During  the  1950s  there  was  an  almost  equal balance  between 
emigration and  immigration - a  net  inward balance  of 57,000  over the 
ten years  1951-61.  A large  number  of  the  immigrants  were  coloured 
people  from  the West  Indies, East  and  West  Africa, and India  and 
Pakistan, but there  were  always  large  numbers  of Irish immigrants  as 
well.  Since  the  Commonwealth  Immigrants  Act  of  1962  and  further 
restrictive measures  which  followed it, immigration has been  severely 
restricted and  outward migration has  considerablye~ededimmigration. 
Over  the  decade  1961-71  there  was  a  net emigration of 428,000,  but 
this  figure  masks  the yearly movements;  in 1961-2 there  was  a  net 
inflow of  300,000,  whilst  since  1962  there has been  a  large net 
outflow of,  on  average,  some  60,000 persons  a  year.  The  official 
population projections  assume  a  future  net outflow of  50,000  a  year. 
The  female  population continues  to be  larger than the  male 
despite  the  greater number  of male births  (outweighing female births 
in the ratio of 1.06 to  1)  because  of  the higher male  mortality, but 
the  gap  between males  and  females  is narrowing.  The  1951  population 
was  48.0 per cent male,  so  that there  were  4  per cent more  females 
than males;  by 1971  this  gap  had narrowed  to  2.8 per cent,  with 
48.6 per cent males;  the  projectionsJDr 2001  indicate  a  male 
population of 49.2 per cent  and hence  a  gap  of only 1.6 per cent. 
For all age  groups  under 45  the  male  population now  outnumbers  the 
female  population,  although in no  case by more  than  about  5  per cent. 
In the older age  groups the position is reversed  and  females 
outnumber  males by  successively greater amounts. 
The  age  composition of  the  United Kingdom  population has 
changed  quite radically through this century.  Partly because  of 
successively longer life expectancies,  the proportion of people  aged 
65  and  over has been rising.  In 1911  5.2 per cent of the  population 
were  aged  65  and  over;  by  1971  this figure  was  12.9 per cent.  It is 
expected to  continua to  rise but then fall back  to  around  13 per cent 
by  the  end  of the  century  (see  table 1.3).  The  corollary to this is 
that the proportion of people under 65 years  of age  has fallen  and, 
16 since  the  trend since  the  war has been  for  the  proportion of  the 
population aged  under  ~5 to  increase  slowly  (22.5 per cent  in  ~95~ 
but  24.2 per cent in  ~97~)  this has  meant  thatthe proportion of the 
population aged  15-64 has  fallen  substantially,  from  66.5 per cent 
in  ~95~ to  62.9 per cent in  ~97~.  In other words,  since  the  war 
the  pop~lation has  tended  to become  both top- and bottoin-heavy. 
This is regarded  as  unfavourable  in so  far as it means  that the part 
of  the population which is of working  age  has  shrunk, but this 
unfavourable  trend is not expected to persist.  It had  two  causes: 
first,  the  low interwar birth rate, which has  meant  a  relative 
decline  in the  number  of middle  aged persons,and,  secondly,  the 
slightly higher birth rate  of the  late  ~950s and  the  ~960s.  The 
first will eventually result in a  fall in the  proportion of  the  old, 
whilst  the  second has  been  reversed in just the last few  years. 
The  second will  also  mean  that larger numbers  will  come  of  working 
age  during the  ~970s.  These  factors  taken  together mean  that the 
40-year decline  in the  proportion of  ~5-64 year olds in the 
population will be  reversed in the  mid-~970s.  Official projections 
suggest  that  th~proportion will rise  from its  ~97~ level  of 62.9 
per cent  (a historic  low)  to 63.2 per cent in  ~98~  and  63.6 per cent 
by  200~.  One  cannot  put  much  confidence  in these projections,  but 
one  can  at least  say that  the unfavourable  movement  in the  age 
structure  should now  come  to  an  end. 
Employment 
The  changing  demographic  structure  of the population,  as  indicated 
above,  has  meant  that  since  the  ~930s a  decreasing proportion of  the 
population has been of working  age.  This is one  of  the  reasons  why 
the  working  population has not kept pace  with  the  growth in the total 
population.  In recent years  the  working  pop~lation has not  only 
declined  as  a  proportion of total population but has  also  declined 
in absolute  terms  (see  table  ~.4).  Several further reasons  have 
been put  forward  to  explain why  this has  happened.  The  main 
arguments  concern,  first,  the  marked  trend in the  number  of  young 
people  who  are  continuing their education beyond  the  minimum  school-
leaving  age  and,  secondly,  variations in participation  rates. 
The  proportion of  the  population in the  age  group  ~5-~9 
attending grant-aided  schools  in Great Britain has  risen from  9  per 
17 cent in 1951  to  just over  25 per cent in 1972.  Furthermore,  since 
1972 the  minimum  school-leaving age  has been raised from  15 to 16, 
which means  that an estimated further 0.4 per cent  of  the  total 
population has been  removed  from  the  working population.  Besides 
this increase in the  amount  of  schooling undertaken beyond  the  age 
of 14,  there has  also been  a  rapid expansion of full-time further 
education.  In particular,  there has been  a  boom in university 
education,  especially in the  last ten years.  The  number  of full-
time  students at United Kingdom universities rose  from 87,000 in 
1951-2 to  117,000 in 1961-2,  and  then more  than doubled in the  next 
ten years to  243,000 in 1971-2.  A  similar expansion took place in 
other establishments of further education.  The  result has been 
that  a  very considerable number  of young persons  who  would previously 
have  been entering the work-force  are  now  continuing with their 
education.  This  trend is reflected in the  activity rates for the 
15-19 age  group:  in 1951  81.3 per cent of this group  were 
economically active;  this fell to 72.9 per cent in 1961  and  to  58.4 
per cent in 1971. 
An  examination of activity rates for different age  groups 
(as in table 1.4)  shows  that,  although since  the war  the 
proportion  of persons  economically active has declined for those 
aged under  25  and for those  over 64,  nevertheless the  25-64  age 
group has  increasedits rate of activity quite  substantially.  In 
particular there has been  a  large  and continuing increase  inthe 
proportion of women  aged  25-64 in the  work-force.  This has  mainly 
been due  to  the  much higher number  of married  women  who  now  work; 
since  1931  their activity rate has  increased from  10 per cent to 
nearly 50  per cent.  This  increase in the  female  participation rate 
meant  that the  percentage  of  women  in the  totlliworking population 
increased from  32.0 per cent  in 1951  to  36.0 per cent in 1971.  Yet, 
despite this large  increase  in female  participation,the working 
population has still been  a  declining proportion of the mtal 
population,  because  the  lower participation of  the  younger  and  older 
age  groups  has proved  a  stronger force.  Indeed  these latter effects 
have been  so  strong that  the total working population has  declined 
in absolute  terms  since  1966.  However,  as  the  age  structure of 
the population  'improves'  through the  1970s,  this trend may  well be 
reversed. 
18 Unemployment,  which was  rarely less than 10 per cent 
throughout  the  interwar years,  has normally been below  3  per cent 
and  has never risen above  4  per cent for any year since  the  war. 
Nevertheless,  there has been  a  slow secular movement  towards higher 
levels of unemployment  nhroughout  the postwar period;  the peak 
level has  slowly risen through  successive cycles.  In the early 
1950s  the  peak rate was  2.2 per cent  (1952), but in the  most  recent 
cycle this had risen to  3.9 per cent  (1972).  Similarly at troughs, 
the  unemployment  rate has  also  tended to move  upwards  through 
successive cycles.  Various reasons have  been put  forward  to explain 
this phenomenon:  it is thought that higher unemployment  compensation 
and  compulsory  redundancy  payments have  meant that the  unemployed 
worker is not  faced with the  same  urgency  to find  a  job  as in the 
past;  it is also  thought that firms  may  now  carry fewer under-
employed staff,  especially in slack periods.  There  has  also been 
a  noticeable rise in graduate unemployment,  particularly amongst 
social scientists, but it is not certain how  far this reflects an 
over-supply of new  graduates,  or how  far it is the  outcome  of an 
unwillingness to  take  up  employment  immediately after graduation. 
A feature  of  the  unemployment pattern is the  great disparity 
between the  various regions.  Northern Ireland,  for instance,  has 
consistently had  a  much  higher rate of unemployment  than the rest of 
the United Kingdom.  In 1972,  whilst the  average  rate of 
unemployment  for the United Kingdom  was  3.9 per cent,  that for 
Northern Ireland was  8.0 per cent.  Two  other regions,  Scotland and 
the  North  of England,  have  also  tended to have  rates of unemployment 
well  above  the  average  - in 1972 rates of 6.4 and  6.3 per cent 
respectively.  This is in sharp contrast to the South  Eas~ where 
unemployment  has never been more  than 2.1  per cent  (1972)  in the 
postwar period and  has at  times been less than 1.0 per cent,  for 
example  in 1964-6.  East Anglia,  the Midlands  and  the South West 
have  also  been areas where  unemployment  has been much less than  the 
national average.  These  regional disparities have  been partly the 
result of the  decline  of the  older consumer  goods industries,  such 
as textiles and clothing,  and  of mining,  shipbuilding  and  other 
heavy industries,  all of  which have been concentrated in the  regions 
such as Scotland,  the  North,  the North West  and  wales which now 
exhibit  above-average  unemployment  levels.  In these less prosperous 
19 regions  there is a  lower activity rate  and  a  much  smaller 
proportion of  female  manual  workers  than in the  rest of the country. 
Although there is only  a  rather slow  movement  of  the  population 
within the  United Kingdom,  it is noticeable  that  the  movement  is 
towards  areas  of high  incomes  and  job vacancies  (the  South East  and 
the  Midlands)  and  away  from  areas  of low  incomes  and higher 
unemployment  (especially Northern Ireland,  Scotland  and  Wales). 
3.  NATIONAL  PRODUCT  AND  ITS  USES 
United Kingdom  output 
Since  the  war  the  average  growth-rate  of  GDP  for  the  United Kingdom 
has been  2.9 per cent per  annum  (~952-73).  This is higher  than at 
any  other comparable  period this century,  but is nevertheless 
lower than that of all other major industrialised countries.  There 
has been  a  marked  cyclical pattern in the  rate  of growth,  but only 
three years of actual decline  (~952,  ~958 and  ~974).  There  have  been 
five  cycles over the  lasttwenty years- ~952-7,  ~958-6~,  ~962-5, 
~966-70 and  ~97~-4.  Nevertheless  the  trend rate  of  growth  has 
remained fairly constant. 
Growth-rates in individual sectors have  differed widely 
from  the  overall  average  (table  ~-5).  There  has been  an  absolute 
decline  in the  mining  and  quarrying  sector,  which was  at a  postwar 
peak in  ~954 but has been  running  down  ever since  at  a  rate  of 
around  2  per cent  each year.  This  trend will be  reversed in the 
later  ~970s however,  since  the  output  of  North  Sea oil from British 
fields will be  recorded in the  industrial production statistics in 
the mining  and  quarrying  sector.  There  are  also plans,  in the  light 
of the  oil price rise  and  themergy situation generally,  to increase 
coal output in the  next  few  years  from  the  present  ~20 million tons 
annually  to  ~50 million tons. 
There  has  also been  an  absolute  decline  in the  'other 
services'  sector,  which  largely reflects the  decline in domestic 
service  and  in public  administration  and  defence  - although the  size 
of the  public  sector as  a  whole  has  grown  substantially.  Other 
sectors have  suffered a  relative decline  in that  they have been 
growing at less than trenational average;  such sectors are 
20 agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing,  the  ownership  of  dwellings, 
and transport  and  communication,  although  the  last sector grew  at 
an  above-average  rate  during the  period  ~963-73.  In the  later 
period construction and  the  distributive trades have  also  suffered 
a  less than  average  growth-rate,  although both showed  above-average 
growth during the  ~950s. 
The  manufacturing sector as  a  whole  has  grown  at  a  rate  of 
3.5 per cent per  annum  over the  period  ~952-73.  Within the  sector 
particular industries have  grown  at very disparate  rates and  these 
are  examined in the  following  section.  The  largest growth-rates, 
however,  have  been recorded in non-manufacturing;  gas,  electricity 
and  water has  grown  by  5.3 per cent per  annum,  whilst insurance, 
banking  and  finance  has  grown  by 4.8 per cent per  annum.  This 
latter sector has been growing particularly fast  in recent years, 
which partly reflects the  continuing rapid expansion of world  trade, 
in which the  City plays  an  important  servicing role.  The  sector now 
constitutes 9.0 per cent  of total output  (~973 figures)  compared 
with  29.8 per cent for manufacturing  and  4~.~ per  cent for total 
industrial production.  Agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing has  now 
shrunk  to providing  only  2.9 per cent  of  output,  and mining  and 
quarrying to  ~.4 per cent.  Public  administration,  defence,  health 
and  education now  provide  ~2.5 per cent  and  transport,  communication 
and  the distributive  trades nearly  20  per cent  of  outp·J.t  - roughly 
the  same  share  as in  ~950.  The  ownership  of dwellings,  at  5.8 per 
cent,  is now  a  more  important  component  of  output  than it used  to be 
and  construction at 6.9 per cent  has  about  the  same  importance. 
Productivity changes in these  various  sectors have  meant 
that the pattern of  employment  has not  necessarily mirrored the 
changes  in output.  Although  agricultur~ has  continued to  grow,  its 
labour  force  has  more  than halved  from  over  a  million in  ~950 to 
only 430,000  in  ~972.  In the  same  period  employment  in services bas 
risen from  4.0  to  6.~ million.  Whilst  agriculture has  undoubtedly 
seen  a  very rapid rise in productivity,  in services productivity has 
increased only  slowly.  There  has  also  been  R  decline  in the  numbers 
employed  in manufacturing between  ~950 and  ~972, and  that  sector now 
accounts  for  32.4 per cent of the  total numbers  in civil employment, 
whereas  previously it accounted for  38.7 per cent.  Since  output in 
21 manufacturing was  growing faster than average  over the period,  this 
reflects  a  substantial increase in productivity in the  sector. 
Another particularly productive  sector has been gas,  electricity 
and  water,  where  the  numbers  employed  have  remained  steady and  output 
has  grown  rapidly.  In mining  and  quarrying there  has  been  a  large 
fall in employment,  from  850,000  in 1950  to  380,000  in 1972;  this 
not  only reflects the  large  fall in  ou~p·ut in this declining sector, 
but  also  a  marked rise in productivity.  Despite  the  large  increase 
in government  work,  the  number  of employees  in  national and  local 
government  has hardly risen at all,  from 6.2 million in 1950  to 6.5 
million in 1972,  although in the  earlier year there  was  still a 
large residue  of the  wartime  civil service. 
Output broken  down  by final  demand 
Slightly more  than half of total final  expenditure  (51.0 per cent in 
1973)  is accounted for by consumption.  But  the proportion has been 
slowly declining since  the  1950s  (table 1.6).  Both investment  and 
exports  have  been increasingly important  components  of final 
expenditure,  with investment increasing its share  from 9.7 per cent 
to 14.3 per cent  and  exports  from  14.8 per cent  to 19.3 per cent 
between  1952  and  1973.  The  other major  component  of  demand,  p~blic 
authorities'  current  expenditure,  has  shown  a  large fall in its 
relative  share,  from  21.0 per cent in 1952  to  14.4 per cent in 1973; 
this is  largely explained by  the  falling proportion of output  taken 
by military defence.  However,  this masks  the  position of  the  public 
sector as  a  whole,  which has  grown  in importance  since  the  1950s. 
When  transfer payments  like debt interest,  pensions,  social security 
payments  and  grants  to  industry are  included,  the  p·ublic  sector now 
controls,  directly and  indirectly,  the  way  in which half of the 
national product is spent.  The  rise in public  spending  on this wider 
definition has been especially rapid during  the  1960s;  in 1964 
public  spending  as  a  share  of gross  domestic  product  (at current 
prices)  was  43.8 per cent,  by  1967  this had risen to  50.3 per cent 
and by  1973 it was  51.4 per cent.  The  change  in the  importance  of 
the public  sector is examined in greater detail in chapter 4. 
The  trend in consumers'  expenditure  since  the early 1960s 
has been  for  a  relative decline  in spending  on  the necessities -
food,  clothing,  housing,  fuel  and  light - and  for greater spending 
22 on  consumer  durables.  In 1970  prices,  household  expenditure  on 
food  declined  quite  sharply  from  21.9 per cent  of  consumption in 
1963  to 17.8 per cent in 1973,  falling in each year of that period; 
spending  on  drink  and  tobacco  has marginally increased its relative 
share  in consumption  over  the  same  period(rising from  12.9 per cent 
to 13.8 per cent), but this disguises the  rapid  growth in consumption 
of wines  and spirits,  and  the actual decline in the  sales of tobacco 
up  until 1971.  Similarly,  the  increase  in expenditure  on  durables, 
from 7.1  to 9.6 per cent,  masks  a  static share  of f·urniture  sales 
and  the  doubling of  spending  on  cars  and  motor cycles. 
4.  REGIONAL  DIFFERENCES 
The  regions  into  which the  United Kingdom is divided for statistical 
p~rposes are Northern Ireland,  Scotland,  Wales  and  eight  standard 
regions  of England.  They  are  so  delimited that most  of them contain 
a  major urban core  (sometimes  a  double  one)  and  in no  region is the 
population predominantly rural.  Although it is still possible 
(notably in the  Highlands  and Islands of Scotlnnd)  to find  quite 
extensive  rural areas where  agriculture is the  largest single 
occupation,  the  regions with the  largest reliance upon  agriculture 
are  Northern Ireland and East Anglia,  neither with more  than 10  per 
cent of their active population in such pursuits.  The  dichotomy, 
so  important in many  countries, between predominantly agricultural 
and non-agricultural major regions  does not exist in the  United 
Kingdom. 
The  historical origin of  the  differences in structure  and 
prosperity between  the  regions is to be  found in developments  during 
and  since  the  Industrial Revolution.  The  urbanisation,  whichh£  been 
proceeding at varying rates for at least four centuries,  has brought 
a  continuous  increase in the  proportion of the total population in 
and  around  London,  which  now  dominates  an  extensive city region -
the  South East  - containing almost  a  third of that total.  From  the 
mid-eighteenth century,  however,  until the  beginning of the  twentieth, 
a  proportionaltely more  rapid  growth  took place in industrial areas 
outside  the South East,  based in many  instances upon coalfields. 
The  most  spectacular development  was  in the  North West,  based largely 
upon  the  cotton textile industry,  followed by Yorkshire  and 
23 Humberside  (wool  textiles,  steel and  coal)  and  the  West  Midlands 
(metal  working).  The  North  (coal,  steel and  shipbuilding)  and 
Wales  (coal  and  steel)  followed  long-term trends in growth not very 
different  from  that  of the  country  as  a  whole.  Scotland and 
Northern Ireland,  despite  very  substantial industrialisation, 
declined in population in relation to the  United Kingdom  total -
Northern Ireland for  a  long  time  declined absolutely.  Throughout 
this period up  to  the First World  War,  the  industrial regions of 
Wales,  the  Midlands  and  the  North of  England  drew  in a  net 
immigration of population,  or suffered less  from  emigration overseas 
than did  the  less industrialised regions  of the  South West  and 
East Anglia;  they also  seem  to  have  had higher wage  levels and  (in 
the  early twentieth century)  lower unemployment.  Scotland  and 
Northern Ireland,  with,  at that time,  still large populations in low 
income  agriculture,  continued long-established traditions  of heavy 
outward migration,  largely overseas. 
The  industrial areas outside  the  South East had  owed  tneir 
growth in the  main  to  foreign trade  and  shipbuilding.  However, 
the  heavy British commitment  to  foreign trade,  prolonged in the  face 
of rising foreign competition by massive  overseas  lending,  was 
sharply checked by the First World  War  and its aftermath.  The 
effects of this check were  especially concentrated on  those  regions 
in which the  old exporting industries were  localised.  How  far a 
region's departure  from  the  national trends  of  growth in employment 
is attributable to  its structure  - its concentration on industries 
that nationally have  fared markedly better or worse  than all 
industries taken together - is a  question to  which  there is no 
unambiguous  answer When,  as is normally the  case,  the  entities 
described for statistical purposes  as the  same  'industry'  in 
different regions both grow  at different rates and,  indeed,  are 
generally very imperfectly comparable  in what  they actually produce. 
Nevertheless,  on  any  reasonable  interpretation,  the  relative 
depression of these  industrialised areas in the  last 50  years has 
been due  primarily to their inherited industrial structure.  It is 
not  only  th~ir original reliance upon  industries  that have  suffeEed 
in world markets that is concerned;  the  rapid  growth in the  last 
two  generatjons has,  to  a  large  extent,  been in non-manufacturing 
activities,  of which  a  substantial part  (central  government, 
professional  and  scientific  services,  head office activities,  the 
24 handling of air traffic,  entertainment,  specialised aspects of 
banking  and  finance)  has  a  strong  tendency to  establish itself near 
the national capital.  Another rapid  grower,  the motor vehicle 
industry,  found  in the  West  Midlands  and  the South East the varied 
metal-working activities best suited to providing its components, 
and  thus  increased still more  the  relative disadvantage  of the 
regions  further north.  Moreover,  once  differences of prosperity 
are  established various  forces  operate  to  accentuate  them.  Some  of 
these  are  greatly reduced in the  United Kingdom by the extent to 
which  a  progressive  tax system and central provision of social 
services  and infrastructure prevent poorer regions  from falling 
behind in the facilities they offer, but  old industrial regions with 
low  growth-rates almost inevitably present  a  less attractive 
appearance  to  new  industry than fast  growing  ones,  or those  regions 
like  the  South West  and East Anglia with in most parts little 
industrial dereliction. 
The  result of  these  circumstances is that the  regions north 
of the  Trent  and  west  of the  Severn have  suffered  a  shortage  of new 
jobs in relation to  the  increase  of their indigenous population of 
working  age;  the  rest,  except  in times  of industrial recession,  have 
experienced the  opposite  maladjustment.  The  less prosperous 
regions have  accordingly  shown  slower growth of total employment, 
lower  income  levels,  higher unemployment  and net  outward migration in 
comparison with the  more  prosperous.  These  differences may  now  be 
briefly described. 
It will be  seen  from  table 1.7 that,over the period 1921-61 
as  a  whole,only Northern Ireland  suffered an  actual decline in 
employment  (although Wales  suffered quite  a  severe  one  briefly 
between  the  two  world wars),  but that Wales,  Scotland  and  the North 
West  experienced virtually no  growth,  in sharp contrast to  the  40 
per cent  growth  of  the  South East  and  the  West  Midlands.  More 
recently,  the relative  records  of tne  regions have  been broadly the 
same  as before,  except  that the  South West  and East Anglia have  moved 
up  to  become  the  fastest  growers,  largely taking overspill  from  the 
South East,  and that Northern Ireland,  up  to  1969,  had  so  far 
improved  as  to  show  a  faster growth  of  employment  than Great Britain, 
although the natural increase  of its population had  grown  still more. 
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in the  United Kingdom  than in most  other countries;  only Northern 
Ireland  shows  a  really large  departure  from  the national average. 
In  factor  income  per capita Northern Ireland stands  some  36  per 
cent below  the  average,  but all the  other regions lie within about 
12 per cent  above  or below it.  The  differences  (including the 
Northern Ireland deficiency)  are  in part due  to  differences in the 
proportion of population that is of  working  age  and  in part to 
differences in the  rate of participation in the  labour force  by those 
of working  age.  In productivity per person in work Nortnern Ireland 
lies only 23  per cent below  average  and  the  other regions  range  f~om 
about  9  per cent below to  6  per cent above.  But  the  interregional 
flow of property incomes,  which is quite  strongly in favour  of  the 
richest region  (the South East)  as well  as  of  one  of the  otherwise 
poorer ones  (the South West)  makes  the  range  of gross  regional 
product per capita  somewhat  greater than that  of domestic factor :incanes. 
The  distribution of  expenditure is, however,  markedly 
affected by  taxation and  those  parts of  public  spending that can be 
identified as  being mainly beneficial to particular regions;  also by 
private capital transfers.  It is further modified in real terms  by 
the fact  that  the  general price  level is appreciably higher in 
London  and  the  South East  than elsewhere,  mostly because  of  the 
higher costs of accommodation  and  travel to  work.  W'.nen  all tl1is is 
taken into account,  it seems  that real expenditure  per head is 
considerably less than  20  per cent below the national average  in 
Northern Ireland and  elsewhere  ranges  from perhaps  10 per cent below 
to  8  per cent  above. 
This relatively high degree  of interregional uniformity of 
income  and  expenditure  levels is attributable in the first place  to 
the  absence  of  a  division of regions into urban  and  rural which has 
already been mentioned.  Agriculture,  as happens  in other,countries 
also,  is outstandingly the least well-paid occupation,  but it does 
not bulk large  enough in any United Kingdom  region either to pull 
the  average  down  very far arithmetically,  or to  depress  earnings 
in other industries very much  through market  forces.  Moreover, 
the  compactness  of  tbe  United Kingdom  and  the national  scope  of  much 
collective bargaining in its labour market tend to  standardise  wages 
in an  industry across  the different regions.  In general,  the 
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of  a  region's  earnings-level in comparison with  the national 
average.  The  part played by the high degree  of centralisation of 
public  finance  has  already been mentioned. 
In unemployment  levels  the  interregional differences are 
much  more  important;  indeed, it may  be  argued that  the  tendency to 
interregional standardisation of the price  of labour makes  deficiency 
of regional  demand  manifest itself in unemployment  rather than in low 
wages.  Between  the  two  world  wars,  when  unemployment  was  high 
nationally, it stood in the  most  depressed regions  at something like 
twice  the national  average.  A not dissimilar relationship  (with 
proportionate differences in unemployment  rates,  indeed,  rather 
greater)  has persisted in the period of  lower unemployment  since 
the  Second World  War  - rates of  about  ~  per cent in the  South East 
and  the  West  Midlands,  2  or 3  per cent  in the North,  3  or 4  per cent 
in Scotland  and  6  or 7  per cent in Northern Ireland are  typical of 
considerable periods before  ~966,  since  when  the  general rate has 
stood higher,  but  the relative  (though not  the  absolute) 
interregional differences have  been rather smaller.  In general, 
regional unemployment  rates vary inversely with growth-rates  of 
employment,  though with  some  anomalies;  Yorkshire  and Humberside, 
for instance,  has  generally  shown  slow  growth  and  low unemployment, 
and  the  South West  rapid  growth  and  a  rather higher unemployment 
rate. 
The  recorded rates of registered unemployment  do  not tell 
the  whole  story.  According to  Census  data,  there is a  body  of 
unregistered unemployed  so  distributed between  regions  as to raise 
considerably the  absolute,  but not  the relative,  interregional 
differences in the  incidence  of involuntary worklessness.  More 
important  quantitatively,  however,  is the  wide  interregional 
variation in participation rates  of women  in the  labour force  -
varying  from  under  30  to nearly 45  per cent.  To  a  large extent 
these variations are  explained by  the  localisation of traditionally 
female-employing  and  male-employing  occupations,  but  to  some  degree 
the  incidental effect of this localisation is to reduce  the 
participation rate in regions  of  low general  demand;  Wales,  the 
North  and  Scotland in particular.  It also  seems  to be  true  that high 
27 effective  demand  for labour,  as  in the  South East  and  the  West 
Midlands,  has  the effect  one  would  expect  in increasing the 
participation rate,  although the  trend over recent decades has 
generally been for that rate to  increase fastest where it initially 
stood lowest.  Diversification of  the  occupational  structure must  be 
responsible  for much  of this. 
The  question arises how  far the higher unemployment  in the 
north and  in parts of  the  west  of  the  United Kingdom  does,  in fact, 
as has been implied here,  stem from  shortage  of effective  demand  in 
those  regions,  and how  far it arises  from  greater imperfection of 
their labour markets.  It seems  that the  regions  where  the  rate  of· 
change  of  the industrial structure is greatest,  and  those  where 
population  and  industry are  most  widely dispersed,  have  some  tendency 
to higher levels of unemployment,  presumably  due  to  market 
imperfection.  Seasonal unemployment is also higher in some  places 
than others,  although the differences are  more  apparent at sub-
regional  than at regional level.  But  the  evidence  suggests  that 
considerably the  greater part of interregional differences in the 
unemployment  rate  are  to be  attributed to differences in the  level of 
effective  demand  rather than to differences in labour-market 
imperfection,  or in the  incidence  of inherent unemployability in the 
labour force. 
Some  reference has  already been made  to aspects  of the 
pattern of interregional migration.  The  largest population movements 
have been relatively  short-distance  ones  out  of  the  conurbations  and 
large cities, but  these  have  mostly intra-regional rather than 
interregional significance.  Interregionally,  the  net internal 
movements,  which consist of differences between gross  inward  and 
outward  movements  several times  as  large,  have  followed  a  fairly 
simple  pattern.  Every region has  gained  from  those  to the  north of 
it and  lost to those  to  tbe  south,  except for  large net movements 
from  the  South East  to  the  neighbouring regions,  East Anglia,  the 
East Midlands  and  the  South West.  The  last mentioned region is 
the  only  one  that has  tended  to  show  a  net gain from  every other one; 
Scotland is the  only  one  except  for Northern  I~eland tnat has  lost to 
every other.  The  effects of  these  internal movements  have  been 
reinforced in general by  the  fact that nearly every region of England 
28 and Wales  has  gained  from  overseas migration (with the South East 
and  the  West  Midlands  gaining most),while  Scotland has lost heavily. 
Taking  internal  and  overseas  movements  together,  Scotland in the 
1960s lost more  than 6  per thousand of her population a  year  (almost 
equal to her natural increase),  Northern Ireland lost more  than 
5  per thousand  (50  per cent of natural increase)·and the North  3 per 
thousand  (60 per cent  of natural increase).  The  South West  and 
East Anglia were  gaining  from  migration at about  the  same 
proportional rate at which Scotland  was  losing;  the South East  and 
the  West  Midlands  had become  slight net losers. 
In general,  gross interregional migration movements  (leaving 
overseas  movements  out  of account)  seem  to be  reasonably well 
'explained'  statistically by  the  sizes of existing populations in 
the  regions  of origin and destination,  the  existence or non-existence 
of proximity between  the~ and their unemployment  rates.  The  effect 
of  the  last mentioned variable is roughly that  for  every percentage 
point by which the  unemployment  in a  region rises above  the national 
average it may  expect  an  additional net loss annually of  something 
between  2  and  5  per thousand  of its male  population of working  age. 
The  relation of migration movements  to  average  income  levels in the 
regions is less close;  most  notably the  regions  with the  highest 
gains  from migration (the South West  and East Anglia)  are relatively 
low-income  regions.  The  earnings  of migrants in their regions  of 
origin and  destination do  nat  seem  to  be  representative of the 
general  levels in those  regions. 
The  distribution of industry in the  last two  or three 
decades  has  followed  trends very different  from  those  of the 
nineteenth century.  There  has been  a  ~rong tendency for industries 
to  grow faster or decline  more  slowly in tne  regions  where  they are 
less strongly represented - in other words,  diversification of 
regional industrial structure  and  dispersion of individual 
industries has  been the  tendency,  rather than  specialisation and 
localisation.  To  some  extent this simply  reflects the  relative 
decline  of industries that had previously become  highly localised, 
but that accounts  for  only part of the  trend;  regional policy,  too, 
may  account  for  some  of it.  In general it seems  likely,  however, 
that  the  tendency is mainly due  to  the  increasing extent  to  which 
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improvement  of transport  and  communications,  the  changing nature  of 
industry and  the  compact  geography  of  the  country.  The  tendency to 
cluster together in a  central situation has been  stronger recently in 
some  service activities than in manufacturing activity proper;  hence 
much  of the  continued  growth  of the  South East.  Latterly,  however, 
market  forces,  together with some  encouragement  from policy  and 
perhaps  from  faster transport  and better communications,  have 
produced  a  considerable dispersion of  office  work.  This has,  as yet, 
however,  mostly been confined to within 100  miles  of  London. 
Regional policy,  to  which  some  passing references have 
already been made,  is of long standing in the United Kingdom.  The 
first manifestation of it - rather different in form  from  later 
ones  - was  the  measure  introduced in 1928  to  assist movement  of 
labou~ from  areas  of heavy unemployment  to  job-opportunities 
elsewhere.  The  policy was  perhaps  inappropriate  to  a  period of high 
general unemployment  and  was  in any  case  unpopular in the  areas  from 
which labour  was  moved;  it was  abandoned  after a  decade.  Meanwhile, 
from  1934  other measures began to be  taken to  encourage  movement  of 
job-opportunities to  the  most  depressed areas,  and modest  though 
these  measures  were,  there  were  signs that  they were  producing  some 
results immediately before  the  Second  World  War. 
The  war itself largely suspended regional differences in 
prosperity by producing general full  employment,  moving activity 
towards peripheral areas  and  stimulating  some  of the  localised 
industries,  for example  shipbuilding,which had been in decline. 
However,  thinking about postwar policy proceeded  on  the  assumption 
that the  prewar problems  would return.  The  Barlow Report 
recommended  government  control  of  the  location of  new  industrial 
establishments,1  and  tbeWhite  Paper  on  employment  policy gave  some 
2  support  to  such mea3ures.  Subsequently,  the  Town  and  Country 
Planning Act  of 1947  gave  the Board  of Trade  power  to  control new 
industrial building through the  issue  of Industrial Development 
1  Royal  Commission  on  the Distribution of the  Industrial Population, 
Report,  Cmd  6153,  London,  HMSO,  1939. 
2  Cmd  6527  London,  HMSO,  1944. 
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the previous year,  gave  powers  for various  forms  of  assistance  -
grants,  loans,  renting of government  factories  - to  developments 
expected to  create  employment  in the  designated Development  Areas. 
With the  assistance  of  some  remaining  wartime  powers  and in 
the  presence  of postwar  shortages  of buildings  and  manpower,  regional 
policy made  a  powerful  impact  on  the distribution of industry in the 
first five  postwar years;  but thereafter,  with the  slackening of 
controls  and  shortages,  and in the  absence  of  the  expected early 
return of depression in the  old exporting industries,  its effect 
weakened.  The  recession  of  1958 marked  the  re-emergence  of he 
regional problem as  an  evident matter for concern and policy 
measures began to be  strengthened.  The  greatest  single  strengthenbg 
came  in 1963,  when  measures  were  introduced that amounted  to 
differential assistance  of  something  over  15 per cent  to  typical 
capital expenditure  on industrial establishments in the  assisted 
areas.  The  form  of  assistance  was  changed,  but its cost not greatly 
altered,  by  the  Act  of 1966,  which  also  redefined the Development 
Areas  as  large,  coherent entities containing collectively about  a 
fifth of the manufacturirgindustry of Great Britain.  (The 
government  of Northern Ireland applied parallel but  somewhat 
stronger incentives.)  In 1967,  there  was  added  the Regional 
Employment  Premium,  a  subsidy amounting initially to  about 7i per cat 
on manufacturing  wages  in the  Development  Areas.  Two  years later, 
following  the report of  the  Committee  on  Intermediate Areas,1  a  new 
class of  area was  introduced in which benefits were  available  on  a 
reduced  scale.  A class of Special Development Areas had  already 
been introduced in 1967,  mainly comprising districts in which 
coalmining  employment  was  declining especially fast,  to which certain 
additional assistance  was  given. 
In 1970,  the  form  of assistance  was  changed  and its amount 
greatly reduced.  The  emergence  of heavy  and  substantially localised 
unemployment  in the  following year,  however,  prompted  the 
introduction in 1972  of benefits not very different in scale  from 
those  of  the  late  1960s  - cash grants  towards  the  cost of plant and 
1  Department  of Economic  Affairs,  The  Intermediate Areas,  Cmnd  3998, 
London,  HMSO,  1969. 
31 machinery in the  Development  and Special Development Areas,  and  of 
buildings and works  in both these  and  tne Intermediate Areas.  On  a 
typical industrial project in the  Development  Areas  the  assistance 
might  amount  to  about  ~9 per cent  of the capital cost.  At  the  same 
time Intermediate Area  status was  extended  to  the  whole  of the 
North West  and Yorkshire  and  Humberside.  Subsequently,  in  ~974, the 
Regional  Employment  Premium,  previously condemned to expire  in the 
autumn  of that year,  was  reprieved,  but  although the  rate  of payment 
was  increased,  the  new  sums  were  a  smaller percentage  of  wages  than 
originally in  ~967. 
The  new  measures  of  ~972 include,  however,  besides these 
benefits,  which  are  automatic,  further provisions for selective 
assistance  to  employment-creating industry by various  forms  of grant 
and  loan,  normally  (together with the  automatic benefits)  not 
exceeding  some  45  per cent  of  the  total cost of the project for an 
enterprise in a  Development Area.  The  selective benefits were  made 
available  to  some  mobile  service  establishments  as well  as  to 
manufacturing industry;  later,  in  ~973, furtner benefits were 
announced to  subsidise  the movement  of key workers  who  go  to  assisted 
areas with  such mobile  service  establishments.  The  armoury  of 
inducements  to  industry to  move  into or expand in the  assisted 
areas is thus now  quite  a  formidable  one.  On  the  other hand,  it 
must be  noted that in recent years  the  stringency of control over 
industrial building by Industrial Development Certificates has been 
considerably relaxed,  most  notably by the raising of the  minimum 
siz·e  of development  for  which  a  certificate is required. 
In addition to the  financial  incentives  and  the  restrictions 
that have  been briefly described,  there  have been attempts at the 
promotion of development by the direct provision of facilities.  The 
building of government  factories  to  rent to industrialists in some 
degree  at concessionary terms  was  one  of tne  earliest and  has been 
one  of tne  continuing strands of regional policy - fairly modest  in 
scale, but broadly successful.  The  building of  new  towns, 
originally conceived as  a  means  of relieving pressure  of population 
in the  overcrowded conurbations,  developed,  especially in Scotland 
and  the  North  and later in central Lancashire,  into  an  attempt  to 
provide  'growth-points'  for the  economic  rejuvenation of the 
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the  removal  of industrial dereliction,  and  the  modificatbn of the 
pattern of road  development  in the  interests of  areas in need  of an 
economic  stimulus have  also played  some  part in general regional 
policy. 
Specific measures  of this kind can certainly be  effective 
in particular cases,  especially where  tne  whole  pattern of 
settlement in an  area needs  to be  changed  to make  it suitable for 
modern  industrial activities.  But  in a  closely settled industrial 
country with  a  very extensive  (even  tnough  often old)  urban 
infrastructure,  the problem of  renewing  growth is very different 
from tnat in,  for  instance,  a  country that is bringing large  rural 
populations  into non-agricultural work.  One  lesson of experience 
in the  United Kingdom  seemsm be  that rather strong incentives, 
perhaps  supplemented by prohibitions,  are  needed to direct 
development  into regions  that are  physically not badly equipped to 
support it, but would not attract it through the  working of market 
forces  alone.  Governmental  opinion  seems,  implicitly,  to  have  swung 
back to this view,  after an interval in which tne  desirability of 
operating mainly through the provision of infrastructure ardthe 
establishment  of  growth-points  was  favourably  considered. 
In view  of  the  determination witn wnich  some  kind  of 
regional policy has been pursued over a  long period, it is important 
to know,  if possible,  how  effective it has  been.  It is not,  of 
course,  practicable to  say with confidence  what  would have  happened 
in any period without  any  regional policy at all,  the more  so  since 
there  has been no  period for  a  long  time  in which  the  effects of 
regional policy can be  presumed  to  have  been negligible.  The  latest 
period of  strong policy,  since  ~972, has not yet lasted long  enough 
for its effect to be  assessed,  but  studies have  been made  of  the 
change  - assumed  to be  largely due  to policy - between the  ~950s, 
when  policy was  relatively weak,andthe  middle  and  late  ~960s,when it 
was  stronger.  In tnis_interval,  big changes  came  about both in the 
pattern of  'moves'  (including the  establishment of branches)  by 
manufacturing industry and in the  regional distribution of industrial 
building.  Changes  can also be  detected in the  regional distribution 
of  employment  growtn  when  that part of it attributable to differences 
33 in regional industrial structure is eliminated. 
The  upshot of such studies is that, between  the  two  decades 
in question,  growth of  employment  in the  assisted regions  was 
augmented by  some  30,000  or 40,000  a  year in manufacturing industry, 
which might  have  been expected to bring secondary increases in 
employment  growth ultimately building up  to  a  further 20,000  or 
30,000  a  year.  Bearing in mind  that regional policy was  by  no 
means  absent in the 1950s,it seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that the 
policy operated in the middle  and  late 1960s may  have  augmented 
employment  growth in tne  assisted areas,  in comparison with what 
would  have  happened  with no  policy at all, by  some  70,000  to 
100,000  a  year.  If tnis is accepted, it follows  tnat,  in the 
absence  of any  regional policy,  the  situation of those  regions would 
have  been very markedly worse  than it was.  It  see~s likely that 
the  excess  of their unemployment  rate  over that in the  rest of tne 
country mignt  nave  been  something like  twice  as  great as in fact 
it was  and  their net loss of population by emigration perhaps twice 
as great also.  In that case  Scotland,  in particular,  would  have 
suffered an absolute fall in population,  possibly of the  order of 
~ per cent  a  year.  This has happened in the past to no British 
region,  except briefly to Wales  in the years of interwar depression. 
It would  certainly have  imposed  a  major  strain on national unity. 
The  situation in North~Ireland, wnere  tne natural increase  of 
population has become  very rapid,  would  also  have  been even worse 
than it in fact became. 
Wnat  seems  to  emerge,  then,  from  a  consideration of the 
regional problems  of  tne  United Kingdom  is that tne  relative mildness 
of interregional differences  and migration flows  has  owed  mucn.  not 
only to  tue compensating effects of centralised public  finance  and 
the  compactness  of the  country,  but  also  to specifically regional 
policy  •  Without  tnat,  the  story  would have  been very different, 
politically as well  as  economically. 
34 Table 1.1.  Populations of the United Kingdom  and the United States 
compared,  1801-1971 
United Kingdom 
United States 
1801 
11.9 
5.5 
1851 
22.3 
24.1.. 
1901 
38.2 
77.6 
Millions 
1971 
55.5 
207.0 
Table 1.2.  The United Kingdom  pop~lation,  1901-2001 
Home 
Increase 
population  Absolute  Percentage 
(OOOs)  (OOOs)  (%) 
1901  38,237 J  3,845  10.1 
1911  42,082  }  1,945  4.6 
1921  44,0271  2,011  4.6 
1931 
~::~8  )  1941  4,187  9.1 
1951  so, 225 }  2,484  4.9 
1961  52,709  J  2,806  5.3 
1971  55,515}  1,748  3.1 
1981~  57,263  J  2,505  4.4 
199~  59,768}  2,632  4.4 
2001~  62,400 
SOURCE:  CSO,  Annual Abstract of Statistics,  1973. 
~  Projections. 
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Net 
immigration 
(OOOs) 
- 820 
- 919 
- 672 
+  435 
+  57 
- 428 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 Table 1.4.  Working  population and activity rates in the United Kingdom,  1901-71 
Population  Activity rates 
Males  and  females  Females 
Total  Working  All 
15+  15- 20- 25- 45-
65+  20- 25- 45-
ages  19  24  44  64  24  44  64 
(thousand:sl  (percentages) 
1901  38,237  18,280  47.8  a  a 
76.0  61. 1  55.5  34.1  56.7  27.2  21.1  n.a.- n.a~ 
1931  46,038  20,930  45.5  60.7  77.6  80.7  62.5  54.7  25.3  65.1  30.9  19.6 
1951  50,225  23,809  47.4  59.6  81.3  79.7  66.7  59.5  15.9  65.4  36.1  28.7 
1961  52,709  25,345  48.1  60.5  72.9  76.8  69.4  66.0  12.7  62.0  40.8  37.1 
1966  54,806  26,174  47.7  62.1  68.6  77.2  72.6  60.6  13.1  61.6  47.1  46.1 
1971  55,515  25,421  45.8  61.1  58.4  75.1  74.4  71.5  11.3  60.1  50.6  50.~ 
SOURCES:  Department of Employment,  British Labour Statistics:  historical 
abstract 1886-1968,  London,  HMSO,  1971;  Department of Employment Gazette, 
November  1973. 
~  Statistics not available because of uncertainty over  ages  at which  juveniles 
started work. 
Table 1.3.  The  age composition of the United Kingdom  population,  1911-2001 
Absolute size  Proportion of total 
Under  15  15-64  65+  Under  15  15-64  65+ 
(millions)  (percentages) 
1911  13.0  26.9  2.2  30.9  63.9  5.2 
1931  11.1  31.4  3.4  24.2  68.4  7.4 
1951  11.3  33.4  5.5  22.5  66.5  11.7 
1961  12.3  34.1  6.1  23.4  64.9  11.7 
1971  13.6  35.4  7.3  24.2  62.9  12.9 
1981~  12.9  36.2  8.2  22.5  63.2  14.3 
1991~  14.0  37.4  8.4  23.5  62.5  14.0 
2001~  14.6  39.7  8.1  23.5  63.6  12.9 
SOURCE:  CSO,  Annual Abstract of Statistics,  1973. 
a  P  •  t"  - roJec  J.ons. 
36 Table 1.5.  United Kingdom  GDP  by  industry 
Agriculture,  forestry and fishing 
Mining  and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
G2s,  electricity and water 
Transport 
Conununication 
Distributive trades 
Insurance,  banking  and  finance 
Ownership of dwellings 
Public administration and defence 
Public health and  education 
Other services 
TOTAL 
Residual error 
Adjustment for financial 
services 
GDP  at factor cost 
GDP  1973 
Value 
(£m) 
1,876 
868 
19,103 
4,429 
1,939 
3,837 
1,623 
6,122 
5,774 
3,668 
4,266 
3,726 
6,908 
64,139 
589 
2,552 
62,176 
Proportion 
of total 
(%) 
2.9 
1.4 
29.8 
6.9 
3.0 
6.0  } 
2.5 
9.5 
9.0 
5.7 
6.7 
5.8  } 
10.8 
100.0 
Annual  growth-
rates 
1952- 1963-
73  73 
(%) 
2.5 
- 1.9 
3.5 
2.9 
5.3 
2.7 
3.1 
4.8 
2.2 
- 0.1 
2.7 
2.9 
(%) 
2.7 
- 3.0 
3.6 
2.7 
5.1 
3.4 
2.6 
5.3 
2.4 
0.8 
2.6 
3.0 
SOURCE:  cso,  National  Income  and Expenditure,  HMSO,  London  (annual). 
37 Table 1.6.  United Kingdom  expenditure and output at 1970 market prices,  1952-73 
Contribution to final  demand 
Consumers'  expenditure 
Public authorities current 
expenditure 
Gross  domestic fixed 
capital formation 
Stockbuilding 
Exports of goods  and 
services 
Total final  expenditure 
Less  imports of goods  and 
services 
GDP  at market prices 
1952 
54.3 
21.0 
9.7 
0.2 
14.8 
100.0 
1962  1967 
(percentages) 
16.5 
13.3 
15.3 
100.0 
52.7 
16.0 
15.2 
0.6 
15.5 
100.0 
1972 
51.9 
14.8 
14.5 
- 0.1 
18.8 
100.0 
SOURCE:  cso,  National  Income  and Expenditure  (various issues) 
Table 1.7.  Rates  of  employment  growth by region,  1921-61 
North 
Yorks.& Humberside 
North West 
East Midlands 
West Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
~For the period 1926-61. 
Percentages 
38 
10.8 
7.9 
1.3 
26.5 
39.9 
20.4 
41.3 
29.3 
0.3 
1.0 
4.~ 
1973 
51.0 
14.4 
14.3 
1.0 
19.3 
100.0 
Value 
1973 
( f.m) 
35,759 
10,109 
10,004 
674 
13,508 
70,054 
13,922 
56,132 CHAPTER  2 
THE  MAIN  SECTORS 
~.  THE  INDUSTRIAL  SECTOR 
Industrial production 
Industrial production,  which  accounts for about 45  per cent of GDP, 
has been  growing at a  faster rate  than  GDP  since the Second World 
War.  In turn,  manufacturing production has been  growing faster than 
industrial production,  although the  major reason for this has been 
the  decline  of  the  mining  and  quarrying sector.  Indeed,  gas, 
electricity and water have been  among  the  major  growth industries, 
tripling in size between  ~951  and  ~973, whilst construction has been 
growing at about  the  same  rate as manufacturing industry as  a  whole 
(table 2.1). 
Within the manufacturing sector there have  been  two 
industries which have  suffered an absolute  decline  since  the  war. 
One  is shipbuilding and  marine  engineering,  which was  at a  peak in 
1956  but has  declined by  over  20  per cent  since  then,  although 
fluctuating  a  great deal  from year to year.  The  other is leather 
and  fur,  which is a  very  small  industry anyway.  The  associated 
clothing and  footwear,  and textile industries,  although not  suffering 
an  absolute  decline,  have  grown very slowly in the  postwar period 
and  have both shed  a  large number  of workers.  Other  slow-growing 
industries have been metal manufacture  and  other metal  goods.  It is 
these  industries - shipbuilding,  mining,  textiles,  clothing and 
metals- which were  the basis of Britain's early industrialisation; 
now  they are all of fading  importance. 
The  food,  drink and  tobacco  industry grew at 2.6 per cent 
per annum  from  195~-73, but with the  drink  and  tobacco  sector 
expanding much  faster than food.  Paper,  printing and  publishing 
grew at about  the  average  rate for manufactunng,  recording  a  3.~ 
per cent growth-rate between 1951  and 1973  - the  same  as bricks, 
pottery,  glass and  cement.  This latter industry has,  however,  seen 
an  accelerated rate of growth in the  1960s  - 4.4 per cent per  annum 
from  1963  to  1973.  The  same  pattern of faster growth in recent 
39 years is apparent  in timber  and furniture,  where  growth between 
1951  and  1973  has  averaged  3.7 per cent per annum,  but 4.4 per cent 
per annum  from  1963  to  1973.  The  other medium-growth  industry has 
been vehicles,  which  grew  at 3.3 per cent per annum  over  the  period 
1951-73,  but here  growth has been noticeably slower in later years 
- only 1.3 per cent per  annum  from  1963  to  1973.  However  this 
disguises  the  fact  that production of  motor vehicles has  remained 
fairly buoyant  (2.8 per cent per  annum  growth  from  1963  to  1973) , 
whilst the  other activities which  make  up  the  industry - aerospace 
and  other vehicles  (mainly railway  equipment)  - have  suffered  a 
decline,  having actually fallen at  an  average rate  of  1  per cent 
per annum  in the  ten years to  1973. 
The  engineering  and  allied industries have  experienced 
a  rapid growth in the  postwar period,  partly due  to  the  growing 
importance  of the  vehicles  sector.  Rising  incomes  have  meant  an 
extension of car ownership both at home  and  abroad,  and this has  led 
to  a  large  increase in the  demand  for  components  from  the  engineering 
sector.  But technical developments  have  meant  that  the  leading 
industry has been electrical engineering,  with  a  growth-rate  of 
almost 6  per cent per annum  over the  period 1951-73,  compared  to 
4  per cent per annum  for  engineering  as  a  whole.  The  development  of 
new  weapons  systems,  the  spread of new  domestic  appliances,  the 
electrification of  the  railways,  and  the  expansion of  the  Post 
Office's telecommunications  networks  have  meanta substantial  and 
continuing demand  for the  output  of the  electrical engineering 
industry and  in particular its electronics section.  Instrument 
engineering has been  growing nearly as fast,  but mechanical 
engineering,  ~hough still the  most  important of  the  three,  producing 
55  per cent of  engineering output,  has been  growing  slowly  (2.8 per 
cent per  annum  between 1951  and  1973). 
Technical developments  have  been  the  major  factor 
responsible  for chemicals  and allied industries being the  fastest 
growing  sector in manufacturing.  Plastics  and  similar materials 
have  replaced metals in many  uses  and  synthetic materials have 
replaced natural fibres in the  textile industry and  elsewhere;  new 
products have  been  introduced  and  other products modified using 
chemical-based compounds.  The  result has been that these industries 
40 have  grown  at over 6  per cent per annum  since  the  war  and  even 
faster in the  last ten years.  The  output  of coal  and  petroleum 
products has  also  grown  exceedingly fast  due  to  the  growing  demand 
for oil products in all walks  of life.  Of  course  the  substitution 
of new  chemical-based products  for  old has  meant  that metal 
manufacture,  leather and  fur,  cotton textiles and  similar industries 
have  suffered accordingly;  hence  their below-average  rates of  growt~ 
Metal manufacture  has  also  been hit by the  decline  of its 
traditional user industries,  such as  shipbuilding,  the railways, 
defence  and  heavy engineering generally. 
A further industry,  not  so  far mentioned,  is other 
manufacturing,  which has been  growing at  a  rate of just over  5  per 
cent per  annum.  This  above-average  growth can largely be  explained 
by increased  demand  for rubber  (for cars,  flooring,  etc.)  and for 
plastic products not elsewhere  specified,  which together account 
for most  of the  output  of the  sector.  The  sector also  includes 
toys  and  sports equipment,  and~se two,  at a  time  of rising incomes 
and  increasing leisure,  have both been growing extremely fast. 
The  figures  for capital expenditure  and  employment  (table 
2.2)  show  that,  whilst manufacturing output has been  growing at 
around  3  per cent per annum  in the last twenty years,  the  inputs of 
labour and capital have  grown at widely different rates.  The 
employment  figures for the period  ~948-7~  show  that the  number of 
workers in manufacturing has risen by only 0.6 per cent per annum  on 
average.  This is in sharp contrast to the  growth in  capital, 
which  over  the period  ~948-68 has been at a  rate  of  about  3i per 
cent per annum.  This  increase  in capital has  meant  that labour has 
become  more  productive  in most  sectors.  Within manufacturing, 
however,  there  have  still been large differences in the  growth of 
employment  and capital in different sectors. 
The  largest increase  in capital since  the  war has  in fact 
been in the  fastest  growing  sector,  namely  the  chemical  industry. 
There  the  growth in capital has been  at  a  cumulative rate  of  5.7 per 
cent per  annum  (~948-68),whilst output has  grown by 6.2 per cent per 
annum  (~95~-73) over  a  nearly comparable period.  This  contrasts 
with the rate  of growth in employment  of  ~.0 per cent per  annum 
41 (~948-7~), which itself is an  above-average  rate  of  growth.  In 
recent years  fixed capital expenditure  in the  chemical  industry has 
been larger than in the  whole  of the  engineering  and  shipbuilding 
industries,  whose  output is three  times  that of the  chemical 
industry.  This partly reflects the  technical complexities of many 
modern  chemical processes,  but is also  one  of  the  reasons  why  the 
industry has  expanded  so  fast. 
In bricks,  pottery,  glass  and  cement  there  has  also been 
heavy investment  and capital has  grown  by over 5 per cent  annually 
with employment  hardly increasing at all.  Much  of this investment 
has been in the  glass industry,  where  the  float glass process has 
been  a  major  innovation. 
There  has,  perhaps  surprisingly  considering its 
relatively low growth-rate,  been substantial capital expenditure in 
the  food,  drink  and  tobacco  industry,  where  capital has  grownannually 
by 4.7 per cent between  ~948 and  ~968,  and  employment by  ~.2 perrent. 
The  development  of  new  products,  the  growth of the  frozen  food 
market  and  of  packeted convenience  foods,  and the  rapid growth  of 
the drink and  tobacco  sector have  been responsible  for this heavy 
investment. 
The  only manufacturing industries where  there has  been  a 
decline  in employment  since  the  war  are  textiles,  leather and 
clothing where  the  work-force  has  fallen by  some  500,000  - some  30 
per cent.  These  industries have  been subject to  a  fall in capital 
as well,  with textiles being  the  worst hit of the  three  and clothing 
remaining  the  most buoyant.  In  two  other industries - metal 
manufacture  and  timber  and  furniture  - there has been  a  static work-
force,  but in both investment has been  substantial.  The  fastest 
increases in employment  have  come  in food,  drink  and  tobacco,  paper, 
printing and publishing,  and  other manufacturing  where  the  work-force 
has been rising by  ~.2 per cent,  ~.4 per cent  and  ~-7 per cent a year 
respectively  (~948-7~), at  a  time  when  the  total working population 
has risen hardly at all. 
So  far as  actual numbers  employed  are  concerned,  the 
engineering industries still dominate  manufacturing  employment,  with 
42 2~ million workers  (~97~)  out  of a  total of nearly 9 million in 
manufacturing  as  a  whole.  There  are  also  840,000  in the vehicles 
sector and  ~,200,000 in metals  and  other metal  goods.  Despite  the 
declining work-force,  textiles and clothing are  still very  labour-
intensive  and  together employ  some  ~~ million workers.  The  ~ther 
large  employing  sectors  are  food,  drink  and  tobacco  with 893,000 
workers  and paper,  printing and publishing,  where  there  are  640,000 
workers.  Outside manufacturing,  there  are  nearly  ~~ million 
working in the  construction sector,  although the  work-force  has been 
growing  only very slowly,  and  there  are  still over 400,000 in the 
mining  and  quarrying sector despite its rapid decline.  The 
redeployment  of miners  has been  a  problem,  because  as recently as 
~959 there  were  over  800,000  in the  mining  and  quarrying sector, 
but ironically in the last few  yaars  the  problem in the  coalmines 
has been  the  failure  to  retain labour rather than redundancy. 
There has been  a  relative decline  in the  importance  of 
industrial employment  in the  total (see  chapter  2  ),  while 
experience  has varied considerably between different regions 
(see  chapter 1  ). 
Concentration 
This  section gives  a  brief review of the  recent  trends in industrial 
concentration,  both in the  aggregate  and in the  individual markets, 
together with  a  short  survey of government  policy towards  monopoly 
and restrictive practices.  Most  studies of concentration have been 
concerned  with possible  monopoly  power  in the  hands  of private 
companies;  consequently the  nationalised enterprises,  including 
public utilities, coalmining  and,  since  ~968,  the iron and  steel 
industry,  have  been  excluded.~ 
~  In  ~968 employment in the  iron and  steel industry accounted for 
roughly 4  per cent  of  the  total in manufacturing industry. 
43 The  changes  in aggregate concentration,  that is in the 
manufacturing  and distribution sector as  a  whole,  enable us  to  gauge 
the  changing importance  of  the  largest privately owned  enterprises in 
the  economy.Two  estimates  suggest that in the first half of this 
century the  level of  aggregate  concentration increased moderately, 
and  in fact  probably fell during the  decade  spanning the  Second World 
War.  Measuring the relative dispersion of publicly quoted 
companies  in manufacturing,  mining  and  distribution,  Hart  and Prais 
found_a  significant increase between  ~896 and  ~939,~ but by  ~950 
relative dispersion was  little different  from that at the  turn of the 
century.  Similarly,  in a  study of the  100  largest firms  in 
manufacturing industry,  Prais has  estimated that their share  in the 
total net  output  of the  sector rose  from  ~5 per cent in  ~909 to  only 
22 per cent in  ~935.
2  By  ~949 the  share had fallen slightly to  2~ 
per cent.  It is possible that wartime  planning controls ensured  a 
larger share  of output for smaller firms  than would  otherwise  have 
occurred  and  that this helped to interrupt,  in the period  ~939-50, 
the  long-term moderate  rise in concentration. 
Since  ~950 the  upward  trend has not  only been resumed but 
has  shifted very markedly.  According to Prais,  by  ~970 the  100 
largest enterprises accounted for 46  per cent  of the net  output of 
the manufacturing  sector.3  As  a  group  they have  therefore more  than 
doubled their share  in a  little over twenty years.  There  is no 
simple  explanation of why  the  rate  of  aggregate  concentration  should 
have  accelerated  so  sharply,  but  a  number  of statistical analyses 
have  established that,  compared with the  remarkable  rise in the  share 
of the  ~00 largest enterprises in manufacturing net  output,  the  share 
of  the  ~00  largest plants (or establishments)  has  remained more  or 
less unchanged  at between  ~0-~2 per cent for  the last 40  years  (the 
4  longest period for which  estimates  can be  made).  The  demands  of 
~  P.E.  Hart  and S.J.  Prais,  'The  analysis  of business  concentration: 
a  statistical approach',  Journal  of  -~he  Royal Statistical Society 
(series A),  vol.  ~~9, part  2,  ~956. 
2  S.J. Prais,  'A  new  look  at the  growth  of industrial concentration', 
Oxford  Economic  Papers,  vol.  26  (new  series),  July  ~974. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
44 technology forcing firms  to build mammoth  plants in order to take 
advantage  of production  economies  of scale cannot,  therefore,  be 
held solely responsible  for the  increase  in the  concentration of 
enterprises.1  On  the  other hand,  since  the  late 1950s  and  early 
1960s,  several studies have  indicated that larger firms  have  been 
growing  on  average proportionately faster than smaller firms. 2  In 
the first half of  the  century there  was  no  such systematic  tendency. 
An  important  factor that probably helps to  explain this faster 
proportionate  growth  and  hence  the  concentration increase is merger 
activity among  large  firms.  Since  the  early 1960s mergers have 
increased substantially in volume  and importance,  reaching  a  peak in 
1968  (when  the value  of acquisitions more  than doubled  from  the 
previous year)  and  again in 1972.3  A detailed study of  the  effect 
of mergers  on  the  inequality in size between manufacturing  firms 
suggested that they probably accounted for about  one  half of  the 
observed  change  in the period 1954-65.4  In view of the  considerable 
merger activity after 1965,  subsequent  analysis is likely to  show it 
with  an  even  more  important  role. 
1  This is not  to  say,  of  course,  that  the  absolute  size  of the 
largest plants has not  increased. 
2  J.M.  Samuels,  'Size  and  growth of firms',  Review  of Economic  Studills, 
vol.  32,  1965;  A.  Singh,  G.  Whittington  and H.T.  Burley,  Growth, 
Profitability and  Valuation,  Cambridge  University Press,  1967; 
M.A.  Utton,  'The  effect of merge.rs  on  concentration:  UK 
manufacturing industry,  1954-65',  Journal  of Industrial Economics, 
vol.  20,  1971.  Larger firms  are  those  above  average  size  at  an 
opening date  and  smaller firms  are  those  below  average  size. 
3  After 1969  the basis of  the statistical series changed  making 
comparisons  with earlier figures difficult.  For details see 
Department  of  Trade  and  Industry,  Business Monitor:  acquisitions and 
mergers  of  companies  (M7),  London,  HMSO  (quarterly). 
4  Utton,  'The  effect of mergers  on concentration'. 
45 Taken  together these points  suggest that  the 
accelerating increase in concentration in manufacturing has been 
caused by  the  larger firms  maintaining a  faster proportionate  growth 
than smaller firms,  a  process assisted by widespread acquisition and 
resulting in a  substantial rise in the  number  of plants operated by 
the  largest firms. 
Market  concentration does  not  have  to rise  simply because 
aggregate  concentration has  increased.  For example,  the  largest 
firms  in manufacturing could increase  their share  of  the  sector's 
output  as  a  whole  by diversifying their activities across  a  wide 
range  of markets without  causing significant individual increases. 
In view,  however,  of the  extent  of  the  recent increase in aggregate 
concentration,  such  a  result  would  be  surprising,  especially as it 
is known  that the  largest firms  in absolute  size  are  frequently 
amongst  the  leaders in individual  markets.~  The  measurement  of 
market  concentration can be  an  important first step in assessing the 
extent  of monopoly power  in individual industries, but  two 
preliminary points  should be  noted.  First,  the  level of seller 
concentration in a  market is only  one  of several important 
characteristics of market  structure which have  a  bearing  on  monopoly 
power.  Of  equal  importance  are,  for example,  the  conditions  of 
entry,  the  extent of product differentiation and  the  level of buyer 
concentration.  Secondly,  data  from  the  Census  of Production,  which 
are  frequently used  to measure  market  concentration,  suffer from  a 
number  of well-documented  shortcomings  for the  purpose  in hand  and 
these  should be  borne  in mind  when  considering the  results discussed 
below.2 
1  M.A.  Utton,  'Aggregate  versus market  concentration:  a  note', 
Economic  Journal,  vol.  84,  March 1974. 
2  For  a  discussion of the  shortcomings  see  P.E.  Hart,  M.A.  Utton  and 
G.  Walshe,  Mergers  and Concentration in British Industry, 
Cambridge  University Press,  1973,  chap.  2. 
46 Detailed studies of market  concentration using  the material 
from  the  Census  of Production have  been made  for 1935,  1951,  1958 
and  1963.1  Data for 1968 have  only recently become  available  and 
have  not yet been fully analysed;  references below  to these  data 
should,  therefore,  be  treated as preliminary.  Comparisons  over 
time  of concentration levels for individual products or product 
groups  (which  we  refer to  as  'market concentration')  meet  a 
formidable  number  of problems,  but  the  result is fairly firmly 
established that,  on  average,  market  concentration rose  moderately 
over the period 1935-63.  Thus  the  average  concentration ratio for 
comparable  sets of products or product  groups  increased between 1935 
and  1951, between 1951  and  1958  (for a  different set of products)  and 
again between  1958  and  1963  for  a  sample  of  215  products.  By  1963 
the  five-firm average  concentration ratio had  reached  just over  59 
per cent.  Preliminary analysis  for 1968  suggests that  average 
market  concentratbn had  then risen further to  about  65 per cent. 
These  figures  refer to  the  average  change  throughout 
product  groups  in manufacturing industry.  But  perhaps  of more 
significance  for the problem of monopoly power is the  growing 
importance  of very highly concentrated products - those  where  the 
five  largest firms  account  for  80  per cent  or more  of total United 
Kingdom  output.  In 1958,  in a  sample  of  214  product  groups in 
manufacturing,  about  18 per cent  of  sales were  accounted for by 
groups  where  the  five-firm concentration ratio was  80  per cent or 
more;  the  comparable  figure  for 1963  was  24  per cent of  sales. 
1  H.  Leak  and  A.  Maizels,  'The  structure  of British industry', 
Journal  of the  Royal Statistical Society (series A),  vol.  108,  1945; 
R.  Evely  and  I.M.D.  Little, Concentration in British Industry, 
Cambridge  University Press,  1960;  A.  Armstrong  and  A.  Silberston, 
'Size  of plant,  size  of enterprise  and  concentration in British 
manufacturing  industry 1938-58',  Journal  of the  Royal Statistical 
Society (series A),  vol.  128,  1965;  Hart,  Utton  and  Walshe,  Mergers 
and  Concentration in British Industry. 
47 An  important  increase  also  appears  to have  taken place between 1963 
and  1968.  In a  comparable  sample  of  288  product  groups,  those 
heavily concentrated accounted for  just over  34  per cent of total 
sales in 1963,  but for  39  per cent by 1968.  By  that year product 
groups  accounting for nearly three  quarters  of  the  sample  sales had 
five-firm concentration ratios of  50  per cent or more,  and  those 
accounting for half of the  sales had  ratios of at least 70  per cent. 
On  the  face  of it these  figures hint at  a  widespread 
potential for the  exercise  of monopoly power,  either through the 
market  share  of a  single  dominant  seller or through tacit 
oligopolistic price co-ordination.  While  the  concentration figures 
alone  are  sufficient to raise important policy questions,  it must be 
stressed that they provide  only  a  first step in the  full analysis 
of market  structure which ideally requires  a  detailed case-study 
approach.1  This approach was  used  in a  study which  attempted  to 
measure  the  effect of mergers  on market  concentration.2  Analysis 
has  also  shown  that for manufacturing industry as  a  whole,  and  indeed 
for broad industrial groups  within manufacturing,  mergers  played an 
important part in the  increase  in concentration observed  over the 
period 1954-65,3 but the  level of industry aggregation in that study 
was  too  wide  to  assess the  effect of mergers  on  market concentration. 
Clearly, if a  large number  of mergers  were  'conglomerate',  as  many 
are  in the United States,  their effect on market  concentration would 
have  been neutral. 
To  overcome  this difficulty,  an  intensive  study of  a  random 
sample  of  30  product  groups  was  made  for  the period 1958-63.  The 
1  Apart  from  the  qualifications already made  above,  it is also 
important to note  that Census  of Production data refer only  to 
United Kingdom  output  and hence,  in many  cases,  ignore  an  important 
source  of competition,  namely  from  imports. 
2  Hart,  Utton  and  Walshe,  Mergers  and Concentration in British 
Industry. 
3  Utton,  'The  effect of mergers  on  concentration'. 
48 results  suggested that  out  of the  2~  groups  where  concentration 
increased,  in ten cases it could be  attributed mainly to  the 
influence  of mergers,  while  in eleven it was  due  essentially to the 
internal growth  of the  leading  firms.~  Again it. should be  noted 
that this inquiry stopped before  the  peak of merger activity in the 
latter part of  the  ~960s,  and  there  are  some  indications that a 
follow-up  study for later years would  show  a  more  significant role 
for mergers  even at this level of  industry aggregation.  The 
statistics thus  suggest that market  concentration has been increasing 
persistently in recent years,  and  that  a  large number  of individual 
product  groups  are  now  very heavily concentrated. 
British policy towards  competition and monopoly entered a 
new  phase  in  ~973 with the  passing of the Fair Trading Act,  which 
created the position of Director General  of Fair Trading with overall 
responsibility for co-ordinating policy on  competition  and  consumer 
affairs through the  new  Office  of Fair Trading.  To  appreciate  more 
fully the  scope  of that office  we  sketch below the  main  elements of 
British policy since  ~948. 
Until the creation of  the  Monopolies  Commission in  ~948,
2 
there  was  no  modern  law  which sought  to regulate or control possible 
abuses  of market  power.  Under  the  Act,  the Monopolies  Commission 
was  empowered,  at the  direction of  the  Board  of Trade,  to investigate 
how  'the public interest'  was  affected in industries where  one  firm 
or  a  group  of  firms  acting together controlled one  third or more  of 
the  United Kingdom  market.  There  was  (and still is)  no  presumption 
in its inquiries against  large market  shares or in favour  of 
competition  and  the definition of  what  constituted  'the public 
interest'  was  left deliberately vague  and  largely up  to  the 
Commission  to  decide.  Its reports presented  a  detailed historical 
and  contemporary analysis of the  industries investigated,  with,  if 
~Hart, Utton  and Walshe,  Mergers  and Concentration in British 
Industry,  p.  34. 
2over  the years  the title of  the Commission has  changed.  Originally 
it was  the  Monopolies  and Restrictive Practices Commission.  In  ~969 
it became  tne Monopolies  Commission  and  in  ~973 the Monopolies  and 
Mergers  Commission.  For convenience  we  refer to it throughout  as 
the Monopolies  Commission. 
49 necessary,  recommendations  to  parliament  as  to  how  the  public 
interest could be better served in the  future.  Several of its 
earlier reports were  concerned with cartels rather than individual 
positions  of  dominance.  It was  the  knowledge  gained in these 
inquiries of  the  particularly damaging effects on  actual  or potential 
competition that could  follow the  close  regulation by restrictive 
agreements  among  producers  of prices,  outputs,  discounts,  authorised 
dealers  and other matters  that  led to  the  next  stage  of British 
policy.  The  Monopolies  Commission had  performed  the  valuable  service 
of making public  the  extent  and probable effects of  a  wide  range  of 
restrictive practices;  the  subsequent  task  was  to  ensure  than  any 
abuses  were  corrected.  The  1956  Restrictive Practices Act  provided 
for  the  registration of all restrictive  agreements  and  their scrutiny 
by the  specially constituted Restrictive Practices Court.  The 
Register,  which is open  to  public  inspection,  was  maintained by the 
new  Registrar of Restrictive Agreements.  In  two  important  aspects 
this section of the  1956  Act  marked  a  new  departure:  first,the  fact 
that  a  Court  could hear cases  of this kind  was  a  'revolutionary step 
in British constitutional  law and procedure' ;1  secondly,  the 
restrictive  agreements  were  deemed  to be  against the  public  interest 
unless the  defendants  convinced the  Court  otherwise  on  one  or more 
of  a  number  of  grounds  laid down  in the Act.2  Thus,  there  was  a 
general presumption in favour  of competition except  where  this was 
rebutted.  In 1964  the  practice  of  resale price maintenance  was 
brought within  a  similar procedure  under  the  Resa~Prices Act. 
1  P.  Sargent Florence,  'Concentration policy in the  United Kingdom' 
H.  Arndt  (ed),  Die  Konzentration in der Wirtschaft,  vol.  2,  Berlin, 
Duncker  and  Humblot,  1971,  p.233. 
2 It can be  argued that  an  agreement is necessary because:  (a)  the 
public derives  a  benefit  from it;  (b)  it protects the public  from 
injury;  (c) it offsets  the  restrictive practice  of another trade 
association;  (d)  it enables  producers  to  deal  with  a  monopoly buyer; 
(e)  exports £E  (f)  employment  would  suffer if it were  abandoned; 
(g)  it maintains  another restriction upheld by the  Court. 
so On  the  face  of it the  success  of  the  1956  Act  appears  to 
have  been remarkable.  By  the  middle  of 1972,  for example,  a  total 
of  2620  registrable  agreements  had been ended,  or modified  so  as not 
to  infringe  the Act.1  Similarly resale price maintenance  had been 
almost universally  abandoned  •  But,  as  overt  (and registrable) 
agreements  were  ended,  there  was  growing  concern about  the use  of 
'information'  agreements,  which did not formally  come  within the 
machinery of the  1956 Act,  but which might  enable  firms  to  achieve 
the  same  degree  of collusion.  Consequently  an  attempt  was  made  in 
1968,in a  further Restrictive Practices Act,  to bring such  agreements 
within  the  scope  of the  Court by providing  for the  registration and 
possible  scrutiny of certain classes  of  such  agreements.  It is too 
early yet to  assess the  impact  of  the  later Act,  but, by their very 
nature,  information  agreements  are  likely to prove  more  intractable 
than their overt  forerunners. 
For  a  period in the  late 1950s  and  early 1960s  the  control 
of restrictive practices rather overshadowed  the  residual tasks  of 
the  Monopolies  Commission  in examining positions  of market  dominance. 
However  the  increase in merger activity in the 1960s,  noted  above, 
rapidly produced  a  major policy response.  In 1965,  the Monopolies 
and !1ergers Act  empowered  the  Board  of Trade  to refer certain types 
of merger to  the Monopolies  Commission  for investigation.2  At  the 
end  of its inquiries  (which normally can last up  to  six months)  the 
Commission  has  to  recommend  whether  or not  the merger is likely to 
operate  against  the  public  interest.  If the  conclusion is that the 
merger is likely so  to  operate,  the  Board  of  Trade3 has  the  power  to 
prevent  the  merger,  to unscramble  it if it has  already  taken place, 
or to  allow it to  proceed  subject  to  conditions. 
1  Department  of Trade  and  Industry,  Report  of  the  Registrar of 
Restrictive  Trading Agreements  for  the period July 1, 1969- June  30, 
1972,  Cmnd  5195,  London,  HMSO,  1973. 
2  Where  the  mergers  involved the  creation or increase  ofa market  share 
in the  United Kingdom  of at  least  a  third,  or where  assets  acquired 
were  valued at £5 million or more  a  reference could be  made  to  the 
Commission.  There  are  special provisions for mergers  involving 
newspapers. 
3  Now  the  Department  of Prices  and  Consumer Protection. 
51 Just as  the  major  emphasis  of British policy was  at  one 
time  on  the  control of restrictive practices, it is probably~  to 
say that now  the  major  concern is with  the  behaviour and  performance 
of dominant  firms  and  the  emergence  or strengthening  of  posit~onsof 
dominance  by merger. 
The  whole basis of British policy has been placed  on  a 
firmer foundation by the  1973  Fair Trading Act,  which  supersedes  the 
previous legislation in this field  and  brings the  several  strands of 
policy together under the  authority of the  Director General  of Fair 
Trading.  His  department  has become  the  focal point  for the 
collection of information  and  the  initiation of action.  Thus  he  now 
has power  to  make  references  on monopolies  to  the Monopolies 
Commission,1  he  is chairman of the  committee  that decides  which 
mergers  to  recommend  for  reference  to  the Monopolies  Commission  and 
he  assumes  full responsibility for proceedings  under  the Restrictive 
Practices Acts.  Thus,  'for the  first time,  the  implementation  of 
the  monopolies  and  restrictive practices legislation will be brought 
together,  so  that the Director General  should be  able  to take  a  more 
comprehensive  view of the  working of competition in the  economy  than 
either the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry or the Registrar have 
been  able  to  do  in the past•.2 
2.  THE  SERVICES  SECTOR 
Britain,  like the United States before it and  others besides,  is 
nowadays  becoming  a  service  economy.  The  distinction between  'goods' 
and  'services'  is not  sharply defined.  Should  transportation be 
regarded  as  an integral part of goods  production or  as  a  service?  The 
repair of a  pair of  shoes undertaken  on  the  premises  of  a  retail 
establishment  would  count  as  a  service, but if the  shooowere  sent 
1  The  scope  for inquiry by the Monopolies  Commission  has been  widened 
in several  ways  under the  1973  Act.  Firms  having  25  per cent  of the 
United Kingdom  (or local)  market  can now  be  referred,  also 
nationalised enterprises. 
2  E.L.  Smith,  'The Fair Trading Act',  Trade  and  Industry,  9 August, 
1973,  p.  304. 
52 back to  the manufacturer the  repair would probably count  as  goods. 
Neve~less, a  rough division of industries is illuminating.  Leaving 
aside  agriculture,  which  in Britain is in any  case  small,  we  classify 
as  'goods industries'  mining manufacturing  and construction,and 
then treat all the  rest  as  services.  On  this basis  ~2.7 million 
people  were  employed in services  and 9.6 million in goods  in the 
United Kingdom  in  ~973.  If we  were  to transfer transport  and 
communications  to  the  goods  side,  however,  the  service  sector would 
be  only slightly larger than the  goods  sector.  Moreover,  the 
figures here  refer to  employees  in paid  employment  and  exclude  self-
employed persons.  The  use  of Census  of Population data  would  raise 
a  little  the  share  of services in total manpower,  but a  slightly 
different picture  again would be  given if  outp~t were  used rather 
than employment  or manpower  as  the measure. 
As  a  rule  there  is wider fluctuation in goods  employment 
than in services,  a  difference especially marked in the  interwar 
period.  This fact,  combined  with the  shadowy nature  of the  line 
separating goods  from  s~rvices,~ makes it difficult to discern trends, 
but it appears  that in the United Kingdom  there  was  a  tendency for 
service  employment  to  grow faster than goods  employment  in the 
interwar years,  a  tendency reversed by the  war  when  the  distributive 
trades  especially  lost  a  substantial part  of their manpower  to  the 
armed  Forces  and  war production.  Since  the  war,  and especially 
since  the  ~950s,  the  comparatively faster growth of service 
employment  has been  renewed.  In the  most  recent period in fact 
service  employment  has  continued to  rise while  goods  employment  has 
actually been  falling.  In table  2.3  we  show  the  industries here 
classed as  qervices,  with the  employment  in them  for  two  recent  year~ 
~969 and  ~973,  and  the  change  between those  years.  At  the  foot  of 
the  table  we  give  the  total of  gooffiemployment,  that is in mining, 
manufacturing  and  construction,  in the  same  two  years. 
~  In the  reclassification of manpower  which took place  in  ~959, 
700,000  men  who  were  list~d under manufacturing under the  old 
Standard Industrial Classification of  ~948 were  transferred to 
distribution. 
53 The  recent rise in employment  in insurance  and banking 
and  in catering and hotels  draws  attention to  another way  of looking 
at  the  importance  of services in the  economy.  In 1973  visible 
exports  were  valued  ab  £11.5 billion:  in the  same  year credits 
for  sea  and air transport,  travel  and  other services  were  £5  billio~ 
that is Britain earned  abroad almost half as  much by selling 
services as by selling goods.  On  the  other hand,  the  expenditure 
on  services of £4 billion was  rather less than  a  third of the  outlay 
on visible  imports  of  over £13  billion.  There  is in fact normally 
a  substantial  surplus  on invisible  account  (which  includes  other 
items  as  well  as  services)  to  offset the deficit  on  visible  account. 
Of  the total earnings  from  services of  just short  of £1  billion in 
1973  about  a  third was  contributed by insurance,  banking,  merchant 
banking  and brokerage,  the  main activities of  the  City of London. 
The  reasons for the  comparative  growth  of  service 
employment  in advanced  countries  are  well known.  As  a  rule,  rising 
real income  leads  to  a  disproportionate rise in the  demand  for 
services.  Moreover,  over long periods  the  manpower  requirements  for 
given outputs  tend to fall more  slowly  in services than in 
manufacturing.  There  are plenty of  exceptions to this,  and  there is 
also  a  tendency for services previously marketed  to be  replaced by 
self-service,  as  a  result  of  which  part of  service  output may  be 
taken out  of  the National Accounts.  On  balance  service  employment  is 
likely to  rise in relation to  goods  employment  even faster than the 
relative rise in output.  Income  elasticities are  obviously  a  strong 
factor in explaining the  growth  of  service  employment,  but there  have 
been complementary explanations,  for  example,  that  the  structure  of 
markets is more  conducive  to restrictive practices in service  trades, 
which  are  thus less competitive  and  less prone  to  introduce  labour 
saving  advances,  although,  of course, it is not  easy to  see  how  the 
labour  'productivity'  of  such  services  as hairdressing or 
gravedigging can easily be  improved. 
The  measurement  of  output  and  productivity in service 
industries is notoriously difficult.  John  Gorman  has  shown,  for 
instance,  that if the business of banks  is regarded  as  the 
production of money  for people  to  hold,  then,  in the  United States 
over the  period 1948  to  1966,  measured productivity was  declining at 
54 annual  average  rate of1.5per cent;  whereas if one  takes  the  view 
that the banks'  primary business is the  facilitation of  spending, 
then measured productivity has been increasing at  an  annual  average 
rate  of  2.75 per cent.1 
Different methods  of calculating productivity change yield 
varying results, but they all tend to  show  a  slower trend in the 
increase  of  labour productivity in most  service trades than in goods. 
A similar difference has  been  noted in the United States,  Canada  and 
elsewhere. 
A.D.  Smith gives  estimates of annual  average  changes  in 
labour productivity over  the period 1951-66  (table  2.4).  British 
indirect taxation has traditionally fallen on  commodities,  especially 
because  purchase  tax,  introduced during  the  Second  World  War  and 
continued since,  fell mainly upon manufactured  goods.  Until  1966 
very little indirect taxation fell upon  services.  This bias  against 
manufactures  was  partially redressed by the  introduction in 1966  of 
the  selective  employment  tax,  a  tax  on  employment  in certain service 
trades.  This  imposed  on  employers  in certain industries atax of  a 
certain amount  per week  for each person they employed,  varying 
according to  whether  the  worker was  adult  or juvenile,  male  or  femal~ 
The  administration was  somewhat  complicated  inasmuch  as  the  amount  of 
the  tax  was  added to  the  weekly National  In~ance Contribution paid 
by all employers  for all employees  irrespective  of their trade, but 
then  employers  in defined industries were  allowed  a  refund (initially 
with  a  premium  in the  case  of manufacturing).  The  initial tax was 
fairly  low  and  as  a  proportion of costs could not be  said to redress 
fully the bias against manufactures in the  system of  indirect 
taxation.  The  rate  was  raised  subsequently, before  the  whole  tax 
was  abolished  and  replaced in 1973  with value-added tax,  which  also 
replaced purchase  tax on  goods. 
Besides  securing a  broader base  for indirect taxation other 
merits  were  claimed for selective  employment  tax.  In particular it 
1  Victor R  Fuchs  (ed.)  Production  and Productivity in the Service 
Industries,  New  York,  Columbia University Press,  1969. 
55 was  suggested that  it would  offset alleged tendencies  to  waste  labour 
in  some  service industries.  This  question,  among  others,  was 
exhaustively analysed in two  extensive researmreports undertaken  on 
behalf of  the  government by Professor W.B.  Reddaway  and associates 
at the  Department  of Applied  Economics  in Cambridge.  The  first 
report  on  the  distributive trades  was  published in 1970  and  concluded 
that productivity in the distributive  trades after 1966  had risen 
significantly more  than could have  been  expected  on  the basis of 
earlier relationships between  employment  and  the  volume  of sales in 
retailing and  the  pressure  of demand  for  labour.  It could not be 
concluded that the  whole  of this exceptional rise in productivity 
was  the result of selective  employment  tax,  since  at  about  the  same 
time  the  abolition of resale price maintenance  had  come  into  force 
and  economic  reasoning would  lead  one  to  expect  such  a  measure  to 
increase  the  productivity of labour  in industries affected.  In 
the final  report,  Professor Reddaway  maintained that the  evidence  was 
statistically very weak  in industries other than distribution,  but he 
personally found  'the  evidence  for  a  modest productivity gain 
moderately persuasive'.  These  conclusions  command  fairly general 
acceptance,  though  some  question has been raised concerning the  scale 
of the productivity improvement  in distribution which could be 
attributed to  selective  employment  tax and  the  abolition of resale 
price maintenance,  it being  suggested that certain other factors 
common  to  all industries,  including manufacturing,  might  also have 
played  a  role. 
An  incidental  conclusion of  the  study as it referred to 
the distributive trades  was  that the  imposition of this particular 
kind of indirect tax had  rather a  small effect on  gross retail 
margins  (inclusive  of tax),  thus making  selective  employment  tax an 
exception to  the  fairly general rule  that  a  substantial part of 
indirect taxes is passed  on  to  the  final  cons·umer. 
3.  THE  AGRICULTURAL  SECTOR 
Proportionamlyfewer people  are  engaged in agriculture in Britain than 
in any  other country of  any  size  - 2.8 per cent of  the  total in civil 
employment  in 1972  - but virtually all suitable  land not built upon 
by  towns  and  cities is in agricultural use,  and  the  industry provides 
56 just over  a  half of the  country's  food  requirement  or  two  thirds of 
all that can be  grown  in temperate  climates.  Britain has been  a 
net importer of  food  since  the  middle  of  the nineteenth century, 
but the  share  of home  production in total supplies reached  a  low 
point between  the  two  wars  and  has lately been rising a  little. 
There  are nearly 300,000  farming units in Britain, but  of 
these nearly half are  very small,  mostly  farmed part-time,  and 
account for less than  a  tenth of the  industry's output.  Of  the 
165,000  full-time  farms  13 per cent  are  classified as  large 
(employing four or more  men  )  and between  them produce nearly half 
the  total output.  The  average  size  of full-time holdings is 232 
acres  (94 hectares). 
British agriculture is highly specialised and highly 
capitalised.  Three  fifths of full-time  farms  are  devoted to 
dairying,  beef cattle  and  sheep,  a  sixth are  crop  farms  and  the 
remainder specialise in pigs,  poultry,  horticulture  or are  mixed 
farms.  There  is also  specialisation according  to  region;  for 
example,  arable crops  are  mainly  grown in eastern counties. 
The  composition of British farm production has not changed 
a  great deal in recent years  as  shown  in table  2.5.  The  principal 
crops  are  wheat,  barley and potatoes,  and  the  principal livestock 
products  are  milk andmilk products,which constitute between them 
over a  fifth of total agricultural output. 
The  total  area  of  land in agricultural use in the  early 
1960s  was  the  same  as  in the  1930s,  but in the  past decade  the 
acreage  has  diminished by  some  5  per cent,  partly because  of 
incursions of urban  development.  Output,  in real  terms,  is more 
than 2t times  that  achieved before  the  war.  The  proportion of land 
given to  farm  crops has  risen somewhat,  so  that the  avera~yield per 
acre  of  the principal crops,such as  wheat  and barley,  has  about 
doubled. 
More  than half ill British farms  are  owned  by  their  occupier~ 
the  remainder being farmed  by tenants  of  private  landlords.  In the 
latter cases  the capital equipment  required to  operate  the  farms  is 
57 most  commonly  provided by the  tenants.  Production methods  are 
highly mechanised:  there  are nearly five  tractors to every six 
people  engaged in the  industry and  at  one  tractor to  every  35  acres 
(14.2 hectares)  Britain has  one  of the  highest tractor-densities in 
the  world. 
From  the middle  of the nineteenth century until the  third 
decade  of the present century Britain followed  a  policy of free  trade 
in goods  and  services,  including food.  This meant  that,when great 
advances  were  made  in transport  and  refrigeration,the British 
consumer had  access to  the  cheapest  food  supplies throughout  the 
world.  When  Britain abandonedfree  trade in 1932,  tariffs were 
introduced  on most  imported foodstuffs,  with  zero  or preferential 
rates for Commonwealth countries.  The  intention was  not primarily 
to protect British farmers but to  give  a  trading advantage  to 
exporters in the British colonies  and  dominions.  Since,  however, 
a  great many  of  the  preferences were  fixed in specific rather than 
ad  valorem terms,  the  value  of this concession  to  Commonwealth 
suppliers has  diminlliaed as prices have  risen.  Nonetheless,  some 
degree  of preference  was  available to  them  on 90  to  95  per cent  of 
United Kingdom  1972 imports  of food,  drink  and  tobacco,  oilseeds and 
vegetable oils.  During the Second  World  War  there was  an intensive 
campaign for  the  development  of British home  food  supplies  and 
imported  supplies  came  under very close  government  control,  which  was 
gradually relaxed in the  postwar period. 
In 1961  two  fifths of British food  imports  came  from 
Commonwealth  countries,  a  quarter from  Western Europe  and  13.5 per 
cent  from  North America.  In recent years the Commonwealth  share 
has  been falling  and  the  West  European  share rising,  as  shown  in 
table 2.6. 
For over half a  century the  size of the British  agricultur~ 
industry was  largely determined by market  forces  - by the  ability of 
British farmers  to  compete  with overseas  suppliers - but in the 
First World  War  and again in the  Second  overseas supplies were 
drastically  curtailed by  submarine  warfare.  Thus  between the  wars 
a  variety of  forms  of agricultural  support  were  introduced.  These 
were,  of course,  enormously intensified during the  Second World  War, 
58 and  subsequently  a  higher degree  of State  support  remained  than had 
existed previously.  Most  industrial countries give State  support to 
agriculture, but in tmmajority of cases this takes the  form  of 
tariffs and/or quantitative restrictions,  including outright 
prohibition of certain imports.  Until  joining the  EEC  British 
policy was  quite different.  The  price paid by British consumers  for 
food  in the  shops  was  based  on the  world price,  that is the price of 
the  cheapest  import.1  The  British farmer,  however,  was  given  a 
guaranteed price for major products other than fruit  and  vegetables. 
The  difference between this guaranteed price  and  the  market price was 
made  up by  a  'deficiency  payment'  tinanced by the State.  In 
addition there  were  specific production grants  and  subsidies.  The 
guaranteed price  and production subsidies were  calculated in such  a 
way  as  to  secure  for the  farmer  a  reasonable  income,  as  well  as  a 
surplus to  finance  the  capital  requirements  of the  industry. 
Because  of the  increasing budgetary cost  of this system 
some  additional protective measures  have been introduced during the 
last ten years  designed  to  reduce  the  volume  of  cheap  food  imports 
and hence  to maintain United Kingdom market prices.  The  most 
important  were  the  introduction of minimum  import prices and  import 
levies  on major cereals and later on beef and veal,  negotiation of 
quotas  on pigmeat  imports  and  the  introduction of  an  import  duty  on 
mutton  and  lamb,  previously duty-free.  Thus,  even before  joining 
the  EEC,  Britain was  moving  towards  a  system that was  in many  respects 
similar to  the  Common  Agricultural Policy,  while  maintaining the 
subsidy to  farm  incomes  given via the  guaranteed price  system  and 
production grants. 
The  effects of British entry into the  EEC  may  be 
considered  from  the point  of view  of  farmers,  consumers  and  overseas 
1  During,  and  for nearly  a  decade  after,  the  Second World,  the 
prices of many  foods,  whether imported or home  produced,  were  kept 
down  by consumer  subsidies.  When  these  were  abandoned,  various 
forms  of  'agricultural'  or production subsidies remained.  Consumer 
food  subsidies have been re-introduced by the Labour  Government  of 
1974. 
59 suppliers.  It is generally expected that  farmers  are  the  group 
likely to be  least affected,  although total farm  income  may  rise; 
they will continue  to enjoy protection.  Competition  from  other 
Community  members  will be  limited to  the  extent that there will be  a 
common  price  throughout  the  area,  so  that transport costs will give 
natural protection to  the  local industry;  protection from non-
Community  suppliers is given by the  levies  imposed  on  imports  from 
outside.  The  exact  amount  of gain or loss for any particular 
farmer will depend  on the  type  of farming  and  also  on how  far the 
farmer  would benefit  from  the  recent rise in world  food  prices under 
each of the  two  systems. 
For the British consumer it may  be  expected that the price 
of food  relative to other products will rise.  Since  entry into the 
EEC  has  coincided with an  enormous  increase  in world  food prices, it 
is hard to  say of  any particular food  price  increase  how  much  is 
owed  to  the  change  in the  agricultural marketing system amhow much 
to  the  change  in world prices;  but it is probable  that the  effect of 
the  Common  Agricultural Policy has  so far been slight. 
The  effect on  overseas  suppliers will be  of  course  to 
switch  towards  supplies  from  other members  of the  Community  and  away 
from previous  suppliers.  Ths  most notably affected will be 
New  Zealand,  over  a  third of  whose  exports had until lately come  to 
the United Kingdom.  The  other principal  group  affected are  the  cane 
sugar suppliers covered by the  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement.  But 
the  final effect of the  Common  Agricultural Policy  on British 
agriculture cannot be  determined until the  long-term relationship 
between food  prices in the  EEC  and  the  world  has become  clear.  If 
the  former  are  fixed  above  the  latter,  then the  farmer will,  in 
general, benefit at the  expense  of the  rest of  the  pop·ulation,  and 
vice versa. 
60 Table 2.1.  United Kingdom  industries production  (output) 
Food,  drink and  tobacco 
Coal  and  petroleum products 
Chemicals  and allied industries 
Metal  manufacture 
Mechanical  engineering 
Instrument engineering 
Electrical engineering 
Shipbuilding and marine engineering 
Vehicles 
Other metal  goods 
Textiles 
Leather  and fur 
CJ.othing  and footwear 
Bricks,  pottery,  glass  and cement 
Timber  and furniture 
Paper,  printing and publishing 
Other manufacturing 
Total manufacturing 
Construction 
Gas,  electricity and water 
Mining  and  quarrying 
TOTAL  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION 
1970 
Weights 
84 
7 
58 
57 
100 
15 
67 
16 
73 
48 
49 
3 
24 
27 
22 
64 
31 
745 
146 
72 
37 
1000 
Annual  growth-rates 
1951-73  1963-73 
(percentages) 
2.6 
5.8 
6.2 
1.4 
2.8 
5.5 
5.8 
- 0.1 
3.3 
1.5 
1.3 
- 0.7 
1.3 
3.1 
3.7 
3.1 
5.1 
3.1 
3.0 
5.2 
- 1.8 
2.9 
2.6 
5.5 
6.8 
0.9 
3.6 
5.9 
6.1 
1.0 
1.3 
2.2 
3.2 
- 0.1 
2.2 
4.4 
4.4 
3.4 
5.7 
3.5 
2.7 
5.2 
- 3.0 
3.2 
SOURCE:  cso,  National  Income  and  Expenditure  (various  issues) 
61 Table  2.2.  United Kingdom  industrial production  (inputs) 
Employment 
Food,  drink & tobacco 
1971 
(OOOs) 
893 
Coal  and petroleum products } 
Chemicals  and allied 
industries 
539 
Metal manufacture 
Mechanical  engineering 
Instrument engineering 
Electrical engineering 
Shipbuilding & marine 
engineering 
Vehicles 
Other metal  goods 
Textiles 
Leather and  fur 
Clothing  and footwear 
Bricks,  pottery,  glass 
and  cement 
Timber  and furniture 
Paper,  printing and 
publishing 
Other manufacturing 
Total manufacturing 
Construction 
Gas,  electricity & water 
Mining  and  quarrying 
TOTAL  INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION 
J 
577 
2,478 
840 
640 
681 
54 
511 
341 
308 
638 
364 
8,862 
1,419 
386 
426 
11,092 
Annual  growth-
rate 1948-71 
(%) 
1.2 
1.0 
0.1 
1.1 
1.0 
1.0 
- 1.7 
- 1.6 
- 0.6 
0.1 
1.4 
1.7 
0.6 
0.2 
0.7 
- 3.2 
0.3 
} 
Capital 
Annual  growth-
rate 1948-6# 
(%) 
4.7 
5.7 
3.6 
3.5 
3.3 
3.6 
- 1.9 
1.8 
5.2 
3.5 
3.2 
3.4 
3.4 
n.a. 
n .. a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
J 
SOURCES:  Department of Employment,  British Labour Statistics Yearbooks 
Fixed 
capital 
format~n 
1968-73=-
(£m) 
250.2 
[
-103.3 
292.0 
223.6 
395.0~ 
168.0 
£. 
158.6 
d 
d 
118.6d 
220.'F-
1,930.1 
n.a. 
763.3 
170.2 
n.a. 
London,  HMSO  (annual);  R.C.O  Matthews,  'Some  aspects of postwar 
growth  in the British economy  in relation to historical experience', 
paper read to the Manchester Statistical Society 1964,  as  extended by 
A.J.  Buxton,  University of Warwick. 
a 
b 
d 
Growth  in the gross  stock of reproducible fixed assets at constant prices. 
Annual  average of gross  fixed capital formation at 1970 prices. 
Other metal  goods  included in figure for engineering  and  shipbuilding. 
Bricks,  etc.  and  timber and furniture  included in figure for other 
manufacturing. 
62 Table 2.3.  United Kingdom  employment in service industries compared with 
total in goods  industries,  1969  and  1973 
Gas,  electricity and  water 
Transport and communications 
Distributive trades 
Insurance,  banking  and finance 
Professional and scientific services 
Catering and hotels 
Miscellaneous services 
Government  service 
National 
Local 
TOTAL 
TOTAL  IN  GOODS  INDUSTRIES 
Employees 
196~  1973~ 
(thousands) 
405  344 
1,577  1,524 
·2' 759  2,744 
903  1,058 
2,840  3,250 
600  794 
1,325  1,359 
581  614 
836  969 
11,826  12,656 
10,861  9,456 
SOURCE:  CSO,  Monthly Digest of Statistics,  London,  HMSO. 
At  end-June. 
Table  2.4.  Annual  average changes  in productivity,  1951-66 
Change 
1969-73 
(%) 
- 15.1 
3.4 
0.5 
+  17.2 
+  14.4 
+  32.3 
+  2.6 
+  5.7 
+  15.9 
+  7.0 
- 12.9 
Percentages 
Goods  industries 
Mining 
Food,  drink & tobacco 
Chemicals 
Metals 
Engineering 
Textiles 
Other manufacturing 
Construction 
1.6 
1.9 
4.8 
2.1 
2.5 
2.8 
2.7 
1.6 
Service industries 
Transport 
Gas,  electricity,  water 
Distribution 
Finance 
Professional service 
Miscellaneous services 
Public administration 
2.9 
4.4 
2.5 
1.3 
0.4 
2.3 
0.8 
SOURCE:  A.D.  Smith,  The Measurement  and Interpretation of Service Output Change, 
London,  National  Economic Development Office,  1972. 
63 Table 2.6.  Food  imports by area of  origin,  1968-72 
Percentages 
1968  1970 
North America  11.2  12.4 
Sterling Area outside Western  Europe  46.0  37.5 
Western Europe  29.9  36.6 
Rest of World  12.9  13.5 
SOURCE:  CSO,  Annual  Abstract of Statistics,  1973. 
Table 2.5. 
a  Distribution of agricultural output-,  1964-5  and  1971-2 
Farm crops 
Horticulture 
Livestock 
Livestock products 
Total of above 
Percentages 
1964-5  1971-2 
19.9  18.5 
11.6  11.5 
35.7  38.2 
32.1  31.3 
99.3  99.5 
SOURCE:  CSO,  Annual  Abstract of Statistics,  1973. 
~  In value'terms. 
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1972 
11.5 
36.1 
38.8 
13.6 CHAPTER  3 
SOCIAL  ISSUES 
~.  TRADE  UNIONS  AND  LABOUR  RELATIONS 
Structure  and  organisation 
In 1973 the  number  of workers  in the United Kingdom  who  were  members 
1  of trade unions  was  estimated at 11,507,000.  This  represents 49 
per cent of the  working population (excluding employers,  self-
employed  and  members  of the Forces).  Male  membership  was 
8,461,000  and  female  membership  3,046,000,  so  that  59  per cent of 
male  workers  and  34  per cent  of female  were  members  of unions.  The 
number  of unions  operating in the  United Kingdom  was  estimated at 
495 in 1973  and  this total has  shown  a  steady decline  over the years, 
from  626  in 1962 to  723  in 1952.  Total membership  of trade unions 
has risen slowly throughout  the  century with no  large movements  in 
either direction;  in 1945 membership  was  7,875,000.2  The  rising 
number·  of members  coupled with a  falling number  of unions has meant 
an  increase in their average  size.  This has  occurred both through 
internal growth  and  through  amalgamations.  The  largeaunions in the 
United Kingdom  at present are  the  Transport  and  General  Workers  Union 
with  a  1973 membership  of  1,746,554;  the  Amalgamated  Union  of 
Engine8ring Workers  with 1,145,826;  and  the General  and Municipal 
Workers  Union  with 848,481.3 
Most  unions  in the United Kingdom  are  affiliated to the 
Trades  Union  Congress,  which in 1973  claimed  an affiliated membership 
of 10,001,419;  workers  in Scotland have  a  separate body,  the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress with an affiliated membership  of  some 
830,000.  The  position regarding affiliation to  the Trades Union 
Congress has been  somewhat  complicated by the controversy which 
1Department  of  Employment  Gazette,  vol.  82,  November  1974,  p.1017. 
2  Department  of  Employment,  Britih Labour Statistics:  historical 
abstract 1886-1968. 
3  TUG,  Report  of  the  105th Annual  Congress,  1973,  Blackpool. 
65 surrounded  the Industrial Relations Act,  ~97~,  as  some  unions  which 
did not de-register under the Act  were  expelled  from  the  Congress. 
The  Industrial Relations  Act  and its impact  generally upon  trade 
unions is discussed below. 
Unions  in the United Kingdom  have  tended  to be  organised 
upon craft lines,  except  in tbe case  of general unions which have 
recruited from all types  of workers.  Craft unions  predominate  in 
trades or professions requiring significant levels of skill or 
training,  whereas  general unions  have  tended to  cater for the less 
skilled occupations.  Craft unions  are  those  to  which workers  with  a 
particular skill, craft or training belong regardless of the 
industry in which they are  employed;  electricians in all industries 
will tend to be  in one  union,  as will engineers.  Another  type  of 
union organisation is known  as  an industrial union,  under which 
workers  of many  different skills will be  in the union relevant  to 
the  industry in which  they are  employed.  This is common  in some 
parts of Europe,  for  example  Sweden;  it is not  found  in the 
United Kingdom,  although for the  mining industry the  National Union 
of Mineworkers  approaches  the patternquite closely.  In other 
industries,  for example,  construction,  a  federation  of trade  unions 
acts as  the bargaining  agent;  this federation  also  approximates in 
some  respects to  an industrial union. 
Unions  in the  United Kingdom  are  normally governed by  an 
executive  council,  which is elected from  the  membership  of the 
union either directly or through an  annual  delegate  conference. 
Unions usually  have  a  full-time  staff headed by  a  General Secretary, 
who  is the  national  spokesman for the  union  and its main 
administrator.  Most  unions  also  appoint  full-time  paid local 
officials to  deal  with union business at  a  local level  and in almost 
all cases unions  have  an organisation of lay members  at local  and  at 
regional  levels.  Union members  belong to  a  branch at their place  of 
work,  but  are  also  likely to  be  members  of  a  branch in the  locality 
of their work  which  includes members  from  other work-places.  The 
union  group  in the  work-place  usual+y elects a  spokesman,  often 
called  a  shop  steward.  Where  there  are  several unions  involved 
in a  work-place  there is commonly  a  committee  consisting of  shop 
stewards  from  each union,  and this committee  is frequently the main 
66 negotiating agent  with management. 
Trade  union objectives 
Theobject  of trade unions is to  act in the interests of their 
members;  in general,  this has been  seen in practice  as maintaining 
and  improving  the  terms  and conditions of employment.  Pay,  hours  of 
work,  working conditions,  industrial health and safety,  fringe 
benefits, pensions  and  redundancy  arrangements  are  just some  of  the 
more  important matters  on which unions negotiate.  Pay is clearly 
the  most  important  single  item and  the role  of unions  is sometimes 
discussed solely in relation to pay,  but the  other items are 
important too. 
The  organisation of  workers  into craft unions has 
implications for collective bargaining  on many  of  the  issues 
mentioned,  because  unions will often  seek to negotiate national 
agreements  which  set minimum  standards for rates of  pay,  hours  of 
work,  holidays,  overtime  and  other premium payments.  These  minimum 
standards apply  to all members  wherever they work,  although locally, 
at the  plant or company  level,  workers  will be  able  to negotiate 
individual additions to  the  agreed national  scales.  This flexibility 
can lead to  a  difference between wages paid at the  place  of  work  and 
those  agreed nationally. 
In the pursuit of their various  objectives,  unions  have 
procedures  which have  been agreed with management  to  cover  the 
appropriate  stages of pay negotiations or the  settlement  of  a 
grievance.  In the  event  of negotiations being unsuccessful,  the 
union may  resort to direct action in support of their case.  Direct 
action can vary through  several types  of non-cooperation to  a  complem 
stoppage  of work  - a  strike.  Because  of the  local base  of union 
members,  a  strike may  be  called locally without reference  to  the full 
-time  union organisation;  this is known  as  an unofficial strike. 
Strikes which are decided by  the  central union organisation are 
called official strikes. 
Trade  unions  and  the  government 
Trade  unions,  employers'  associations  and  the  general field of labour 
relations have  been the responsibility of the  Department  of  Employme~ 
67 formerly  the Ministry of Labour.  Before  the  ~960s the  role  of the 
Ministry of Labour  was  to  ensure  the  orderly running of the  system 
of industrial relations in the  United Kingdom,  with little reference 
to  the  significance  of individual  wage  bargains  or disputes.  For 
many~ars the Ministry has  offered facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration in the  event of  a  dispute,  with power  to  establish a 
Court  of Inquiry if necessary. 
This  form  of ad  hoc  arrangement  was,  in the  main, 
satisfactory as  long as unions  and  employers  were  engaged in the 
process  of free collective bargaining,  at either a  national or local 
level.  In the  ~960s, increasing government  concern with inflation, 
and  the  consequent  growth of incomes  policies,  wage  restraint and 
other anti-inflation measures,  has  meant  that  the  government  is no 
longer content to  leave  unions  amemployers to  sort out their own 
problems.  The  government is now  much  more  interested in the  outcome 
of collective bargaining and  more  concerned with the use  of 
industrial disputes to further such bargains. 
The  trade union movement  through the  Trades  Union  Congress 
and  the  main  employers  through the  Confederation of British Industry 
are  now  frequently consulted by governments  in the  formulation  of 
policies,  particularly to deal with inflation.  Representatives  of 
both bodies sit on  the National  Economic  Development  Council,  which 
is chaired by the Chancellor of  the  Exchequer.  The  Conservative 
government  consulted extensively with both bodies in the  formulation 
of its counter-inflation policy of  ~972 onwards. 
Trade  unions  and  the  law 
Apart  from this consultation over policy,  the  government  as  law maker 
has been closely involved in trade  union organisation during recent 
years.  In  ~964 a  Royal  Commission  was  established under  Lord  Donovan; 
the  Labour government  received its Report in  ~968.~  Although the 
Labour Party traditionally has been closely linked to  the  trade  union 
movement  and  has  drawn  much  support  from it, in the  aftermath  of  the 
~  Royal  Commission  on  Trade  Unions  and Employers'  Associations, 
Report,  Cmnd  3623,  HMSO,  ~968. 
68 Report,  the  government  introduced  a  White  Paper containing proposals 
for  legislation which  went  further than the  report  recommended  in 
trying to curb  what  was  seen as  a  major problem of unofficial or 
unconstitutional strikes.1  The  Trades Union Congress  was  strongly 
opposed to penal clauses contained in the proposals,  and  the 
government  dropped  these proposals in favour  of the  Congress's 
'solemnand binding'  undertaking to  implement  a  programme  of action 
which  would  give  them more  power to  involve  themselves in unofficial 
strikes and  inter-unfun disputes.  The  other move  following  the 
Donovan  Report  was  the  establishment  of  a  standing  Commission  on 
Industrial Relations,  which  was  to examine  problems  of union 
recognition  and  other industrial relations issues. 
The  delay involved in discussions between  the  Trades Union 
Congress  and  the  government  over  the  White  Paper meant  that, by the 
time  of the  change  of government  in 1970,  no  major  industrial 
relations legislation had been passed.  It was left to  the 
Conservatives  to  introduce  a  wide  ranging Industrial Relations Bill. 
The  main purpose  of the legislation was  to  involve  the  law in cases 
of what  were  now  to be  called  'unfair industrial practices'.  A new 
high court  was  created,  called the  National Industrial Relations 
Court,  which could  impose  fines if breaches  of the  law occurred.  The 
proposals also provided for  a  register of trade unions. 
The  Trades Union Congress  and  the  trade  union movement  in 
general were  strongly opposed  to  the  legislation.  The  Congress 
adopted  a  policy of non-cooperation with the  Commission  on  Industrial 
Relations,  the  National Industrial Relations Court  and  any  other 
aspect  of the Act.  It instructed its affiliated unions not  to 
register and  expelled those  that did.  Later the  Trades Union  Congress 
relaxed this non-cooperation  and permitted those unions  which were 
the  subject of legal action to  defend  themselves in court  should they 
so  wish. 
1  Department  of  Employment  and Productivity,  In Place  of Strife:  a 
policy for industr1al relations,  Cmnd  3888,  London,  HMSO,  1969. 
69 The  opposition of the  organised trade union movement  to 
the Industrial Relations Act  meant  that considerable  controversy 
accompanied  the  decisions of the  National Industrial Relations Court. 
In one  dispute  involving dockworkers  of the  Transport  and  General 
Workers  Union  and  a  container company,  six dockers  were  jailed for 
contempt  of court.  In another dispute,  the  total assets of the 
Amalgamated  Union  of Engineering Workers  were  threatened with 
sequestration because  of  a  fine  for  contempt  of court left unpaid. 
The  Labour Party had  sharply  opposed much  of  the 
legislation when it was  introduced and,  in March,1974,  when  a 
minority Labour  government  was  formed,  repeal of the Industrial 
Relations Act  was  a  high priority.  Despite  some  amendment  in the 
House  of Commons,  the  repeal bill received the  Royal  Assent in 
August  1974.  This  measure,  the  Trade  Union  and  Labour Relations 
Act,  1974,  abolished the  National Industrial Relations Court  and 
the  Commission  on Industrial Relations;  it tried in general  to 
restore much  of the  status  quo.  In addition,  the  Labour  government 
has established the beginnings  of  a  new  conciliation and  arbitration 
service. 
2.  SOCIAL  POLICY 
For at least a  century fuere  has been  a  secular trend for  a  higher 
proportion of both national resources  and public  expenditure  to be 
devoted  to  social services.  Even before  the First World War,  the 
idea was  emerging that social services  should not be  regarded as  a 
form  of charity, but rather as  one  of the natural benefits available 
to  the citizens of  a  civilised State.  Stimulated by both world  wars, 
the State  increased its powers  and  pushed  ahead with the  development 
of social  services.  But it was  not until after the  Second  World  War 
that the  services became  comprehensive.  The  broad pattern of the 
social services as  they are  at present was  laid down  in the  1940s, 
but they have  not  remained static,  and  developments  in the last 30 
years have been  aimed  at continued improvement  in the  levels of 
services  and more  satisfactory administration to  cope  with rising 
needs.  Table  3.1  shows  public  expenditure  on  the  social services and 
70 housing  as  a  percentage  of gross domestic  product at factor cost. 
Health and  welfare  services 
The  National Health Service  was  set up  in 1948 to promote  the 
provision of comprehensive health treatment available  according to 
medical need without regard to  any  insurance  qualification.  It was 
originally free  to users,  but various charges have  subsequently been 
introduced  from  time  to  time.  The  aim  of policy has been to meet 
needs  for cure  and rehabilitation,  to  prevent illness and  to  promote 
health.  The  methods by which these  aims  were  pursued have been an 
increase  in personnel, better training and  research,  greater 
integration of  services,  and  the  renewal  and  modernisation of the 
hospitals. 
Between  1951  and  1972  the  medical  and nursing staff in the 
hospitals almost  doubled,  and  other professional  and  technical staff 
trebled.  The  number  of general medical practitioners increased much 
more  slowly - by only about 40 per cent over the  same  period - while 
the  number  of dentists rose  by about  a  quarter. 
The  trend in hea~hadministration, particularly over the 
last decade,  has been towards  greater integration of the  services 
provided by hospitals,  general practitioners and  local authorities. 
This has been particularly evident in the  treatment  of children,  the 
elderly,  the mentally ill and the mentally handicapped.  There  has 
been increased emphasis  on rehabilitation to  reduce  the  length of 
stay in hospital  and  to return patients to their own  homes  as  soon 
as po£sible,  with continued treatment  when  necessary at out-patient 
clinics or in day hospitals.  As  a  result,  the  average  length of 
stay in hospitals generally has  decreased sharply,  at the  same  time 
as  the  number  of patients treated both as in-patients and  as  out-
patients has  risen rapidly.  Moreover,  much  of  the  treatment was  in 
more  modern hospitals,  as  the  government  embarked  on  a  programme  of 
rehabilitation and,  where  necessary,  rebuilding. 
Although there  are  only indirect indicators of progress in 
health  services,  they  suggest  striking improvements  in standards of 
physical health in the  last twenty years.  The  main  infectious 
diseases,  which  were  once  the  major  cause  of death of people  of 
71 working  age,  have  been virtually eliminated  as health problems. 
People  in Britain live  longer than in most  other countries;  the 
proportion of children who  die  in the first year of life is among  the 
lowest  o.f  all countries in the  world.  There  has been  a  steady 
increase  in sickness  and  death from  degenerative diseases,  largely 
attributable  to  the  ageing of the  population.  Part of the  increased 
cost  of  the  health service is due  to  changes  in the  age  structure, 
but  a  major part is due  to  technological  changes  - the  use  of new 
drugs,  new  diagnostic  tests and  new  treatment in virtually every 
field of medicine. 
Education 
Between  1951  and  1968 current expenditure  at constant prices  on 
education doubled.  As  a  proportion of  gross national product it has 
risen steadily from  2.2 per cent in 1951  to  3.9 per cent in 1968. 
This reflects a  considerable  increase  in the  numbers in full-time 
education,  both at schools  and  at universities and colleges of 
further education.  The  growth has been uneven,  reflecting the 
fluctuating birth rates since  the  war. 
The  school-leaving age  was  raised to  15 in 1947  and  to  16 
in1973.  In addition a  decreasing proportion of pupils leave  school 
at the first opportunity  and  more  are  staying on voluntarily.  As  a 
result, by  1971  there  were  40  per cent more  pupils at schools  than 
in 1951.  The  increase in the  number  of children has been more  than 
proportionately matched by increased numbers  of teachers.  'In the 
public  sector,  where  more  than 90  per cent  of all children receive 
their education,  many  more  pupils  are  now  taught in comprehensive 
schools.  There  has been  a  massive  school building  programme 
during  the  last 30  years  and,  although there  are still a  number  of 
unsatisfactory schools particularly in urban  areas,  a  large 
proportion of  children are  now  educated in modern  schools. 
The  increase in numbers  of pupils staying  on at  school has 
been reflected in a  rise  in numbers  and  an  improvement  in standards 
in the  school-leaving examinations.  An  increasing proportion of 
school  leavers now·move  into full-time  further education. 
A ten-year education programme  was  announced by the 
72 government  in December  ~972.  The  proposals involved substantially 
increased expenditure in five  sectors:  a  new  programme  of nursery 
education;  a  larger building programme  for  the  renewal  of 
secondary  and  special  as  well  as  primary  schools;  a  larger teaching 
force  to  improve  further  the  staffing standards in schools;  new 
measures  to  improve  the pre-service  and in-service training of 
teachers;  and  the  development in higher education of  a  wider· range 
of opportunities for both  studeits and  institutions. 
Income  support 
The  system of  income  support consists of many  elements, but the 
central  one  is the  social security system.  Social  security 
payments  increased  from  5i per cent  of personal  income  in  ~95~ to  ~~ 
per cent  in  ~972.  More  than half of this increase  was  due  to 
higher expenditure  on  retirement  pens~ons. 
The  main purposes  of  the  social security system are  to 
replace  earnings in periods of interruption or cessation of earnings, 
and  to  transfer extra income  to  those  who  currently have  family 
responsibilities.  This  involves  a  redistribution between  those  in 
good health and  the  sick,  between  the  working population and  the 
unemployed  and retired,  and between those  currently with family 
responsibilities and those without. 
The  postwar national insurance  scheme  created rights to 
benefits which are  taking years to mature:  for  the  whole  population 
over pension age  to  draw pensions  earned by contributbns under  the 
scheme,  or for all widows,  long-term sick and work-injured  to 
receive benefits  on  the  new  basis.  Thus  the cost of social security 
has been increasing because  the  postwar  scheme  is still maturing.  In 
addition,  a  number  of changes  in policy  since it was  introduced,  such 
as  the  Family  Income  Supplement,  have  added  to the  cost. 
Between  ~95~  and  ~972 total expenditure  on retirement 
pensions at constant prices increased threefold,  although the 
population of pension  age  increased by only  one  third.  But  the 
proportion of the population of pension  age  actually receiving 
pensions  increased from  60  per cent in  ~95~ to  89  per cent in  ~972. 
This is mainly because  a  higher proportion of pensioners had had 
73 time  to pay contributions  from  ~948 onwards  which  gave  them title to 
pensions,but there has also been  a  trend towards earlier retirement. 
The  rates of both absence  through  sickness  and  unemployment 
are  also higher now  than in the  ~950s.  A large  increase  in sickness 
absence  in the  ~960s has been  almost  entirely due  to increases in 
incapacity rates at all ages.  The  reasons for this trend  are 
probably complex  and it is not confined to Britain. 
Between  ~95~  and  ~972 the  population under  20  increased 
by  20  per cent,  but children for  whom  family  allowances  were  paid 
increased more  - by 40  per cent.  This  was  partly because  the  number 
of families  with  two  or more  dependent  children increased more  than 
the number  of  children,  and partly because  an  increasing number  of 
children stayed  on  at school  after the  age  of  ~5 and  continued to be 
counted  for purposes  of  family  allowances. 
For all these  reasons  social security expenditure  has been 
increasing within the  framework  of the  ~945-6 legislation quite  apart 
from  changes  in policy.  In addition benefits have  been increased, 
not just in line with changes  in prices, but with the  object  of 
improving their real value.  Improvements have  taken the form  of 
supplements  related to earnings  and  increases in the real value  of 
basic flat-rate benefits  and  allowance~  A further policy aim has 
been to ensure  that those  entitled to benefits and  allowances 
actually claim them. 
A further part of  income  support is the  supplementary 
benefits  scheme,  which in  ~966 succeeded national assistance.  Every 
person aged  ~6 or over who  is not in full-time  work,  attending school 
or involved in a  pay dispute,  and  whose  ~esources are  insufficient to 
meet his requirements is entitled to  a  supplementary benefit.  In 
~948  ~~i per cent  of persons  over pension age  were  drawing national 
assistance;  in  ~972  2~ per cent were  drawing  supplementary benefits. 
Housing 
Satisfactory housing implies  adequate  numbers  of  dwellings  of the 
right  size  and  quality in the  right places.  There  are  nearly  20 
million dwellings in Britain and  nationally the  numbers  of 
74 households  and  dwellings  are  about equal, but they are  unevenly 
distributed and housing shortages persist in the more  prosperous 
commercial  and  industrial centres,  such as London  and  Birmingham. 
Over 8  million new  dwellings have been built in Britain 
since  1945  and  two  families in five  now  live in a  postwar dwelling. 
During  the past  30  years,  the  demolition of slum dwellings  and more 
advanced  standards for new  housebuilding have  led to significant 
improvements in the general  quality of British housing.  However, 
there  remain  a  large  number  of older dwellings,  some  of which have 
been kept in good  repair and modernised,  while  many  others are 
unsatisfactory by modern  standards.  A  sample  survey in 1971  showed 
that 12 per cerrtof dwellings  lacked  an internal water closet  and 7 
per cent  were  regarded as unfit. 
The  number  of people  owning  their own  homes  has  increased 
rapidly in the  last 50  years  and  now  about half of all dwellings  are 
owned  by their occupiers.  Some  30  per cent are  rented  from public 
housing authorities  and  most  of the  remainder  are  rented  from private 
landlords.  A national  system of rent rebate  and  allowance 
schemes  has been introduced to  assist poorer tenants.  The  main 
objectives  of  government  housing policy are  to  secure decent  homes 
for  every family,  to offer families  a  fairer choice between  owning  a 
home  and  renting  one,  and  to  ensure  fairness between  one  citizen and 
another in giving  and  receiving help  towards housing costs. 
Government  subsidies are  available for local authorities which  incur 
financial  debts in clearing slums  and providing adequate  public 
sector housing  in areas  of housing shortage.  Another major 
objective has been  to  enable more  people  with moderate  means  to 
become  owner-occupiers. 
Nevertheless,  a  satisfactory housing policy has proved 
difficult  ~achieve.  Rent  control has  led to  many  anomalies  and  the 
rapid move  to  owner-occupation has  caused  sharp increases in house 
prices  and  a  shortage  of mortgage  funds.  Moreover,  sharp  changes  in 
policy have  resulted from changes  in governments  and  there have been 
sharp variations in the  resources devoted  to housing  investment.  A 
housing policy which will  achieve  the  objectives described  above  has 
yet to be  evolved. 
75 Table 3.1.  Public  expenditur~ on the social services  and  housing  (at current 
prices),  1951-71 
Education 
Health  and welfare services 
Social security benefits 
Housing 
Total 
As  a  proportion of GDP 
1951 
433 
564 
707 
367 
2,071 
16.4 
1961  1971 
(£ millions) 
1,012  3,006 
1,088  2, 754 
1,628  4,307 
555  1,268 
4,283  11,335 
(percentages) 
17.7  23.7 
SOURCE:  cso,  National  Income  and Expenditure  (various  issues). 
Current and capital expenditure. 
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PUBLIC  FINANCE  AND  NATIONALISED  INDUSTRIES 
1.  CHANGING  PATTERNS  OF  PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  AND  TAXATION 
Public  expenditure 
Although discretionary changes in central government  expenditure 
(particularly on capital account)  have  occasionally been applied in 
the  postwar period to meet  cyclical needs,  their major contribution 
has been to  the  secular growth of capacity and  output.  The 
development  of public  expenditure  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  through the 
1950s  and  the first half of  the  1960s has been  examined by the 
Musgraves,1  and  table 4.1  carries this analysis  through to  1973. 
Expenditure  of central and local government  together with the 
national insurance  funds  are  included,  but not  of the nationalised 
industries  and  other public  corporations.  In addition to  a 
distinction between central  and  local government,  the  table  also 
categorises  expenditure  on  an  economic basis (distinguishing 
current consumption  and capital formation  from  subsidies  and  grants 
to personal  and  overseas  sectors,  and  from  interst  payments  in 
respect  of the National  Debt)  and  on  a  functional basis 
(distinguishing expenditure by main  head  of programme). 
The  Musgraves  noted that  the public  expenditure  ratio had 
declined  somewhat  during  the  1950s but had risen substantially 
during the  first half of  the  1960s,  reaching  a  level of over 40 per 
cent by 1966.  The  principal vehicle  of  growth had  been the  human 
investment  and  welfare  oriented programmes,  especially education, 
other social services  and  housing,  and  these  more  than compensated 
for  a  considerable  decline  in the  share  of defence.  Furthermore,  the 
change  in the  direction of  public  expenditure  programmes  towards the 
satisfaction of welfare  needs  had  the  secondary effect of 
concentrating much  of the  increase  on  local authorities. 
1  R.A.  and  P.B.  Musgrave,  'Fiscal policy'  in R.E.  Caves  et al., 
Britain's Economic  Prospects,  Washington,  The  Brookings Institution, 
1968. 
77 Table  4.~ suggests that these  trends not  only continued 
but were  greatly accelerated during the  period of  the  Labour 
government  in the  second half of the  ~960s.  The  increase  of six 
percentage points in the  share  of total public  expenditure between 
~965 and  ~969 was  more  than double  the  corresponding increase  over 
the preceding ten-year period, but by  ~969 a  plateau appears  to  have 
been reached.  It is also interesting that the  distribution of the 
increase between central  and local government  was  much  more  evenly 
divided than in the earlier period.  Further analysis  reveals, 
however,  that the underlying reasons  for this  were  further 
developments  of the social  and  welfare  infra-structure  as in the 
earlier period, but also  an  increasing emphasis  on  the  development  of 
industrial  and  regional programmes.  On  the central government 
account,  the  decline  in total purchases which had been apparent 
through the  ~950s and early  ~960s was  halted despite  continued 
cutbacks in defence  spending,  and  the ratio oftotal central 
government  expenditure  to  GDP  rose by more  than 3i per cent between 
~965 and  ~969.  The  principal components  of the  increase  were 
current grants  to  the personal sector,  especially national insurance 
and  other social security benefits,  and,  of rather less importance, 
subsidies to housing  and,  from  ~-965,  payments  of  selective  (later 
regional)  employment  premiums.  On  the  local authority account,  the 
total expenditure  ratio rose by two  percentage points over the 
period,  mainly through increased transfer payments.  This explains 
why,  despite  the  growth of central government activities,the ratio  of 
local authorities'  purchases as  a  percentage  of total public 
consumption  and capital formation,  which had risen from  38 per cent 
in  ~960 to 45 per cent in  ~965 had  increased further to 48 per cent 
by  ~969.  As  with central government,  however,  extensions of social 
services were  of paramount  importance.  Three  quarters  of the  increaoo 
in the  ratio of total local authority expenditure  to  GDP  was 
at~ributable to  growth in social  and  environmental  services  and  two 
thirds of this to  expenditure  on education. 
Taxation 
The  United Kingdom  tax structure incorporates a  wide  range  of taxes 
and  duties  on personal  and  corporate  incomes,  goods  and  services, 
property  and  transfers of wealth,  which  are  also  found  in one  form 
or another in other EEC  countries.  Indeed,  recent  OECD  statistics 
78 suggest that the ratio of total tax to  GNP  in  the United Kingdom  is 
very similar to the  average  ratio for  the  other eight members  in the 
enlarged Community.1  At  a  more  detailed level,  however,  there 
are  many  striking differences,  the  most  important of which  emerge 
from  table 4.2  In particular,  the  United Kingdom  places 
considerably greater emphasis  on the  taxation of personal  incomes 
while,  until the  introduction of value-added tax,  indirect taxation 
concentrated,  thruugh the discriminatory purchase  tax and  specific 
duties,  on  a  narrow range  of consumer goods,  of which  durables, 
tob.acco,  alcoholic drink  and petroleum were  subject to  special -
emphasis. 
Two  main trends  emerge  when  we  examine  changes in the 
composition of tax revenues  from  1960  to  1973  as  shown  in table 4.2 
First,  from  1960 until 1971  there was  an  increase  of more  than six 
percentage points in the  ratio of total revenue  to  GNP,  an 
expansion which started gradually and  accelerated with the  rapid 
growth of public  expenditure in the  late 1960s, but  which was 
slightly checked by the massive  discretionary tax cuts in the  1971 
and  1972 Budgets.  Secondly,  in spite  of  substantial increases over 
the  period in the  nominal  value  of personal  income  tax reliefs,  a 
large part of the  increase in the  ratio of  tax to  GNP  was  financed 
from personal  income  tax through fiscal  drag.  Conversely,  the 
raising  of additional revenue  through the volume-based  and mostly 
income-inelastic  specific duties proved especially difficult during 
1  In 1971,  the  latest year for which comparable  figures  are  available, 
the  ratio for  the United Kingdom  of total tax (including social 
security contributions)  to  GNP  was  35.7 per cent.  This  compared with 
an  average  for the  EEC  of  35.1  per cent  (see table 4.2),  the United 
Kingdom  ratio being third highest  among  EEC  members,  behind  Denmark 
(44.0 per cent)  and  the  Netherlands  (42.4 per cent).  If social 
security contributions are  excluded,  the  ratio for the  United Kingdom 
(30.6 per cent)  is six points highAr than the  EEC  average  (24.1  per 
cent)  and  second highest in the  ranking.  However,  there  are  still 
far wider divergences within the  Community,  from  Denmark  with 40.2 
per cent to Italy with 19.2  (OECD,  Revenue Statistics 1965-71,  Paris 
11973). 
79 this inflationary period,  and  the proportion of total revenue  taken 
by customs  and  excise duties fell substantially despite considerable 
increases in the nominal rates of duty.  As  a  result the  share  in 
total revenue  of taxes  on  goods  and  services  (excluding social 
security payments)  declined  from 40 per cent  in 1960  to little over 
one  third by 1971. 
In addition to  the  predominant  role  in counter-cyclical 
policy and  demand  management  played by taxation,  particularly 
through investment  incentives,the personal  income  tax,  specific 
duties  and  purchase  tax,  the  1960s  and  early 1970s  have  witnessed  a 
series ~ major  structural reforms  which  are unparalleled in recent 
British fiscal history.  These  have  been  designed  for  a  variety of 
secular objectives:  to  simplify the  tax structure,  to  increase 
capacity and  channel  resources to more  productive uses,  to 
encourage  growth and investment,  to  attain a  more  equal distribution 
of resources  and  other equity objectives  and,  more  recently,  to 
coordinate United Kingdom  fiscal  structures and practices more 
closely with  those  of other EEC  members.  The  following is a 
summary  of the  most  significant of these  changes. 
Three  major phases  in the pattern of corporate  taxation may 
be  distinguished during  the  period.  First,  from  1Y58  to  1965, 
companies  were  subject both to  a  uniform profits tax and,  in addition, 
income  tax at the  standard rate  was  chargeable  on both retained and 
distributed profits.  However,  the  income  tax on distributions  was 
treated as  a  withholding tax,  creditable by the  shareholder against 
the  tax liability on his dividend  income.  In 1965  the  uniform 
profits tax was  renamed  the  corporation tax and  the rate  increased 
from  15 to 40  per cent,  while,  to  encourage  companies  to  'plough back 
profits for expansion',  the  income  tax on  retentions  was  abolished. 
Finally,  in 1973,  after considerable  debate  about  whether the  pre-
1965  system  should be  re-established,  a  new  system based  on the 
French  'imputation'  method  was  introduced,  under which  a  single rate 
of corporation tax was  maintained,  but  the  additional  layer of 
income  tax on  distributions  was  abolished.  Instead,  companies  paying 
a  distribution become  liable  to  an  advance  payment  of corporation 
tax and  the  shareholder is imputed with  a  corresponding tax credit 
which is sufficient exactly to  offset his charge  to  income  tax at 
80 the basic rate.  The  main  justification for the  1973 reform,  namely 
that, by removing  the  discrimination against distributions,  greater 
freedom  of capital movements  both domestically  and  across 
international frontiers  would be  achieved,  has been bolstered by the 
recent  decision of the  EEC  Commission that the British imputation 
method  should become  the  model  for company  taxation in the  Community. 
To  encourage  productive  investment,  successive  governments 
have  introduced  a  multiplicity of measures  designed to provide 
financial incentives for fixed  investment.  For most  of  the  period, 
incentives were  provided through capital allowances  designed to 
provide relief from  tax in ~spect of outlays  on plant  and machinery, 
industrial buildings and certain other qualifying capital assets;  a 
system of accelerated depreciation operated through  a  combination of 
initial (first-year)  and  investment  allowances,  which varied both 
regionally and  for different types  of asset.  Between  1966  and  1970, 
however,  a  system of cash grants  to manufacturing,  construction and 
extractive industries replaced  the  investment  and initial allowances. 
The  reversal of the  grants policy in 1970  led to  a  rationalisation 
and  simplification of  the  pre-1966  system of  accelerated  depreciatio~ 
and  important  changes  in the  1972 Budget  included the  introduction of 
a  100 per cent first-year allowance  for all capital expenditure  on 
plant  and machinery throughout  the  United Kingdom. 
Selective  employment  tax was  in operation for eight years 
from  1965  to  1973;  it was  designed to  serve  a  number  of purposes, 
including the  raising of additional revenue  and  the broadening of  the 
base  of indirect taxation to  include  services.  In addition, it 
sought  to provide  assistance  to  the  manufacturing  sector, both to 
strengthen exports  and  to  generate  economic  growth,  while  also 
encouraging increased efficiency in services by raising relative 
labour costs.  To  achieve  these  objectives the  tax was  imposed  on 
the  employment  of  labour,  refunds being provided to  manufacturing 
industries.  Initially,  a  slight subsidy was  also  given to 
employment  in manufacturing  through excess  refunds  and,  although this 
subsidy was  soon discontinued,  provision for paying excess  refunds  to 
Development  Areas  was  retained in the  form  of the  regional  employment 
premium.  Selective  employment  tax met  with considerable criticism 
from  the  outset not  only for  technical  reasons but  on basic  economic 
81 grounds.  The  tax was  not  a  particularly satisfactory method  of 
taxing services and,  given the  low rates at which it was  levied,  the 
size of any resulting shift of labour to manufacturing was  questione~ 
More  fundamentally,  it seems  extremely dubious in retrospect whether 
the  choice  of tax base  was  appropriate;  the continuing poor 
performance  of British manufacturing does not  suggest that labour 
shortage  was  the  main  impediment  to  improved  growth  and  export 
performance. 
In April 1973,  purchase  tax,  selective employment  tax and 
part of the  customs  and  excise duties  on  tobacco  and  alcoholic  drinks 
were  replaced by value-added tax.  According to  the  Green Paper 
heralding the  new  tax the  changeover was  intended to create  'a more 
broadly-based structure which,  by discriminating less between 
different types of goods  and  services,  would  reduce  the  distortion 
of consumer  choice'.1  A further objective was  that the 
establishment of  a  common  system of sales taxation based  on value-
added  tax was  central to policy co-ordination within the EEC,of  which 
Britain had become  a  new  member  on  1  January 1973.  The  principal 
feature  of the new  tax was  that for the first time in the  United 
Kingdom it extended sales taxation to  a  wide  range  of service 
sectors,  most  notably the retail trade, but,  to prevent  the 
changeover having  a  regressive  impact,  large areas  of essential 
expenditure  which have by tradition been free  of any direct 
imposition of tax (particularly food,  fuel  and power,  public 
transport  and  housing)  were  relieved of value-added tax through 
exemption or zero rating.  Despite  a  broadening of  the base  of the 
tax in the  1974  Budget,  its effective coverage  remains less than 60 
per cent  of consumer's  expenditure,  as  compared with the  80-90  per 
cent  envisaged by the  EEC's  proposed  common  system. 
Before  the fiscal year 1973-4,  an individual could be 
liable both to  income  tax at  a  standard rate  and (if his income 
exceeded  a  certain amount)  to  surtax levied atdifferential rates 
which  increased progressively with the  amount  of taxable  income.  In 
1973  this dual  system was  replaced by  a  single unified tax,  under 
1  Treasury,  Value-added tax,  Cmnd  4621,  London,  HMSO,  1971. 
82 which  a  broad band  of  income  became  taxable  at  a  basic rate,  with 
successive  slices above  this level being chargeable  at graduated 
higher rates.  At  the  same  time  the  complicated  system of allowances 
was  greatly simplified.  Earned  income  relief was  abolished, but  the 
value  of personal reliefs was  adjusted upwards  so  as to maintain 
their value  in relation to  earned  income. 
The  1~62 Finance Act proposed to subject  speculative gains 
on  a  wide  range  of property  and asset holdings to  income  tax and, 
where  applicable,  to surtax or profits tax.  Following their victory 
in the  1964 election,  the  Labour government  announced that a 
comprehensive  capital gains tax would be  introduced  and  the 
subsequent legislation in 1965 provided for the  separate taxation of 
short-term gains  (taxable at an individual's marginal rate  of 
income  tax and  surtax)  and  long-term gains  (taxable at a  special 
rate).  Subsequent  amendments  have  resolved  some  of the  anomalies 
and difficulties of the  original legislation, have  somewhat  widened 
the  range  of asset holdings  subject  to~emptfun and have  abolished 
the  short-term  tax. 
In October 1972 the  Conservative  government  issued a 
discussion document  which contained plans for  the  introduction of  a 
form  of negative  income  tax as  a  means  of unifying the  systems  of 
personal  income  taxation  and of  income  maintenance.1  This  was 
followed by  a  Report  from  a  House  of Commons  Select Committee,  but no 
pronouncement has yet been made  by the present Labour  government  on 
the  future  of  the proposals.  The  government  has~ however,  declared 
its intention to widen  the  scope  of capital taxation.  In August  1974 
a  White  Paper outlined the  structure  of a  new  capital transfer tax 
designed to block the  most  obvious  loopholes in the  existing estate 
duty.2  A  Green Paper discussion outline  of a  comprehensive  wealth 
1  Treasury,  Proposals for  a  Tax-credit System,  Cmnd  5116,  London, 
HMSO,  1972. 
2  Treasury,  Capital Transfer Tax,  Cmnd  5705,  London,  HMSO,  1974. 
83 tax has  also been published1  and  present plans are  to  introduce 
legislation in the  1976  Finance Bill. 
2.  NATIONALISED  INDUSTRIES 
A number  of basic industries,  fuel  and  power  (other than petroleum), 
transport  and  communication,  and  iron and  steel were  taken into 
government  ownership in the  late  1~4us.  Steel  was  denationalised 
in 1954  and renationalised in 1965.  The  nationalisation of these 
basic industries was  a  major political transformation,  the result 
of forces  which had been developing  over many  years. 
Since  their nationalisation,  each industry has had its own 
special  problems.  In some  these  were  created by  strongly 
increasing demand,  while  in others,  particularly coal  and  the 
railways,  the  problem was  falling demand.  But  there  were  also 
common  problems  associated with the  role  of  the  industries in the 
economy  and  their relations with the  government  and  parliament. 
The  government's  objectives were  set out  in the 
nationalisation Statutes:  first,  the  Boards which were  set up  to  run 
the  industries had  a  duty to raise  revenues  that,  taking one  year 
with another,  would  be  not  less than sufficient to meet  all items 
properly chargeable  to  revenue;  secondly,  they were  to be  operated 
in the public  interest.  Boards  were  made  responsible  to parliament 
for the  overall financial position of  the  industries,  while  ministers 
were  given powers  to  control  investment  and borrowing. 
Dissatisfaction with the  conduct  of  the  industries in the 
19?Us,  both inside  and  outside parliament,  led to  the  setting up  of 
a  Select Committee  on  the  nationalised industries,which proceeded to 
a  series of investigations into each undertaking.  At  about  the  same 
time  the  industries were  required to borrow  from  the  Treasury rather 
than  onthe  market  as had been the practice. 
1  Treasury,  Wealth Tax,  Cmnd  57u4,  London,  HMSO,  1974. 
84 During  the  1960s there  were  two  White  Papers  on  the 
financial  and  economic  obligations  of the nationalised industries, 
which  attempte~ to  set out new  guidelines for their operation.1  The 
1961  White  Paper emphasised that,  although the  industries had 
obligations of  a  national  and  non-commercial kind,  they were  not 
and  ought not  to be  regarded as  social services absolved  from 
economic  and  social justification.  It went  on  to note  that  some 
Boards  were  not making  large  enough provision to cover the 
replacement cost of  assets having  regard to  inflation and  to  provide 
against obsolescence.  It noted the  low returns  obtained by  some 
industries  and pointed out that as  a  consequence  the  nationalised 
industries depended heavily on the  savings  of others to  finance  their 
investment.  The  White  Paper  explained how  the Statutes should be 
interpreted with  the  aim  of  encouraging  the  Boards  to increase 
revenue  and  prevent poor performance. 
Following the publication of this White  Paper specific 
financial  objectives  were  set up  for most  of the industries for 
period3  of up  to  five  years,  but  the  financial performance  of the 
industries  showed little improvement  during the early 1960s.  There 
was  some  increase in their gross  trading surpluses in 1962  and  1~63, 
but by  1964 the borrowing requirement  was  again rising rapidly. 
1967. 
The  unsatisfactory position led to  a  further White  Paper of 
This started from  the position that the  industries should be 
operated basically as commercial  concerns  and  have the  objectives of 
promoting  an efficient allocation and  use  of resources.  It laid 
down  guiding priuciples for price policy and  investment  decisions; 
the  technique  of discounted cash flows  was  to be  used  for all 
important projects in the  investment  programmes.  In addition to 
recovering  accounting costs,  prices were  to be  reasonably related to 
long-run marginal costs.  Critical attention was  to be  paid to 
1  Treasury,  The  Financial  and Economic  Obligations of the 
Nationalised Industries,  Cmnd  1337,  London,  HMSO,  1961;  Nationalised 
Industries:  a  review of  economic  and  financia~ objectives,  Cmnd 
3437,  London,  HMSO,  1967. 
85 reducing costs and  there  was  to be  a  continuous drive  to increase 
efficiency and productivity.  The  system of financial targets would 
continue but  should be interpreted more  flexibly.  All major price 
increases  should be  referred to  the  National Board for Prices and 
Incomes,  which was  also  given powers  to  inquire into  the 
efficiency of  the industries when  proposals for price  increases were 
referred to it. 
In the years following  the  1967  ~nite Paper,  the investment 
criteria came  increasingly to be  adopted as  a  useful discipline. 
But  there  wew  major difficulties in applying marginal-cost pricing. 
There  was,however,  a  trend towards  the application of more  complex 
tariffs designed to reflect the  costs of peak demand,  so  that time-
differentiated tariffs are  now  used for electricity, telephones, 
railways  and  airlines,  although differential charging is not  carried 
to  the  optimal  solution in marginal-cost pricing.  In the  coal 
industry and  on  the  railways  the  application of  the  new  criteria 
was  especially difficult.  In the  coal industry the  main problem was 
that  of insuring the progression to  a  smaller efficient industry and 
the  elimination of some  pits which  were  losing heavily.  The 
declining demand  for railway transport meant  that the  Railways  Board 
could not eliminate their deficit by raising charges;  the best they 
found  they could do  was  to try to keep  charges in line with general 
inflation.  Where  new  investment was  involved, it was,  as  a  rule, 
only undertaken when  the  demand  permitted charges  which  would cover 
costs. 
The  financial performance  of the  industries improved 
somewhat  during the late 1960s,  but conflicts with national economic 
policy led to  a  deterioration at the  end of the  decade.  Prices and 
incomes  policies were  intensified and  the  industries were  forced  to 
delay price increases in line with price restraint.  In mid-1974 
the  government  attempted  to  reduce  the nationalised industries' 
losses by permitting some  large increases in the prices of  electric~ 
and coal,  and  in railway fares  and  telephone charges. 
There  were  also broad  government  objectives relating to 
transport policy and fuel policy which  sometimes  conflicted with the 
main financial  objectives.  For example, it was  argued that prudence 
86 dictated the maintenance  of the  coal  industry in view of the 
uncertainty about rupplies  and costs of imported fuels.  Similarly, 
a  consideration  of future  transport needs  implied that an  efficient 
railway system would be  needed  even though commercial  operation in 
the  1960s  would not have  sustained the  railways  as  a  going concern. 
An  uncontrolled run-down  of the coal industry and  the  closure  of  some 
railway lines would  also  have  conflicted with the  government's 
regional policy. 
87 Table  4.1.  Public  expenditur~  in the United Kingdom  as  a  proportion of GDP, 
1955-73 
Purchases 
Consumption 
Capital  formation 
Total 
Transfers 
Total,  excluding debt interest 
Debt interest 
Total 
Total,  excluding interest,  by  function 
Defence,  purchases  and transfers 
Social services,  excluding education 
Purchases 
Transfers 
Total 
Education 
Purchases 
Transfers 
Total 
Housing 
Purchases 
Transfers 
Total 
Other 
Purchases 
Transfers 
Total 
Total,  excluding interest,  by authority 
Central  government 
Purchases 
Transfers 
Total 
Local  authorities 
Purchases 
Transfers 
Total 
1955 
18.9 
3.8 
22.7 
9.8 
32.4 
4.6 
37.0 
9.1 
4.0 
6.1 
10.1 
2.8 
0.4 
3.3 
2.0 
0.6 
2.6 
5.0 
2.4 
7.3 
14.4 
9.2 
23.6 
8.4 
0.6 
8.9 
1960 
18.8 
3.7 
22.6 
9.9 
32.5 
4.5 
37.0 
7.2 
4.8 
6.3 
11.0 
3.4 
0.6 
4.1 
1.1 
0.6 
1.7 
6.1 
2.3 
8.5 
13.7 
9.6 
23.4 
8.4 
0.6 
9.1 
1965 
19.4 
4.8 
24.2 
11.3 
35.6 
4.3 
39.9 
6.8 
5.1 
7.4 
12.6 
4.0 
1.1 
5.1 
1.8 
0.6 
2.3 
6.7 
2.1 
8.8 
13.4 
10.7 
24.1 
10.8 
0.6 
11.4 
SOURCES:  CSO,  National  Income  and  Expenditure  (various issues). 
Percentages 
1969 
20.6 
5.8 
26.5 
14.8 
41.3 
4.9 
46.2 
5.9 
5.9 
8.7 
14.6 
4.7 
1.3 
6.0 
2.0 
0.7 
2.8 
8.1 
4.0 
12.0 
13.7 
14.1 
27.8 
12.7 
0.7 
13.4 
1973 
21.3 
5.7 
27.1 
14.9 
42.0 
4.3 
46.2 
5.5 
6.4 
8.5 
14.9 
5.3 
1.3 
6.6 
1.5 
1.3 
2.9 
8.4 
3.8 
12.1 
13.6 
13.7 
27.3 
13.5 
1.2 
14.6 
~  Includes central government,  local authorities and national  insurance funds, 
but excludes  public corporations. 
88 Table 4.2.  Tax  revenue in the United Kingdom  and the  EEC  as  a  proportion of 
GNP  (at market prices) 
Percentages 
United Kingdom  EEC~ 
Taxes  on all goods  and  service~ 
General  consumption 
Specific goods  and services 
Other 
Income  and  profits tax£ 
Personal  incomes 
Corporate  incomes 
Social security contributions 
Other  taxe~ 
Total tax revenue 
Including social security 
contributions 
Excluding social secutiry 
contributions· 
1960  1965 
9.7  10.1 
2.0  1.8 
7.2  7.6 
0.5  0.7 
10.6  11.2 
7.7  9.4 
2.9  1.8 
3.5  4.7 
4.3  4.5 
28.1  30.5 
24.6  25.8 
1971  1973  1965 
10.3  9.7  11.2 
2.5  2.8  4.8 
7.0  6.2  5.8 
0.8  0.7  0.5 
14.6  13.2  8.8 
11.8  10.7  6.8 
2.8  2.6  2.1 
5.0  5.5  9.1 
5.7  4.7  3.1 
35.7  33.2  32.2 
30.6  27.7  23.1 
SOURCES:  OECD,  Revenue Statistics 1965-1971;  cso,  National  Income  and 
Expenditure 1973. 
~  Average of  enlarged Community of nine. 
1971 
11.3 
5.6 
5.0 
0.7 
10.1 
8.0 
2.1 
11.0 
2.7 
35.1 
24.1 
b  Includes purchase  tax,  value-added tax,  other customs  and excise duties  and 
motor vehicle licence duties. 
£  Taxes  on  income,  including personal  income tax,  surtax and corporation tax, 
and on capital gains,  paid by  the personal  and corporate sectors. 
d  Local  authority rates,  selective employment  tax,  stamp  duties,  death 
and betterment  levy. 
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FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS  AND  MONETARY  POLICY 
In the first part of this chapter,  the  different types  of financial 
institutions in the United Kingdom  are  examined,  together with their 
interactions  and their roles in providing finance  for investment, 
the  government  and individuals.  Rapid  developments,  however,  are 
taking place in the  structure of such institutions  and  any  summary 
such as this must be  static.  It is likely that in five years'  time 
the picture will be  as different as the  present picture is from  that 
of ten years  ago.  The  second part of the  chapter consists of  a 
description of monetary policy and  the  mechanismsby  which it is 
administered. 
1.  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND 
The  Bank  of England has been in public  ownership  since  1946  and 
fulfils the  functions  of  a  central bank,  including the provision of 
economic  and  financial  advice  to the  government.  For accounting 
purposes its business is divided:intnanissue  Department,  which deals 
with the  issue  of notes backed by government  securities,and a  Banking 
Department,  which offers banking services to the  government,  the 
deposit banks,  about 90  foreign governments  and  international bodies, 
and  a  very small number  of private customers. 
As  the  government's banker the Bank handles the  sale of 
Treasury bills to  the public  and  the  financial  sector according  to 
short-term financing  requirements.  To  ensure  a  steady market it 
acts as lender of last resort to the  discount houses.  It also 
administers monetary policy by its dealing in the  market  for 
government  stocks, by the  use  of  the  minimum  lending rate  and by 
regulating financial institutions.  The  Bank  also administers the 
exchange  control regulations  and manages  the  Exchange  Equalisation 
Account  which holds the  official reserves. 
2.  THE  DEPOSIT  INSTITUTIONS 
The  deposit institutions are  the most  important part of the private 
sector in terms  of size,  numbers  and  lending.  There  are various 
91 different types. 
The  deposit'banksconsist  of  the  London  and Scottish 
clearing banks,  the  Northern Ireland banks  and  the Banking Department 
of the  Bank  of England.  The  largest part of  thmgroup is dominated 
by the  four big London  clearing banks  - Barclays,  Lloyds,  the Midland 
and  the National Westminster.  They  have  thousands  of branches 
throughout  the  country and  handle  a  large number  of  small  accounts. 
Current  accounts  on  which cheques  are  drawn  and  cleared in a  central 
clearing  system are  repayable  on  demand  and carry no  interest. 
Interest-bearing deposit  accounts in theory require  short notice  of 
withdrawal,  but in practice  small  sums  are  payable  on  demand. 
A unique  feature  of their lending is the  system of 
overdrafts,  where  customers  are  allowed to  draw more  than they have 
in their accounts  up  to an  agreed limit  and  only pay interest on 
daily balance  outstanding.  For personal  customers,  the  tendency in 
recent years,  however,  has been  towards  fixed-term personal  loans 
rather than the  revolving credit of the  overdraft  system. 
At  the beginning of the  1960s  the  deposit banmdominated 
the banking  sector in terms  of both deposits  and  advances,  but their 
relative  importance  has  declined in recent years.  Formerly they 
alone  were  subject to  severe controls as to  the  form  of their assets 
and  their activities, but  since  the  new  system of regulations  came 
into force  in 1971,  treating all banks  alike,  they have  begun  to 
move  into areas  such  as  the  inter-bank market,  which  were  formerly 
the  sole province  of the  secondary banks. 
Secondary banks  include  a  number  of different banking 
groups  largely based in the City of London:  the  merchant banks, 
branches of foreign banks,  branches  of BritEh banks  largely 
operating overseas  and  specialised subsidiaries of  the  clearing banks. 
They offer specialised financial  services to companies,  often 
launching share  issues,  and  operate  extensively in the  'parallel' 
money  markets  which  grew  up  during the  1960s  - local  authority loans, 
certificates of deposit,  inter-bank lending  and  the Eurodollar market 
-where interest rates are  usually higher than in the  'traditional' 
money markets  such as  that in Treasury bills. 
92 Table  5.1  shows  the  relative importance  of the deposit 
banks  and  secondary banks  in the banking sector over the  last five 
years,  with the  figures  for 1973  to  show  the  rapid growth in the 
importance  of  the  secondary banking  sector.  This  took place  during 
the  period when  severe  restrictions were  placed  on  the  deposit banks. 
Discount houses provide  a  mechanism  for the  orderly flow 
of  short-term funds.  The  banks deposit money  at call with the 
discount houses  in order to earn interest  on their surplus  cash. 
The  discount  houses  then buy short-term assets - until recently 
mostly  'traditional'  assets  such as Treasury and  commercial bills, 
but now  a  wider range  including Eurodollars  and certificates of 
deposit. 
The  discount houses  have  a  joint agreement  to buy  the 
whole  of  each week's  Treasury bill issue  (or that part which is left 
after higher bidders have been satisfied).  They  then pass  them  on 
to  otherinstitutions,  mainly the deposit banks.  In return the 
Bank  of England will always  lend cash to  the  discount houses in the 
last resort.  This can occur when  the  banks call in their deposits 
or they do  not  have  sufficient cash to cover  the Treasury bill issue. 
Such loans  are  usually for  one  week  at the  minimum  lending rate, 
although they can be  at higher rates for  shorter periods. 
Finance houses provide  instalment credit, usually in the 
form  of hire purchase,  but increasingly in the  form  of personal 
loans,  to  individuals  and  companies  wishing to buy  consumer durables 
or plant and machinery.  Their main  sources  of  funds  are  deposits 
from  the  secondary banks  and  overdrafts from  the  clearing banks, 
although  some  of the  larger houses  have branches which accept 
deposits  from  individuals. 
The  National Giro  was  founded by the  government  in 1968 
and  operates  through the Post Office.  It provides  an inexpensive 
cheque  account  and  money  transfer service  for  individuals  and 
companies.  In conjunction with  a  finance  house it has  now  moved  into 
the  field of personal loans. 
There  are  over 400 building societies,  ranging in size 
93 from  the  large national societies to one-branch institutions.  They 
are  outside  the  normal  sphere  of financial control as  they are 
regulated by the Registrar of Friendly Societies as non-profit 
organisations.  Their purpose is to lend money  on mortgages  to 
owner-occupiers for house  purchase  and  they obtain their funds  from 
individuals in much  the  same  way  as  savings banks.  Ordinary 
depositors receive  a  lower rate of interest than shareholders,  but 
have  additional security in the  event  of liquidation.  There  are 
also  added  incentives for regular savers  and all savers  get· priority 
over non-savers in mortgage  lending.  The  authorities have  taken 
steps to  ensure that the building societies are  able  to compete 
successfully for deposits with the banks by limiting the interest 
payable  on  small bank deposit  accounts. 
3.  OTHER  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 
Insurance  companies  and pension funds  use  the  funds  they receive  as 
premiums  and pension contributions mainly to buy long-term assets -
company  securities,  government bonds  and property;  they are  also 
important buyers  of new  share  issues.  In addition they do  a 
relatively small  amount  of  loan and mortgage business.  As  the  size 
of their funds,  particularly pension funds,  grows,  their position 
and  power in the  stock market becomes  increasingly important. 
There  are  also  two  principal types  of collective 
investment institution - investment trusts and unit trusts - whose 
assets are  shares in other companies,  usually public  and  quoted  on 
the Stock Exchange.  Shares in investment  trusts are  themselves 
traded on  the Stock Exchange,  whereas  'units'  in a  unit trust,  which 
is the British form  of a  mutual  fund,  are  bought  and  sold at  a  price 
calculated to reflect the value  of the  assets and  declared by the 
managers,  usually daily.  Over  the past decade  there has been  a 
rapid growth in the market  share  of unit trusts, but they still 
represent  a  very small proportion of the  whole  market in equities. 
Special investment agencies  have been established since 
1945  to  provide  medium  and  long-term capital to  companies  which have 
difficulty raising it from  other sources.  The  most  important are  the 
Finance Corporation for Industry Limited  and  the 
94 the  Industrial and  Commercial  Finance Corporation Limited.  The 
former  lends  sums  of over £200,000  for the  re-equipment  and 
development  of industry.  The  latter offers financialadvice  and 
computer  and other services,  as well as loans,  to  small  and medium-
sized companies.  Generally its loans  are  less than £50,000  for 10 
to  20  years.  In 1974  these  two  institutions were  grouped under a 
single holding  company known  as Finance  for Industry Limited.  The 
share capital is held by the London  and Scottish clearing banks  and 
the  Bank of England. 
The  London  and provincial Stock Exchange  trading floors 
in the United Kingdom  and  the  Irish Republic  are  now  grouped into  a 
single dealing system for  quoted securities, both public  sector and 
private.  Business is introduced by brokers who  work  on  commission 
for buyers  and  sellers.  Brokers must deal through  jobbers,  who 
make  a  market in stocks,  which they deal in on their own  account. 
New  capital for  industry  and  commerce  is raised through the Stock 
Exchange by  share  issues.  Nearly all securities issued on  the 
British market  are  in registered form.  United Kingdom  residents who 
hold bearer securities are required to deposit  them with an 
authorised depository - a  stockbroker,  a  bank or  some  other 
professional intermediary. 
The  government  also directly competes,  through its various 
national  savings facilities,  in the  small  savers'  market.  Facilities 
include  the National Savings Certificate  and the British Savings 
Bond  (both maturity type  securities);  Save  As  You  Earn  (a 
contractual savings  scheme);  the  Premium Savings Bond  (accumulated 
interest is distributed by way  of prizes determined by lot);  and 
facilities offering small  savers easy access to  government  stocks. 
The  National  and  Trustee  Savings Banks  are  deposit institutions who 
offer interest bearing on call and  long-term accounts.  The 
Trustee Savings Banks,  who  also  run  cheque  accounts,  are  expected to 
expand their range  of  services in dEe  course.  Many  of the national 
savings facilities attract tax reliefs. 
4.  SOURCES  OF  FUNDS  FOR  INVESTMENT 
Table  5.2  shows  the  proportions in which non-financial companies 
derive capital funds  from different sources.  About half is generated 
95 internally, but much  of the balance  comes  from bank borrowing.  In 
1973  about half each came  from  the  secondary  and  deposit banks,  but 
in 1969  nearly three  quarters had  come  from  the  deposit banks.  The 
category  'other loans  and  mortgages'  includes  funds  received  from 
the  special investment  agencies  and  from  insurance  companies  and 
pension funds. 
5.  MONETARY  POLICY 
Monetary policy aims both to  assist fiscal policy in the  management 
of overall  demand  in the  economy  and  to prevent excessive  loss of 
reserves  through international  moveme~ts of capital, particularly 
short-term funds.  In pursuit of the latter the  Bank  of England 
deals in the  foreign  exchange  market  and  imposes  exchange  control 
regulations;  there  are  also  other policies, particularly as regards 
interest rates,  which  often have  the international situation in mind. 
When  the  pound is at a  fixed  exchange  rate  the Bank  intervenes in 
the  foreign  exchange  market  to  prevent  movements  outside  the  limits, 
but  when,  as  at present, it is floating,  interventions  are  confined 
to  ensuring that  speculation does  not  push  the  exchange  rate  to 
unrealistic levels. 
Domestic  monetary policy is determined by the  Treasury in 
consultation with the  Bank  of England  and  administered by the  Bank. 
It aims  to  control demand  through regulating the  amount  of 
outstanding credit and,  to  a  lesser extent,  through ensuring that 
the  growth of  the  money  supply is not excessive.  There  has been no 
arithmetic  target for the  growth  of the  money  supply  on either of 
its definitions, but policy has to  some  extent been influenced by 
the  idea that the  money  supply should  accommodate  the real rate  of 
growth  of  the  economy plus  the 'acceptable' rate  of inflation,  which 
would,  of course,  often be  the  current rate.  As  subsidiary 
objectives,  policy seeks  to minimise  the  cost of  the  interest burden 
of the  National  Debt  and  to  ensure  the  health and  solvency of the 
major financial institutions. 
In general,  monetary policy has been much  less important 
thanflBcal  policy in demand  mangement  in postwar Britain.  This  was 
for  a  number  of reasons.  The  policy makers  considered that - with 
some  exceptions  - the  effects of the use  of  monetary policy was 
96 vague  and hard  to ascertain,  with considerable  uncertainty about  the 
sectors of expenditure  which would be  affected.  (Hire  purchase 
controls were  an exception to this.)  Further,  the  authorities were 
constrained in their use  of tbeinterest rate weapon,  both by a 
desire  to keep  an  orderly market  in government securities,  and by 
the  need to use  interest rates primarily to  encourage  short-term 
capital inflows,  or discourage  short-term capital outflows,  in the 
interest of the balance  of payments. 
Consequently,  through most  of the  postwar period the  main 
monetary weapons  used by the  authorities were  two:  first,  the 
influencing of hire purchase  transactions by altering the  size  of 
the  deposits  required  and  the  length of time  over which repayment 
had  to be  made;  and,  secondly,  the  setting of  a  physical limit to 
the  advances  made  by  the  clearing banks,  together with directions 
about  the priorities which the banks  should use.  It was  these 
instructions in the  lending behaviour of the clearing banks which 
led to  the  rise of the  secondary banking  sector (table 5.1).  From 
the  time  of  the  Radcliffe  Committee's Report  on monetary policy,  at 
the  end  of the  1950s,  up  to  the beginning of  the  1970s,  there  was 
very little evolution in the  actual practice of monetary policy. 
Then in September 1971  a  new  system came  into effect;by which  an 
attempt  was  made  to replace  the  direct control  on bank  advances by 
a  system of indirect control,  described below;  the  Bank  of England 
also  ceased to  intervene  to maintain  a  steady rate  of  interest  on 
medium  and  long-term government  stock. 
Debt  management 
The  Bank  of England deals in the market  for  government  bonds  (the 
gilt-edged market)  in its capacity as banker  and  issuing house  to  the 
government.  The  government  tends to  receive  a  large proportion of 
its tax income  in the first quarter,  although public expenditure 
continues  throughout  the year;  in addition, it has  long-term 
investment  programmes  which cannot be  financed  out  of current income. 
It therefore needs  to borrow both short- and  long-term.  In addition, 
a  substantial amount  of marketable  government  debt is outstanding 
1  'Competition  and credit control';  Bank  of England Quarterly 
Bulletin,  June  1971. 
97 (some  £30,000 million in March  1973);  some  of this matures  each 
year  and  requires refinancing.  For these  reasons  the  government 
broker,  acting on behalf of the  Bank,  has  to  maximise his long-run 
sales of bonds to  firm buyers. 
In the  past the  authorities were  prepared  to buy all stock 
offered to  them at the  current price in order to  secure  an orderly 
market.  It was  felt that this led to  excessive marketability of 
the banks'  holdings,  thus  leaving little control  over  the  money 
supply,  and  since  1971,  the  practice has been confined  to  stock with 
one  year or less to maturity.  All  other stock is now  brought  solely 
at  the  authorities'  discretion and  at prices of their own  choosing. 
The  'tap'  stocks  (current issues of different maturities)  are  no 
longer sold at  a  quoted price,  but  the  government broker will accept 
bids for  them.  This had  led to greater variability in the  price  of 
gilt-edged stocks as  a  whole  and  a  decline  in long-term holdings. 
The  authorities now  have  greater scope for using the bond  market  as 
an  instrument  of monetary policy, but  are  faced  with  a  bigger 
refin&ncing problem. 
The  Treasury bill market 
Every  week  there is an issue  of  three-month Treasury bills,  the  size 
of which is determined by short-term financing  and  general policy 
needs.  They  are  bought  largely by the banks  themselves,  and  on 
their behalf by the  discount houses,  as  they  are  an  important 
component  of the  banks'  minimum  reserve  ratios.  The  Bank  of England 
can exercise  influence  over  a  range  of interest rates by varying the 
size  and  thus  the  price  of the  Treasury bill issue.  If the  discount  1 
houses  are  unable  to  cover the issue,  they have  the  right to borrow 
cash from  the  Bank  of England,  usually for  one  week  at minimum 
lending rate,  although this can vary.  As  this is a  penal rate,  in 
order to maintain their margins  the  discount houses  must  increase 
the  rates  they charge  the banks. 
The  rates of interest in the  Treasury bill market  are  less 
important  than they used  to be  since  the  growth  of  the  'parallel' 
money  markets,  but if the Treasury bill issue is particularly small 
the banks  are  often forced  to bid for money  in the  inter-bank or 
sterling certificate of  deposit markets  to  make  up  their reserve 
98 ratios. 
The  minimum  lending rate 
As  a  general rule,  the  minimum  lending rate,  which replaced Bank 
rate in October 1972,  is i  per cent  above  Treasury bill rate  rounded 
up  to  the nearest i  per cent.  Unlike  Bank  rate to which  many  other 
rates  were  tied,  the  minimum  lending rate is only relevant  to  loans 
to  the  discount  houses.  In exceptional circumstances the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer can determine  the  rate  independently and  in 
November  1973 it was  raised from 11i per cent to 13 per cent during 
the  oil crisis.  Such  a  use  has purely psychological impact  and 
gives  an  indication of the  feelings  of the  authorities. 
Regulation  of financial institutions 
The  new  regulations for financial institutions were  drawn  up  after 
consultations in 1971  andreflect the changes  which had  taken place 
during the  1960s,  particularly the  growth  of  the  secondary banks. 
The  aim is to  allow the  authorities  some  control over the  activities 
of  the  institutions without  unduly interfering with competition 
between  them  or discriminating between different types  of 
institution. 
Technically the  regulations  and  directives  imposed by the 
Bank  of England have  no  legal force  and  are  observed voluntarily, 
but powers  exist under the  Bank  of England Act  1946  to  give  them the 
force  of law if necessary.  The  regulations fall into  two  groups: 
permanent  day-to-day rules  and  those  which  the  Bank  invokes  from 
time  to  time  as  circumstances warrant. 
The  permanent  regulations require  that all banks  hold 12i 
per cent of certain liabilities (chiefly sterling deposits  of less 
than  two  years maturity,  net foreign currency liabilities, net inter-
bank  sterling deposits  and net sterling certificates of deposit)  in 
certain specified assets.  These  are  largely  'traditional'  money 
market  assets:  balances at the Bank  of England,  Treasury bills, 
money  at  a  call with the  London  disco·unt  market,  government  stocks 
with  a  maturity of  one  year or less,  local  authority  and  commercial 
bills eligible for  rediscount at the  Bank  of England  and  company tax 
reserve certificates.  The  banks  themselves  can determine  what 
99 Proportion of each asset  they hold,  with the  exception of commercial 
bills which must  not contribute more  than  2  per cent  and the deposit 
banks'  holdings  of cash at the  Bank  of England which must  contribute 
a  minimum  of  1~ per cent.  The  supply of these  assets is largely 
under  the  control  of the  authorities,  so that they can make  it 
easier or more  difficult for the banks  to. make  up their minimum 
reserve  ratios.  However,  eligible liabilities include net inter-
bank  deposits  and  issues of sterling certificates of deposit,  which 
means  that a  bank  can reduce its liabilities and  thus  increase its 
reserve  ratio by lending to other banks  and bidding for sterling 
certificates of deposit.  There  are  special  arrangements  for the 
Northern Ireland banks in view of their particular relations with the 
Republic  of Ireland and  the financial needs  arising out of the 
present emergency. 
Finance houses  must hold  10 per cent of their eligible 
liabilities (all deposits for less than  two  years  other than  those 
from banks)  in the  same  assets. 
The  arrangements  for discount  houses  were  changed in July 
1973,  so  that their total assets excluding certain ones  from  the 
public  sector (largely of less than five  years to maturity)  must  not 
exceed twenty times their capital and  reserves.  Although there is 
no  longer any formal  requirement to  hold public  sector debt,  the 
Bank  of England will only act  as  lender of last resort against 
approved securities, particularly Treasury bills. 
Among  the discretionary regulations the  Bank  of England 
may,  from  time  to  time,  call for  special deposits.  These  are  levied 
on all banks  as  a  uniform percentage  of eligible liabilities and 
must be  deposited in cash at the Bank  of England.  Interest is 
payable  at Treasury bill rate.  They have  the  effect of increasing 
the  minimum  reserve ratio,  as  the banks  have  to  sell liquid assets in 
order to pay the  deposits  and  these  must  then be  replaced.  In 
addition  a  different rate  of special deposits  can be  levied  on  the 
increase in overseas liabilities after a  given date  or  on the 
outstanding total of  such liabilities. 
Since  December  1973  there has been an  additional variation 
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which  allows  the  Bank  of England  to  call for up  to  50  per cent  of 
the  increase in interest-bearing eligible liabilities after a  given 
date  and  above  a  specified rate of increase  to be  placed in non-
interest-bearing special deposits.  Subsequent  comparisons  are 
based  on  a  three-month moving  average.  This instrument is in use  at 
the  present  and applies to both  banks  and  finance  houses  which  accept 
deposits.  The  base  level is the  average  of  the last three months  of 
1973  and  the  allowable  rate  of increase is 8  per cent for the  first 
six months  and 1i per cent  a  month thereafter.  The  penalties vary 
from  5  to  50  per cent depending  on  the rate of excess  growth.  This 
scheme  is designed to  restrain the  increase  in the  money  supply  and 
lending without  rises in short-term interest rates. 
The  other main  discretionary weapons  are  the  power  to 
restrict the interest paid  on  deposit  accounts in order to protect 
the building societies  and  savings banks  in competition for  small 
savings,  and  the  power to issue  guidelines  on  the  direction although 
not  the  total of  lending. 
Hire  purchase controls 
Controls  over  the  terms  on which hire purchase  lending can be 
conducted  are  strictly speaking under  the  control of the  Secretary of 
State for Prices  and  Consumer Protection,  not  the  monetary 
authorities, but they are  generally regarded as  a  monetary instrument 
The  regulations lay down  the  minimum  deposit  and  the maximum 
repayment period for different classes of consumer  goods.  Unlike 
other instruments their effect on  demand  is immediate,  but they are 
discriminatory both between persons  (hitting only those  who  cannot 
afford to pay cash)  and between industries.  Largely for these 
reasons their abolition was  recommended by the  Committee  on  Consumer 
Credit in 1971  and,  with the  lifting of restrictions in July of that 
year, it was  widely believed that this recommendation had been 
followed.  However,  the  authorities were  reluctant to  lose  such  a 
useful weapon  and  new  restrictions were  imposed in 1973. 
The  competition  and  credit control arrangements  introduced 
in 1971,  which replaced  a  system of ceilings on bank  lending,aimed to 
influence  the  aggregate  supply  and  allocation of credit through its 
cost,  while  also providing  scope  for the  authorities to influence  the 
101 direction of bank  lending  ~hrough directional guidance.  The 
introduction in December  ~973 of the  supplementary deposits  scheme 
has  meant that the  authorities  once  again have  a  more  direct means 
of  influencing the  growth  of money  and credit than was  provided for 
in the  ~97~  arrangements. 
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Table 5.2.  Sources of ca:12ital  funds  of industrial and  commercial  com:12anies, 
1969-73 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
(percentages) 
Undistributed income  56  51  54  48  46 
Investment grants  10  8  8  3  2 
Other capital transfers  1  1  1  1  1 
Bank  borrowing  11  19  11  31  32 
Other loans  and mortgages  4  5  5  1  7 
UK  capital issues  9  3  6  6  1 
Overseas  10  12  15  9  11 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
(£ millions) 
Total value  5,793  5,878  6,376  9,573  13,452 
SOURCE:  Financial Statistics,  May  1974. 
Table 5.1.  De:12osit  and  secondary bank  share~ in total banking sector de:12osits 
and  advances,  1963-73 
Percentages 
1963  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Deposits 
Deposit banks  74  43  40  38  36  32 
Secondary banks  25  57  60  60  63  67 
Advances 
Deposit banks  66  30  27  26  26  25 
Secondary banks  33  70  73  74  72  74 
SOURCE:  Bank  of England Quarterly Bulletin. 
~  All figures  at end-December. 
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CHAPTER  6 
EXTERNAL  TRADE  AND  PAYMENTS 
1.  GENERAL  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS 
The  United Kingdom  has had  a  deficit  on visible trade  in all but  a 
few  years  since  the beginning  of  the  nineteenth century.  Usually 
the deficit has been more  than matched by  a  surplus  on  invisible 
transactions, but between the First and  Second  World  Wars  this was 
tending to dwindle,  while  at the  same  time  exports were  declining in 
both value  and volume,  although imports  were  rather more  stable. 
Consequently  the  balance  of payments  on  current  account is believed 
to  have  been  in slight deficit in the  years  immediately preceding 
the  Second  World War. 
In the  postwar period the deficit on visible trade  has  on 
the  whole  increased  (table 6.1);  in 1973 it reached £2,355 million, 
some  3i times  the  highest figure  previo~sly recorded.  This,  however, 
reflects the  rise in turnover.  Even in 1973  the  value  of  imports 
was  some  sixteen or  seventeen times  as high  as  in 1938,  whereas  the 
value  of exports was  twenty times  as high.  In real terms  the 
comparison is even more  favourable,  imports having risen less than 
threefold and  exports nearly fourfold.  For manufactures,  on the 
other hand,  the  story is rather different,  partly no  doubt because 
of the  dominating position of United Kingdom  products at  the 
beginning of  the  period.  Between  1937  qnd  1973  imports  of 
manufactures  increased in volume  five  to ·six times  and  exports 
increased  fo.ur  times. 
From  1925 until 1935 the United Kingdom  terms  of trade 
improved,  reaching  a  level that was  only gradually regained through 
the  1950s  and  1960s after a  sharp deterioration in the  late  1940s  and 
105 early 1950s.  The  interwar improvement partly compensated for  the 
worsening in the balance  of trade in real terms,  while  the early 
postwar-deterioration reduced the effect of  the  relative increase in 
the  volume  of exports.  In 1973,  however,  because  of the rise in 
commodity prices,  the  terms  of trade  turned violently against  the 
United Kingdom  and a  further worsening in the first half of 1974 
brought  them back  to about  the  level of  the Korean War  period, 
although they began to improve  again in the  second half of  the year. 
The  problem of  a  visible deficit has not  in the past been 
as  serious for the  United Kingdom  as  for other developed countries, 
although if present trends continue it will become  increasingly 
important.  The  United Kingdom  was  able  to tolerate  rapid  growth in 
the  volume  of  imports in the  1930s  and  1950s partly because  of 
favourable  terms  of trade.  But broadly from  the beginning of at 
least the  1960s,  and probably in the  1970s until circumstances made 
it obviously impossible,  the intention has been that a  surplus  on 
invisible  account  should  finance  a  small  trade deficit,  an  outflow 
of capital (first principally as investment,  recently as aid)  and 
any desired increase in the reserves.  As  the United Kingdom's 
widespread,  though contracting,  overseas  commitments  imply  a 
substantial deficit on  government  account,  this postulates  an  even 
bigger surplus  on private  services.  The  invisible balance has  alwa~s 
in fact been positive;  but  since  the  ~iddle of 1972  and 
particularly after the  oil price increases the  surplus of invisibles 
has been too  small to offset the increased deficit on visible trade, 
so  that the capital account,  previously in surplus only in 1960-1  and 
1970-1,  has also financed part of the latter.  The  net flow of 
capital for private investment had previously been inward  only in 
occasional years, but substantial net inflows were  recorded both in 
1971  and in 1973,  when  the  public  sector capital account had its 
first large surplus.  Apart  from these long-term capital inflows, 
which will probably continuefor  some  years at least,  the  other main 
source  of finance  in recent years  (as in the  late 1940s)  has been the 
building up  of  sterling reserves by other countries. 
Availability of North Sea oil from  1975  onwards  should 
bring the net cost of oil imports back to  about  the  1973 level by 
1980  (either by reducing imports or by providing  export  income  from 
106 which continuing imports  can be  financed).  By  the mid 1980s net 
exports of oil could reverse  the traditional deficit on visible 
trade.  The  surplus  on property income  may  also be eliminated  by 
the interest  and profits accruing to  foreign participants in the 
exploitation of the oil,  including those  who  have  financed related 
imports  of  equipment.  But  unless North Sea oil production 
necessitates an increase in such imports  or the  diversion of output 
from  export markets  (both of which  are unlikely),  the  surplus  on 
non-oil trade  that was  usual before  1973 may  be  restored.  Net 
exports of oil, if they materialised,  would  then  make  it possible to 
achieve  the postwar goal  of current  surplus  (which might by the  1980s 
be  needed to  reduce  external liabilities created by the post-1972 
deficits rather than to  increase external  assets~. 
2.  THE  COMMONWEALTH  PREFERENCE  AND  STERLJNG  AREA  SYSTEMS 
Perhaps the  outstanding feature  of British commercial policy over the 
past  50  years has been the  establishment  and  subsequent dissolution 
of preferential arrangements  of various kinds in favour of the 
Commonwealth  and Sterling Area. 
Though  membership  of  the  two  areas overlapped to  an 
important extent,  there  were  in fact  two  systems,  differing both in 
coverage  and in organisation.  The  Commonwealth Preference  Area 
comprised all members  of  the  Commonwealth,  South Africa and  the Irish 
Republic;  the Sterling Area  excluded  one  major Commonwealth  country 
- Canada  - and  included  a  number  of other countries,  varying from 
time  to  time,  within the British sphere  of influence either 
politically or commercially. 
The  Commonwealth Preference Area  originated in the  1930s 
with the  extension of the  previously limited duties  on United 
Kingdom  imports.  This provided the  opportunity for  an  area with 
special privileges to be  formed,  although the  basic privilege was 
only exemption  from  the  new  restrictions. 
The  introduction of  exchange  controls  and dollar pooling 
for the Sterling Area during  the  Second World  War  marked the 
beginning of  a  formally defined area.  For its overseas  members  the 
107 change  was  from  keeping reserves in London  from habit  and  for 
convenience  to being expected not  only to keep  them there but to 
accept co-ordination of their use  according  to  the  needs  of the  area 
as·a whole.  Freedom  of action was  particularly limited for  some  of 
the  colonial countries,  where  the domestic  currency issue still 
required complete  sterling backing,  and  the  only complete  exception 
to  the general rule  was  the  Union  of South Africa,  which continued to 
keep  a  high proportion of its reserves in gold.  The  pooling  and 
restrictions represented  a  reversal  of  the  trend of  the  1930s  towards 
a  reduction in effective United Kingdom  direction of  the  monetary 
policies of the Sterling Area  countries,  particuarly the  independent 
ones. 
In the  early years after the  Second World  War  the 
existence  of exchange  controls  on  payments  to  and  from non-Sterling 
Areas  gave  the  Sterling Area  a  further  stimulus because  of its 
exemption  from  the United Kingdom's  controls.  The  United Kingdom 
also  gave  uniform and preferential quota treatment  to Sterling Area 
products,and it gave  uniform tariff treatment to  goods  originating 
in the  Commonwealth Preference Area,  although the  range  of  goods  to 
which the  preference  applied  was  not  large.1  This  uniformity was 
not reciprocated,  however.  Many  Commonwealth  countries  gave British 
goods  no  tariff preferences or very  few;  some  Sterling Area  countr~s 
operated  a  generalised  system  of  quotas  and  exchange  controls that 
gave  no  preference  to  imports  from  other Sterling Area  countries. 
In the  1930s  the  United Kingdom  had provided  other 
Sterling Area  countries,  particularly the  food  producers,  with  a 
stable market;  the  central control  of imports in the  1940s permitted 
long-term contracts that had  a  similar effect.  In the  1950s  and 
1  In one  special caee,  sugar,  the United Kingdom  paid negotiated 
prices  on  fixed  quantities of imports  from  the  Commonwealth under  the 
Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement,  the  negotiated prices normally being 
well  above  world market prices.  In the  immediate  postwar years it 
had  operated  a  number  of other commodity  long-term bulk-purchasing 
agreements,  but  these  had effectively disappeared by the  early 1960s. 
108 especially in the  ~960s, however,  the  shift in the  commodity 
composition of world  trade  made  the  existence  of  an  organisation 
providing complementary markets  less important,  and  over  the  last 
fifteen or twenty years there has been  a  drastic re-orientation of 
preferential trading arrangements:  the  system of Commonwealth 
Preference  and  the Sterling Area  was  first ended  and  then,  in the 
process  of negotiating entry to the  European Communities, 
deliberately dismantled. 
The  restraints of the  early postwar years which had been 
directed at discouraging  expenditure  outside  the Sterling Area,  and 
particularly in Dollar Area  countries,  lapsed for the  independent 
Sterling Area  countries  as  early as  the  ~950s.  Such preferences 
as  Overseas Sterling Area  countries had  given to Britain and to  one 
another by  means  of exchange  controls  and  quotas virtually 
disappeared,  as  did the  similar pn!erences  accorded by  the United 
Kingdom. 
The  Sterling Area  remained  in being after  ~960 because 
exchange  controls were  not  applied to  investment by United Kingdom 
residents in the  Overseas Sterling Area  - a  privilege abolished when 
the  pound  was  floated in  ~972 - but when  sterling was  devalued in 
November  ~967 a  number  of Overseas Sterling Area  countries did not 
change  the  par value  of their own  currencies correspondingly.  These 
countries nevertheless continued to keep  a  large proportion of their 
foreign  exchange  reserves in British government  assets.  From  ~968 
onwards  the United Kingdom  guaranteed the  great part of these 
sterling reserves against devaluation by  a  series of agreements  in 
which Sterling Area countries undertook in return that·tire proportion 
of their reserves  (though not  the  amount)  held in sterling would  be 
maintained at or  above  a  prescribed figure. 
were  ,  however,  allowed to  lapse  in  ~974. 
These  arrangements 
Meanwhile preferential margins  in the  United Kingdom 
tariff,  which in  ~96~ was  equivalent  to  about  7  per cent  ad valorem, 
were  being eroded in a  number  of ways.  First,  where  duties were 
specific rather than  ad valorem,  rising prices steadily reduced the 
percentage  preference margin.  Secondly,  where  'most  favoured nation' 
duties  on products paying no  duty if imported  from  the  Commonwealth 
109 into the  United Kingdom  - in practice most  manufactured products  -
were  reduced  in the  course  of the  GATT  negotiations,  the margin of 
preference  was  automatically reduced.  Thirdly,  the  creation of 
EFTA  during the years  1959-67 diluted the  effectiveness of United 
Kingdom  preferencesto the  Commonwealth by putting Commonwealth  and 
EFTA  manufactures  on  the  same  tariff footing.  There  is some 
evidence  that this led to  trade diversion in favour of EFTA.  Finall~ 
unilateral tariff changes  led to  the  reduction or dilution of 
preferences,  initially affecting only United Kingdom  exports to  the 
Commonwealth.  However,  at the beginning of 1972 the  United Kingdom 
made  two  major  steps:  it introduced  a  preferential duty on 
Commonwealth  cotton textiles and clothing,  formerly duty-free,  and  a 
system of generalised preferences for manufactures  other than 
textiles from  developing countries,  putting  them  on  a  par with the 
developing countries in the  Commonwealth. 
Thus,  even had Britain not  sought  to  join the  EEC,  the 
Commonwealth  Preference  and Sterling Area  systems  were  rapidly 
declining in importance  during the  1950s  and 1960s;  but this 
decision  amounted  to  a  death blow.  The  psychological  impact  of  the 
abortive negotiations  of 1957-8 was  itself important,  while  the 
creation of EFTA,  the  free  trade  association of Britain,  the 
Scandinanvian countries,  Portugal,  Switzerland and Austria,  had  a 
direct effect on  trade between the United Kingdom  and  the 
Commonwealth.  In the  1961-3 negotiations for entry into the  EEC 
the  United Kingdom  was  still seeking to retain some  part of the 
Commonwealth Preference  system,  but by the  time  of the  final 
negotiations for  entry this special treatment had been reduced  to 
medium-term guarantees  on United Kingdom  imports  of  Commonwealth 
sugar and  New  Zealand butter and cheese,  association with the 
Community  for  some  minor  Commonwealth  countries  and  territories,1 
and easier Community tariff treatment  for  a  handful of products  of 
interest to  Commonwealth  producers. 
1  The  major African Commonwealth  countries already have  association 
agreements  with the Six,  while  Asian  and  developed  Commonwealth 
countries are being treated like  the  rest of the  world. 
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the  final  stages of transition from  the  old Commonwealth Preference 
and Sterling Area  systems  to the  new  Community  system.  If all goes 
according to  the  Treaty of Accession,  tariffs between Britain and 
the rest of the enlarged Community will have  been abolished by 
July 1977  and  the  Common  External Tariff will have been fully 
adopted by the  United Kingdom  along with the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy.  Britain will also,  of course,  participate in any 
developments  of  the  common  commercial policy of the  EEC. 
3.  TRADE  LIBERALISATION 
The  other major  development  of the postwar period in the  sphere  of 
trade policy has been the  liberalisation of  trade  on  a  multilateral 
basis,in common  with all  other members  of the EEC,  through 
tariff reductions,  and  through the  abolition of  quantitative  import 
restrictions,  and  exchange  controls. 
As  a  founder-member  of the  International Monetary  Fund  and 
the Organization for European Economic  Cooperation,  Britain directed 
its commercial policies during the  1950s  towards  restoring the 
convertibility of  sterling (associated with the  removal  of  exchange 
controls  on  current  though not  on capital transactions)  and towards 
the abolition of  quota restrictions on  imports.  Formal 
convertibility under article 8  of the International Monetary  Fund 
was  adopted in 1961;  but  the  pound had  in effect been convertible 
for non-residents  since February 1955,  when  the  Exchange  Equalisation 
Account began to  support  the  rate for non-convertible  sterling, 
previously sold for foreign  exchange  only at a  discount. 
Meanwhile,  quota restrictions  on Sterling Area  imports, 
which had been of little significance  since  1955,  were  effectively 
abolished in 1958.  The  removal  of quotas  on  imports  from  the  OEEC 
and  the Dollar Area  took slightly longer,  until mid-1960  and  1961 
respectively.  Quotas  on  Japanese  goods  and  imports  from  the Sino-
Soviet bloc  were  maintained into  the  1960s,  but  there  was  steady 
progress towards  liberalisation.  In contrast,  a  system of  quotas 
on  imports  of cotton textiles and  clothing  from developing countries 
was  gradually built up  over the  same  years.  However,  apart  from this, 
111 some  restrictions  on  imports  from  Sino-Soviet countries  and  a  few 
quotas  remaining  on minor items,  physical controls  on United Kingdom 
imports had  disapp~ared by  the  end  of the  1960s. 
Thus  the  sole major  instrument  of  commercial policy,  save 
in respect  of farm produce,  is now  the tariff.  Britain's  'most 
favoured nation'  tariff has  always  had negligible  or zero duties  on 
raw materials, but used to  give  considerable protection to 
manufactures.  Tariff reductions from  the  early postwar tariff-
cutting programme,  under  the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT),  which culminated in the Geneva  Round  of 1956,  made  little 
differe~ to this  situation.  As  elsewhere,  significant tariff 
reductions began with the  Dillon Round  and  were  carried on in the 
Kennedy  Round  on  a  greatly increased scale.  Between 1960  and  1972, 
the  United Kingdom's  'most  favoured nation'  tariff on manufactures 
was  reduced by  roughly two  fifths,  with reductions of  a  half applying 
to  a  high proportion of finished goods,  especially machinery  and 
vehicles.  At  the beginning of 1972  the  average  United Kingdom 
tariff on non-agricultural goods  was  only  a  few  percentage points 
higher than  the  Common  External Tariff,  where  formerly it had been 
considerably higher. 
Though  duties are  applied to  imports  of many  kinds  of 
temperate  foodstuffs,  the chief instrument  of protection here is now 
a  system,  introduced gradually during  the  1960s  and  early 1970s,  of 
import  levies  and  minimum  import prices for major cereals, beef  and 
certain dairy products.  At  the  same  time,  the  United Kingdom  still 
retains elements  of its former  method  of agricultural protection, 
depending  on  a  system of annually negotiated guaranteed prices, 
whereby  the  government pays producers  the  difference between market 
prices and  the  guaranteed price in order to maintain farm  incomes. 
4.  EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICY 
Before  the First World  War  there had been little change  in exchange 
rates,  and it was  assumed that this situation would  continue;  the 
fact  that  the value  of the  pound  in terms  of  the  dollar had fallen 
sharply during  and  immediately after the  war  was  considered  a  result 
of  temporary strain because  of high  imports  and restricted exports. 
112 (Only  the dollar rate  was  considered  and  this remained generally 
true until the  early  ~970s in devaluation decisions.)  The  decision 
to return to  the  prewar rate  ($4.86)  was  thus treated as  a  timing 
decision rather than  a  decision about  the  appropriate  rate.  The  rise 
in the  rate in early  ~925 was  both  a  confirmation of this assumption 
and  an indication that  the  timing could be  brought  forward.  That 
adjustments  to  domestic  prices might be  needed  was  recognised,  but 
this was  treated as  a  necessary cost,  not  as  a  possible influence  on 
the  decision.  The  appreciation,  followed by the  failure  of 
United States prices to rise  as rapidly as  expected  and France's 
return to  gold with a  devaluation,  made  British exports uncompetitive 
in those  markets  in the late  ~920s.  The  adjustments necessary to 
hold  the  new  exchange  rate proved to  be  impossible  and,  combined  with • 
the  loss of confidence  in other currencies,  to threaten a  flight of 
capital from  sterling in  ~93~.  The  gold  standard was  accordingly 
abandoned  for  the  rest of  the  ~930s. 
The  government did not intervene  to  slow the  resulting 
fall in the  value  of  the  pound.  But in  ~932 when  it began to 
recover (at about $3.50),  control was  introduced,  directed at 
preventing disturbances in external markets  from hurting domestic 
policy.  (It was  in this year  too  that  import duties were  increased 
and  the Sterling Area began to be  encouraged.)  The  exchange 
Equalisation Account provided,  through dealings in Treasury bills, 
some  insulation from  short-term capital flows.  The  value  of  the 
pound in terms  of other currencies rose  through the  ~930s, rising 
above  the  former rate at the  end  of the  period and  losing its 
competitive position. 
After the  war  a  lower parity was  held at  ~4.03, helped by 
exchange  controls.  An  attempt  to restore convertibility in  ~947 
under  the  terms  of  the  ~945 Anglo-American  loan agreement  failed, 
and  in September  ~949 the  rate  was  lowered  to  ~2.80.  For the 
United Kingdom  this change  was  perhaps  a  reaction more  to capital 
account  problems  than to  import  increases;  controls still kept  these 
to  a  low level.  As  the  devaluation immediately preceded  a  large 
rise in commodity prices, it increased their effect.  For the 
United Kingdom its size  was,  however,  reduced by the  number  of 
countries inside  and  outside  the  Sterling Area  that maintained their 
113 currencies'  existing parities with the  pound.  The  principal effect 
was  thus to reinforce  the  planned diversion of imports  from  and 
exports to  the  Dollar Area by the  Sterling area  as  a  whole. 
Throughout  the  1950s  and  the first half of the  1960s, 
maintaining the parity unchanged  was  a  central consideration in the 
United Kingdom's  external policy.  The  ability to maintain the  rate 
was  helped by the  introduction of  swap  arrangements  among  central 
banks.  The  possibility of devaluation  to  improve  the  current 
balance  was  discussed  from  the  mid-1960s,  but,  as in the  1920s, 
attempts  were  made  to  adjust the  economy  to  the  exchange  rate, until 
huge  short-term outlaws made  inevitable  the  movement  to  a  lower 
rate  (~2.40) in November  1967.  The  subsequent  improvement  in the 
current balance  was  slow  to  materialise  and  was  partly the result 
of  growing  world tade, but it was  widely  accepted as  a  demonstration 
of the  success  of  the devaluation,  and  opposition to  a  more 
flexible  exchange  rate was  correspondingly weakened.  In 1971  the 
floating  and  devaluation of  the  dollar caused  the  pound  to float for 
four months  and,  although the mistake  of  returning to  an  overvalued 
parity was  made  yet  again,  in the  summer  of  1972 floating and 
devaluation were  no  longer feared  and unfamiliar,  and  could be 
introduced without delay. 
Movements  in the  exchange  rate have  of course  affected the 
invisible balance  and  the  capital account  as  well  as visible trade. 
Property income,  in particular,  has risen through devaluation,  as 
sterling-denominated payments  abroad  do  not  change,  while  foreign 
currency receipts increase in sterling terms.  Such benefits  will 
be  reduced  as  payments  denominated in foreign  curre.ncy  on  loans  from 
abroad become  more  important,  but these  would  have  to  rise more 
than is probable before  the situation would be  completely reversed. 
Similarly,  on capital account,  the  borrowing in non-sterling 
currency is a  potential burden.  But until the  offering of exchange 
rate guarantees,  which have  now  been withdrawn,  devaluation improved 
the  ratio between  these  and  short-term sterling liabilities by 
increasing the  sterling value  of reserves  of  foreign currency. 
5.  IMPORTS  AND  EXPORTS 
The  volume  of imports  of goods  was  about  four times  as great in 1973 
114 as  at the  turn of  the  century (table 6.2);  it doubled in the first 
60  years  and  has  doubled  again during the last decade.  Two  world 
wars,  the  great depression,  and restrictions and import duties of 
varying  severity hampered  import  development  during  the  former  perio~ 
On  the  other hand  from  the  early 1960s  an unprecedented  import 
growth  accompanied  the  import  liberalisation measures  already 
described and  a  rapid rise in home  demand.  In general,  import 
growth lagged behind the increase in national product in volume 
terms  during the first half of this century, but far outstripped it 
in later years,  with imports  of manufactures rising particularly 
fast.  Until  the beginning  of  the  1970s  fuel  imports  also 
increased very rapidly,  whereas  imports  of  food,  beverages  and 
tobacco  and  of basic materials have  throughout  risen relatively 
slowly. 
In value  terms  the  ratio  of imports to national product 
has  changed little in the  last 25  years,  import prices having risen 
a  good  deal  more  slowly than domestic  prices until 1973.  There  have, 
however,  been big changes  in the  composition of imports.  Imports 
of  food,  beverages  and  tobacco  shrank  from  almost half of  the  total 
value  in 1935-8 to  a  fifth last year  and  imports  of basic materials 
accounted  for  only  12 per cent  of all merchandise  imports in 1973, 
compared with  26  per cent before  the  Second  World War  and  about  30 
per cent  in the  early 1950s  (table 6.3).  On  the  other hand,  fuel 
imports had,  by the  1950s,  grown  from practically nothing at the 
turn of  the  century into  a  group  which regularly constituted  about 
10-12 per cent  of  the  total until 1974,  when  this  share  rose  to 
about  20  per cent  as  a  result of the  increase in oil prices.  At  the 
same  time  the  share  of the  total accounted  for by imports  of 
manufactures  rose  by  1973  to  56  per cent,  although up  to  the mid-
1950s it had been  only  about  20  per cent,  as in 1935-8. 
The  volume  of  food  imports  rose by about  50  per cent 
between  1900  and  1937, but then  remained below  the  1937  level until 
the  late 1950s.  This  was  partly due  to  the  incentives given to 
British agriculture during  and after the  war.  But  imports of  food 
per head  of  the population during the  last ten years have been on 
115 the  whole  lower than in  ~960-3.  Again,  imports  of basic materials 
were  only about  20  per cent higher in  ~973 than in  ~938 and  imports 
per unit of manufacturing  o·utput  were  lower by over  a  half. 
Falls in the ratio of  imports  of materials to industrial 
production  weree~ecially sharp during the  two  world  wars,  although 
apparently continuing on  a  much  smaller scale  in peacetime  also.~ 
The  chief reasons  have been the decline  of  the textile  and  other 
industries which  are heavily dependent  on  imported materials,  the 
partial replacement by synthetic products  of natural fibres  and 
rubber,  and  the  new  applications of manufactured materials as 
substitutes for natural  ones,  for example  the  use  of steel instead 
of timber in building. 
The  volume  of fuel  imports has  increased  on  average  by 
about  7  per cent annually during  the  last twenty years.  Not 
surprisingly,  there has been  a  marked  slowing down  after the 
spectacular rise during the first half of the century which 
accompanied  the  development  of the  internal combustion  engine  for 
mass  transport  and industrial use.  The  volume  of  imports of 
manufactures  regained its prewar level in five  years after the 
First World War,  but the  same  process  took  ten years after the Second 
World  War.  Subsequently,  however,  there has been a  spectacular rise 
in most  groups  of manufactures.  This  applied most notably to 
finished  goods,  where  the rise has  often been  20-30  per cent or more 
in one  year.  Between  ~956-9 and  ~973 total imports  of finished 
manufactures  increa~d  over ninefold in volume  and,  within this 
group,  transport  equipment  grew  twelvefold.  In value  terms  the 
share  of machinery and transport equipment  in total imports  was  ~ 
times  as  large in  ~973 as it had been in the late  ~950s,  whereas 
over the  same  period chemicals  and  textiles nearly doubled their 
respective  shares. 
~  M.FG.  Scott,  A Study of United Kingdom  Imports,  Cambridge 
Univasity Press,  ~963, pp.  28-9.  On  a  definition which  includes non-
ferrous metals,  Scott estimates,  however,  that imports  of materials 
increased by about 40  per cent  from  ~900 to  ~938. 
116 In considering the recent  growth in imports  of 
manufactures it is important  to  remember  that,  whereas  their volume 
is estimated to have  increased about  2i times  from  ~9~3 to  ~959 for 
all industrial countries,  there  was  little change  in the 
corresponding  figures  for United Kingdom  imports.  Over this period 
the  apparent  import  content of supplies  of manufactured  goods  in 
the United Kingdom  decreased  from  ~7 per cent  to 6  per cent  and it 
is estimated that in  ~959 imports  of manufactures per head  of 
population were  about  ~0 per cent  lower  than in  ~899 and  a  third 
lower than in  ~9~3 and  ~929.  Consequently it seems  reasonable  to 
assume  that British imports  were  abnormally  low prior to the  strong 
upsurge  which produced  a  fivefold increase between  ~957 and  ~973 in 
imports  of manufactures per  head.~ 
Between  ~900 and  ~973 the United Kingdom's  share  of  the 
world  export trade  in manufactures fell  from  33  per cent to  9  per 
cent,  although the  importance  of production for  export in total 
United Kingdom  output  was  roughly the  same  at both dates  - about  a 
quarter of  GNP.  Over the  same  period dramatic  changes  occurred in 
the  composition of exports.  Among  commodities there  was  a  sustained 
decline in the  share  of textiles in total exports  of manufactures, 
and  a  corresponding increase in sales of chemical products, 
machinery  and  transport equipment.  Among  foreign markets  there  was 
a  fluctuating balance between Sterling Area  and  West  European 
customers,  the  former becoming  dominant  in the  interwar years  and 
the  latter gaining in relative  importance  in the  ~960s (table 6.4). 
The  spread of industrialisation abroad- thro~Germany 
and North America in the  late nineteenth century,  and  through the 
rest of Europe,  Russia,  Japan  and  major Commonwealth  territories 
in the  twentieth - was  the key factor determining these trends in 
export level and  structure.  The  reduction in Britain's share  of 
output  of manufactures that this implied in itself contributed to 
the  reduction in its share  of world  trade.  But  more  important  was  a 
1  Estimates in this paragraph are  from  A.  Maizels,  Industrial Growth 
and  World  Trade,  Cambridge University Press,  1963. 
117 continuous failure  to  adapt  to  the  new  patterns of competition  and 
comparative  advantage  thrown  up  by the  general  economic  growth. 
This  deterioration took place  in  two  phases,  separated in 
time by  the  Second  World  War.  The  first was  characterised by  a  loss 
of cost advantages  in traditional exports.  The  early specialisation 
in labour-intensive  lines  such  as  coal  and  cotton became  increasingly 
inappropriate  in the  1920s  as  textile industries developed  in Asia 
and  mining  expanded  in the Netherlands  and  central Europe.  Losses 
in cost  competitiveness in iron and  steel production  vis-~-vis 
Germany  and  the  United States were  another  important  factor.  In 
part,  this reflected genuine  productivity differences  - the British 
capital  stock  was  older and  the  labour force  slow to  adjust  to  the 
new  industrial order - but  the  over-valuation of sterling after the 
gold  standard was  readopted in 1925  also contributed to the 
disparities between  the  United Kingdom's  export prices and  those  of 
its competitors.  The  United Kingdom  thus failed  to profit from 
growth in advanced  economies  and by the  1930s  the  bulk of its export 
trade was  concentrated  on  the preferential Sterling Area markets. 
The  adverse  terms  of trade,  and hence  lower real incomes; encountered 
by the  primary producing countries in the  1930s  thus  meant  declining 
markets  for British goods.  The  United Kingdom  lost ground  in a 
contracting volume  of  world  trade  and  the  potential direct 
contribution of exports to  GNP  growth  was  much  reduced. 
In the  second,  postwar,  phase  of British export growth, 
trade  consisted increasingly of the  exchange  of manufactured  goods 
with  other industrialised countries.  There  was  some  further erosion 
of  export  shares  on  the  earlier pattern,  one  notable  example  being 
the  substitution of Japanese  iron and  steel in Australian and 
New  Zealand  imports  during  the  trade  liberalisation of tmmid-1950s. 
However,  the  striking feature  of that period was  the  elevation of 
exports  of  engineering products  to  a  role  no  less dominant  than that 
of textiles at the  turn of  the  century;  and  this was  a  position to 
which  the  commodity mixes  of  other leading trading nations also 
converged.  In this competitive  climate,  the British share  of the 
fast  expanding world  trade  in manufactures  proved  extremely 
vulnerable  and  fell  from  25m 99  per cent between  1950  and  1973; 
two  thirds of  the  overall decline  since  1900  thus  occurred after  195~ 
118 The  devaluation of  1967  was  followed by  a  considerable 
improvement  in the  annual  rate  of growth  of  the  volume  of exports 
(table 6.5)  from  3  per cent between 1960  and  1967 to 7t per cent 
over the next  six years.  The  credit for this - and  for  the 
consequent  increase in the  importance  of exports in output  - was, 
however,  shared with  a  coincidental  acceleration in worHtrade. 
6.  INVISIBLES 
The  invisible  surplus has  fallen in real value  since  the  1920s  and 
prospects for parts of it are  not  favourable.  Of  the  three 
components  of  the  account,  property  income  has  always  provided the 
major  source  of funds,  services have  occasionally been in deficit 
and  only in recent years  in surplus  on  the  same  scale  as property 
income,  while  transfers have  always been in deficit. 
After the First World  War,  shipping receipts,  the 
traditional source  of invisible earnings,  fell because  freight  rates 
and Britain's share  of  shipping were  lower.  But in spite of another 
large fall after the  Second  World  War,  in which  the  merchant  fleet 
wasreduced by  a  quarter,  the balance  remained positive until the 
1950s,  since  when  it has been in deficit.  The  United Kingdom  share 
of tonnage  has  continued to fall and  freight costs have  grown  faster 
on  imports  than  on  exports.  Deficits are  likely to  continue because 
of  rising oil costs  and  the  increasing volume  of  shipping.  The 
surplus  on civil aviation has  in the  past usually been sufficient to 
balance  the  shipping deficit.  On  travel,  although there  was  a 
deficit in the  early years,  there has  recently been  a  small,  but 
falling,  surplus.  Other private services,  principally insurance 
and banking,  have  had  an increasing surplus.  They  suffered least 
after both wars  and  are  less sensitive  to  conitions in the  United 
Kingdom.  However,  they cannot alone  provide  a  substantial  surplus 
on  services. 
Net  property income  has  increased rapidly since  1960, 
when  its money  value  was  about  the  same  as  in the  1920s.  But,  after 
the  liquidation of British overseas  investment  to the  amount  of  over 
£1,000 million in the  Second  world war,  it is still much  lower  in 
real terms  than it was  in the  interwar period.  The  surplus will now 
be  reduced by  the  interest payments  on  p·ublic  sector borrowing  and by 
119 the returns  on  increased private overseas investment in the  United 
Kingdom. 
Private transfers have  never been large.  Government 
transfers  and  services are  a  new  postwar deficit,  although this rose 
only slowly after 1962  and fell in the late 1960s.  Expenditure  on 
administrative  services has  increased rapidly during the  postwar 
period,  faster than the rate  of inflation.  Aid  payments  stagnated 
until 1971,  and  there  was  a  slow  growth in military spending at 
current prices.  There  was  an  increase in net transfers in 1973 
because  of  entry into the  EEC. 
7.  CAPITAL  BALANCE 
The  reversal  of  the  previous net outflow of capital for private 
investment is one  of the  major  changes  in the  United Kingdom balance 
of payments  in the  last few  years.  It has been the  result of a  very 
slow  growth  of investment,  particularly portfolio investment,  from 
the United Kingdom  (except that financed  from  loans raised abroad) 
combined with increasing investment  in the  United Kingdom, 
particularly in securities and  North Sea  oil.  The  outflows,  even 
in the  1950s,  were  small  in real value  compared  with  those  of  the 
1920s  and  1930s.  The  flows  of capital in both directions,  however, 
remain very large  compared  with those  of  other countries  except  the 
United States. 
In contrast to  the  long-term position,  short-term 
liabilities have  normally exceeded assets.  The  growth of  the 
Eurodollar market  has  meant  a  very rapid rise in recent years in both 
assets  and liabilities (table 6.6), but  the  net inflow of short-term 
capital has  increased partly because  United Kingdom  interest rates 
have  been relatively high. 
The  preferred  form  of short-term capital inflow has been 
official deposits,  particularly those  of sterling countries,whose 
holdings  have  fluctuated  least.  These  had  always  existed as both 
the  working balances  and  the  long-term holdings  of Sterling Area  and 
other countries, but during the  Second World  War  they increased 
sharply and  were  more  clearly distinguished  from  other British 
liabilities.  At  that  time  most  of  the  sterling reserves  were  held 
120 by India,  Pakistan and  Ceylon,  with  smaller  amounts  held by the 
colonial territories,  and holdings by Australia,  New  Zealand  and 
South Africa comparable  with those  of  North America  and Europe. 
The  official attitude to  them  seemsto have  changed  from worry in the 
1930s  about  their growing  size in relation to United Kingdom 
reserves;  anxiety to prBvent their reduction  and  encourage  their 
increase during the late  1940s  when  they could have  increased the 
deficit on  the balance  of payments;  renewed  concern over their size 
in the  1950s  and  1960s  when  the need  for finance  was  less pressing; 
to  efforts to preserve  and  increase  them again in the  1970s.  During 
the  1950s  the balances of the non-Sterling Area countries probably 
returned to about  working balance level,  with minor  exceptions 
when  there  were  fears  of  a  devaluation;  within the Sterling Area 
the Middle  East became  an important holder  and  the balances held by 
the  colonial territories increased,  while  those  of the Asian members 
of the  Commonwealth  were  reduced.  The  total has increased in the 
1970s because  of trade  surpluses of the  Overseas Sterling Area, 
particularly those  of the  oil-producing countries since  the  latter 
part of 1973. 
Sterling balances provided  a  form  of external support for 
the balance  of payments  throughout  the  period,  particlliBrly in the 
1940s.  The  need for official assistance in the  late 1960s  followed 
the  declining importance  of this traditional source  of finance. 
Finally,  although  some  public borrowing occurred in the  1960s  and it 
increased in 1971  and  1972,  the  major  increase  came  in 1973. 
All the traditional forms  of government borrowing then rose  (except 
sales of  government  stocks,  perhaps because  they aredenominated in 
sterling), but they became  much  less important  than the new  method 
of using foreign banks.  This  expedient provides the relative 
freedom  from policy constraints on  the United Kingdom  that the  use 
of sterling balances offered until the  1950s. 
In the  1930s,  and  again :i.n  the  1950s  and  1960s,  the 
official objective  was  not merely to balance payments but to 
increase reserves.  They have  been considered too  low because  the 
large volume  of capital movements  and  the short-term liabilities, 
such as  the sterling balances,  make  necessary  some  protection against 
sudden withdrawals that might  reduce  the  reserves to below  a  working 
121 balance.  This  fear has been  reduced by floating currencies, but the 
level of the  floating rate  itse~depends partly on  confidence  in the 
ability of the  reserves to sustain a  temporary outflow. 
Reserves  rose  immediately after the First World  War  and 
more  slowly in the late  ~920s.  They  rose  rapidly after  ~932 to 
reach a  level in  ~938 that permitted  a  large  outflow of short-term 
capital.  After the  Second  World  War,  except  for  a  peak  about  ~950, 
they rose  slowly until the early  ~960s, when  fluctuations began, 
followed by  a  sharp fall until  ~968.  Gold  was  the  major part of 
the  reserves between the  wars  and  as  late as  ~955 it accounted for 
94 per cent;  since  then foreign exchange  has become  more  important. 
In  ~970 and  ~97~ gold holdings fell,  while  foreign exchange  reserves 
increased rapidly. 
Controls  on capital movements  began as  informal 
consultation, particularly on  the  timing of foreign issues,  in the 
late  ~920s.  They may  have  thus  prevented temporary difficulties, 
although they had little net effect.  In the  ~930s they increased, 
and  they were  replaced by full  exchange  control in the Second  World 
War.  After the  war  control continued,  and  the use  of United 
Kingdom  funds  for overseas  investment has been increasingly 
restricted to investments  which promise  immediate  returns.  The 
result has been an increase  in investment  financed  from unremitted 
profits and  foreign borrowing.  Portfolio investment is limited by 
the use  of  a  pool  of  investment currency,  preventing any increase 
financed  from  the  United Kingdom.  The  controls,  which at first 
applied only to  investment outside  the Sterling Area,  were  extended 
to developed countries within the  area  'voluntarily'  in  ~966 and 
completely in  ~972.  Inward  investment has  also been controlled 
to  ensure  that the major part is financed  from  abroad,  not from local 
borrowing.  The  ending  of the  net  outflow of private  investment has 
thus been consistent with official policy since  the  war  and 
particularly since  the  early  ~960s. 
122 Table 6.1.  United Kingdom balance of payments,  1962  and  1973 
£  millions 
Visible  Invisibles  Current  Capital  Balancing  Official 
trade  (net)  (net)  balance  flows  item  financing 
(net) 
1920  - 148  +  463  +  315  - 135  - 132  - 48 
1925  - 265  +  296  +  31  - 78  +  45  +  2 
1930  - 283  +  298  +  15  - 72  +  64  - 7 
1938  - 285  +  220  - 65  - 182  - 21  +  268 
1955  - 313  +  158  - 155  - 195  +  121  +  229 
1960  - 406  +  151  - 255  +  138  +  294  177 
1965  - 237  +  188  - 49  - 326  +  22  +  353 
1970  - 9  +  716  +  707  +  592  +  121  -1,420 
1973  -2,355  +1, 157  -1,198  +1, 045  +  222  - 69 
SOURCES:  CSO,  United Kingdom  Balance of  Pa~ents 2  1963-19732  London,  HMSO,  1974; 
Economic  Trends,  December  1974;  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
March  1974. 
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 Table 6.3.  Changes  in the composition of  imports,~  1935-73 
1935  1948  1852 
_a£  -51  -5 
Food,  beverages  and 
tobacco 
Basic materials 
Fuels 
47 
26 
5 
Total non-manufactures  78 
Chemicals  2 
.  c  3  MachJ..nery-
Transport equipment  1 
Textiles and clothing  3 
Other manufactures  12 
Total manufactures  21 
TOTAL  GooosE.  100 
39 
34 
8 
81 
3 
2 
1 
4 
9 
19 
100 
38 
30 
10 
78 
3 
3 
1 
2 
12 
21 
100 
Percentages 
1956  1960  1964  1968  1970  1972 
-9  -3  -7  -9  -1 
39 
25 
12 
76 
3 
4 
2 
3 
13 
24 
100 
35 
21 
12 
68 
4 
6 
2 
4 
16 
32 
100 
30 
18 
11 
59 
5 
8 
3 
4 
20 
40 
100 
24 
15 
11 
50 
6 
10 
5 
4 
24 
49 
100 
22 
14 
12 
48 
6 
12 
5 
5 
23 
51 
100 
21 
12 
11 
44 
6 
13 
7 
5 
24 
55 
100 
SOURCES:  W.  Beckerman and Associates,  The British Economy in 1975,  Cambridge 
University Press,  1965,  p.149,  table 5.1;  Customs  and  Excise, 
Annual  Statement of the Overseas Trade of the United Kingdom. 
1973 
20 
12 
11 
43 
6 
14 
7 
5 
24 
56 
100 
~  Retained imports up to 1969,  total imports  1970-3.  In the years  1964-7  and 
1968-9,  the differences between retained and total imports were under 0.5 per cent 
for each main commodity group. 
b  1936-8 for machinery,  transport equipment,  textiles and clothing. 
c  SITC  groups  711.4-6 are excluded from machinery and  included in transport 
equipment. 
d  Including miscellaneous  imports. 
125 Table 6.4.  Changes  in the areaand commodity structure of exports,  1900-73 
1900  1920  1931  1948  1955  1961  1966  1971 
-10  -30  -8  -55  -60  -5  -70  -3 
(percentages) 
Western Europe  33  30  28  26  28  36  39  48 
Sterling Area 
outside Europe  31  37  43  48  42  35  28  20 
North America  11  11  10  11  15  14  17  16 
Rest of the World  25  22  19  15  15  15  16  16 
Non-manufactures  18  19  21  14  14  13  16  15 
Chemicals  5  4  7  7  8  9  10  10 
Textiles  38  33  25  15  8  6  5  5 
Metals  and 
metal 
manufactures  13  12  12  12  13  12  12  11 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment  11  8  18  37  41  42  41  40 
Other manufactures  15  24  17  15  16  18  16  19 
Total manufactures  82  81  79  86  86  87  84  85 
(£ millions) 
Total  valu~  342.1  757.0  422.4 2,339.5  3,366.5  4,209.6  6' 465. 6  10' 460.7 
SOURCES:  London  and  Cambridge Economic  Service,  Kel Statistics of the British 
Economl  1900-70;  Department of Trade  and  Industry,  Trade of the 
Upited Kingdom  with selected countries  • 
.2.  Annual  average of years covered. 
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Table 6.5.  Exports of goods,  1900-73 
Volume  indices2  1961=10~ 
Manufactures 
Non- Total 
Chemicals  Textiles  Metals  M  .  b  ach1nery  Other  Total  manufac- goods 
tures 
1900  12  341  35  9  28  45  n.a.  48 
1913  23  445  66  21  50  70  n.a.  83 
1929  27  303  68  28  60  65  n.a.  67 
1937  26  220  53  23  50  51  n.a.  54 
1950  45  173  83  73  90  82  70  82 
1950-5  51  151  76  76  86  80  74  79 
1956-60  78  117  97  92  88  92  89  92 
1961-5  115  103  102  106  112  107  107  107 
1966-70  168  112  119  133  159  136  130  135 
1971-3  238  154  145  164  242  181  166  177 
SOURCES:  Maizels,  Industrial Growth  and World Trade;  Department of Trade and 
Industry;  NIESR  estimates. 
~  Indices based on  1954,  1961 and  1970  linked through overlapping years  1950-5 
and  1961-5. 
b  - Includes  transport equipment. 
127 Table 6.6.  External assets and liabilities,  1962  and  1973 
Assets 
Private investment abroad 
Public sector lending etc. 
Banking  and commercial  claims 
Reserves 
Total identified external assets 
Liabilities 
Overseas  investment in private sector 
Overseas  loans  to government  and  investment 
in public sector 
Banking  and commercial liabilities 
Other public sector capital 
Total identified external  liabilities 
SOURCE:  Bank  of England Quarterly Bulletin,  June  1974. 
128 
£  millions 
1962  1973 
8,070  19,725 
710  1,790 
2,265  41,325 
1,540  2,235 
12,585  65,075 
3,165  10,405 
3,806  4,194 
2,965  43,910 
1,189  1,091 
11,125  59,600 
,. 
j 
1 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ CHAPTER  7 
THE  MANAGEMENT  OF  THE  BRITISH  ECONOMY 
1.  OBJECTIVES 
The  purpose  of management  is to alter the  course  of the  economy  in 
order to  achieve  certain objectives - that is, to  improve its 
performance  in  some  way.  During the postwar period,  there has been 
some  change  in the  emphasis  laid on  different policy objectives in 
Britain.  First of all, the  experience  of  the  war had convinced 
politicians that full  employment  could be  attained;  the proposition 
could not be  defended that  work  could be  found  for all  .in  time  of 
war but not in time  of peace.  Already,  before  the  end  of the  war, 
the  coalition government  had  committed itself to full  employment 
policies;  and  the  Labour  government  elected in 1945 accepted the 
preservation of full  employment  as its dominant  economic  objective. 
Secondly,  Britain had  emerged  from  the  war  with  a  huge  imbalance  in 
its overseas  trade;  the  second main  objective was  to right this 
imbalance by raising exports  and holding  down  imports.  In those 
early years not much  was  heard  about  economic  growth,  because  the 
concept  was  probably rather inapposite in a  period of reconstruction; 
the  emphasis  wassimply  on more  and  more  production.  The  idea of  an 
underlying growth-rate  whichcould be  accelerated by economic  policy 
was  as yet  absent.  Finally,  in the early postwar years not  many 
policy makers  saw  the  problem of rising prices as  a  long-term chronic 
problem;  it was  more  widely held to be  a  temporary problem of 
postwar shortages.  In the years up  to  1950  there  was  a  much  greater 
fear of  a  possible post-recovery depression than there  was  of 
inflation. 
In the  1950s,  which was  a  period of Conservative 
government;  the full  employment  commitment  was  maintained.  We  find 
the balance  of payments  objective frequently stated in a  rather 
different way;  policy makers  constantly referred to  the need  to 
maintain  'the  strength  of sterling'  and  to preserve Britain's role 
as  a  world banker.  Gradually,  as  the  decade  wore  on,  there  was  a 
growing realisation that the problem  of  rising prices was  not  just a 
temporary or cyclical problem,  but a  continuing one.  The  price 
129 objective  was  a  much  more  ambitious  one  then  than now,  in that policy 
makers  were  concerned if a  rise in prices in any year  exceeded  3  per 
cent. 
Towards  the  end  of the  1950s,  a  new  concern arose,  or at 
least an  old concern was  phrased in a  different  way.  As 
international comparisons  of growth-rates become  available, it 
became  clear that Britain was  a  slow-growth country.  It gradually 
became  an explicit objective  of  economic  policy to  accelerate  the 
rate of enconomic  growth.  New  instruments were  devised  and  new 
institutions established to this  end  (they are  discussed in the next 
section).  However,  in the mid-1960s,  this new  objective  of 
economic  growth  came  into  sharp conflict with the balance  of  payments 
objective.  It was  in fact the  latter objective which  dominated 
policy from  1964,  not only up  to the  time  of devaluation in 1967, 
but up  to  the  beginning of 1969. 
Finally,  towards  the  end of the  period,  there  were  further 
changes  in emphasis.  From  1966  onwards  governments  of both 
persuasion accepted  a  higher level of unemployment  than they would 
have  done  before.  In Britain,  as in other industrial countries,  the 
price  objective became  less ambitious,  as  the  difficulties of  finding 
any effective means  of moderating  the  price rise became  more 
apparent.  And  with the  floating of  the  exchange  rate in July 1972, 
the  form  of the balance  of payments  objective  changed.  Both before 
devaluation,  and  indeed after it, the  government  was  concerned to 
maintain  a  certain fixed parity for  sterling,  and  the balance  of 
payments  objective could  be  expressed as the  defence  of the  exchange 
rate.  As  from July 1972 this ceased to be  so;  the  objective  of  an 
adequate balance  of payments  was  still there,  of course,  but the 
exchange rate became  an instrument  of policy rather than an objective 
in its own  right. 
2.  INSTITUTIONS  AND  INSTRUMENTS 
Institutions in Britain would  appear to be  well designed for a  stron& 
coherent,  centralised economic  policy.  Central governments in 
Britain are not  faced  with  a_  division of powers,  as in the  United 
States,  nor with powerful  federal  states,  as in Western Germany;  nor 
130 do  they have  the  problems  of coaliation governments,  as in the 
Netherlands  or Belgium.  Consequently there is nothing in the party 
system to prevent  the  elaboration of  a  coherent  economic  policy,  and 
the parliamentary system normally  allows  governments  to pass any 
legislation required without  any  great difficulty.  There  are not 
many  constraints in the parliamentar,yor legal fields to hinder policy 
makers.  Further,  the  country had,  from early on,  a  comparatively 
advanced  apparatus of economic  statistics;  its national accounts, 
for  example,  were developed early and  are highly detailed;  and  the 
government  throughout  the  postwar period has had reasonably high 
level  economic  advice  from  economists well trained in Keynesian modes 
of thinking.  Throughout  most  of the  period economic  policy has been 
highly centralised in the  Treasury;  and it has  generally been true 
that if the  Chancellor of the Exchequer  and  the  Prime Minister 
together decided  on  a  course  of economic  policy,  they were  usually 
able  to carry it through.  Parliament's contribution to  economic 
policy was  relatively small. 
There  are  two  qualifications to this general picture,  of 
economic  policy being essentially decided by the  Prime Minister and 
the  Ch3ncellor of the  Exchequer  on  the  advice  of the  Treasury.  At 
various  times  the  Governer of the  Bank  of England has been accepted 
as  a  third partner,  with an independent view.  How  far this has been 
true  has  depended both on the  complexion  of the  government  and on 
the personality of the  Governor.  Secondly,  there  was  a  short period 
of  about  three years,  from  1964  to  1967,  when  a  new  department,  which 
had been set up in 1964,  had  some  significant influence  - the 
Department  of Economic Affairs.  Indeed it had been set up  by  the 
incoming Labour  government  specifically to provide  a  countervailing 
force  to  that of the  Treasury;  and in the  early years  of the  Labour 
government it did  succeed  to  some  extent in sponsoringjdeas  other 
than those  of short-term demand  management.  However,  it was 
essentially the  department  which was  supposed  to bring about  the 
acceleration of  economic  growth;  as it became  clearer that the 
balance  of  payments difficulties of the country would  prevent  any 
such acceleration,  its power  waned,  and it ceased to  have  any 
important  influence  on  economic  policy well before its actual demise 
in 1969. 
131 Some  generalisations are possible about the  instruments 
of economic  policy which have been preferred in Britain;  here,  too, 
there  have been changes  over time.  In the  early postwar years,  the 
main  instruments used  were  physical controls.  Industry's basic  raw 
materials were  allocated  and  there  was  fairly extensive  consumer 
rationing.  Indeed Britain took longer than  many  other countries to 
dismantle  the full  apparatus  of physical controls;  for  example, 
rationing of butter,  cheese,  margarine,  cooking fats  and  meat 
continued until 1954,  and  of house  coal until 1958.  Steel 
allocation continued until 1953  and building licences did not  end 
until 1954.  So  physical controls were  still quite  important 
instruments of policy up  to  the  early 1950s. 
Thereafter,  more  traditional instruments  of economic 
policy took  over the  dominant  role.  In general, it is true  to  say 
that fiscal instruments have been preferred to monetary instruments; 
certainly if one restricts the  comparison to  the  traditional monetary 
instruments of open  market  operations and  interest rate  changes. 
There  is each year a  major fiscal decision at the  time  of  the 
regular annual  Budget,  which is introduced at  any  time  between the 
middle  of March  and  the  mi~dle of April  according to  the  government's 
convenience.  The  accepted official mode  of thinking about  the 
Budget's role in macroeconomic  policy has not changed  a  great deal 
in the last 30  years.  The  purpose  is to  reduce  prospective 
aggregate  demand  in the  economy if it is considered likely to be 
excessive,  or to  increase it if it is likely to be  deficient. 
Chancellors have  normally presented their Budgets in these  terms, 
explaining at Budget  time  whether they consider it necessary to 
stimulate  or restrain the  economy.  It should be  noted that by the 
time  the  Budget is presented,  the  expenditure  estimates for the 
coming  financial year have  normally been settled;  the  items  which 
are  varied in the  Budget  are  on  the  side  of tax or revenue  rather 
than expenditure. 
There  is thus  an  annual  fiscal  'intervention'  in the 
economy  at Budget  time.  The  other main  group  of interventions in 
British postwar  economic history have  been  those  which have  taken 
place  quite  often in July or August  (a  time  when  sterling tends  to 
be  seasonally weak)  and  have  been triggered by a  balance  of payments 
132 crisis whicL  has  shown  itself in a  run  on  the  gold  and  foreign 
currency reserves.  These  interventions have  tended  to be  'packages', 
which have  often included public  expenditure cuts,  increases in Bank 
rate  and  changes in indirect taxation.  The  purpose  of these  packages 
of measures has been not  so  much  to make  some  carefully calculated 
adjustment  to  the movement  of demand  in the  home  economy,  but rather 
to reassure  foreign holders  of sterling. 
On  the  tax side,  the  instruments have  changed  quite 
considerably during the  postwar period,  particularly in the  field 
of indirect taxation.  In the early 1960s,  for  example,  it was 
decided that the  economy  needed more  instruments that  could be 
effectively used between  annual Budgets;  so  the  'regulator'  was 
introduced,  by which  a  large  group  of indirect taxes  can be  raised 
or lowered by  anything up  to 10 per cent.  The  10 per cent, it 
should be  noted,  is a  percentage  of  the  previous rate:  for example, 
if the  regulator is brought  into full operation to increase  taxes, 
a  25  per cent purchase  tax rate  would be  raised to  a  27i per cent 
rate.  Then in 1966  the  government  introduced the  selective 
employment  tax;  this was  essentially a  tax on  employment  in services 
and  construction,  and it included  a  premium  on  employment  in 
manufacturing industry.  The  most  recent major  change  was  the 
introduction of value-added tax in 1973,  to  replace both purchase 
tax and  the  selective  employment  tax.  In the  field of direct 
taxation,  the  main changes  have been  in corporation tax. 
On  the  expenditure  side,  there  was  a  change  in doctrine  -
much  more  than  a  change  in actual practice - in the  early 1960s. 
An  influential committee  then recommended  that  government  expenditure 
should be  planned  ahead  on  a  five-year basis,  and this committee 
was  highly critical of the  use  of  government  expenditure  as  a  short-
term conjunctural instrument.  It argued that this led to great 
inefficiency and  waste,  and that in any case  the  expenditure  cuts -
or for that matter the  short-term increases in expenditure  - usually 
took much  longer to become  effective than the  government  intended. 
However,  although the  government  in theory accepted this critique 
of  short-term expenditure  adjustments,  the practice nevertheless 
remained  common  throughout  the period.  Particularly in the packages 
of measures,  which were  essentially designed to  impress  foreign 
133 opinion, it continued to be  considered more  or less obligatory to 
include  some  measures  reducing public expenditure.  The  evidence is 
that in a  number  of cases the  cuts were  not particularly effective; 
they were  perhaps  valued more  for their announcement  effect than for 
the  reduction in real demand  which they brought about. 
Monetary policy in Britain has essentially been secondary 
to fiscal policy.  Certainly,  in the  early period up  to 1950,  the 
Looar  government  used it very little;  they  argued,  for example, 
that since  they had direct control of large  sectors of investment 
through the Capital Issues Committee  and  through building licences, 
they had no  need  to use  the  rate of interest for this purpose. 
Consequently Bank rate during this early Labour  government  was  hardly 
used at all.  The  Conservative  government  which  followed declared 
itself to be  more  interested in the  use  of monetary policy;  however, 
through the bulk of this period,the main  concern of the  Bank  of 
England  - certainly so far as medium  and  long-term rates of interest 
were  concerned - was  to keep  an orderly market  so  that there  would 
be  smooth management  of the  Natbnal  Debt.  Throughout  the period 
the  main weapons  of monetary policy were  non-traditional ones;  over 
the  greater part of the period,  there  was  some  form  of direct control 
over bank  advances,  and  the  banks  were  given directives  about  the 
type  of business  whiCh  they should favour  - such as exports or import 
saving projects - and  the  types of expenditure  which they should 
discourage  - such as personal borrowing,  or borrowing for property 
development  or for speculative purposes.  The  other main instrument 
which  was  used in the monetary field was  also non-traditional;  it 
was  the  use  of hire purchase  controls.  The  government varied the 
proportion of the total sum  borrowed  which  had to be  put down  in 
cash,  and  also varied the  length of the total period over which  the 
borrower had to  repay the full  sum.  The  use  of this particular 
instrument also  came  under  heavy criticism on the  grounds  that it 
discriminated heavily against particular consumer  goods  industries, 
and  indeed  served to raise costs and prices in those  industries; 
none  the  less the  government has  found it so useful  an  instrument, 
particularly in its quick effect on  consumers'  expenditure,  that it 
has been unable  to  ~ive it up  entirely 
The  method  of control of the banks  - and particularly the 
134 direct control of bank advances  - led to the  rapid growth of 
secondary money  markets during this period;  the traditional clearing 
banks began to  lose their share  of the total provision of credit. 
Partly for this reason,  towards  the  end  of  the period an  attempt  was 
made  to  get rid of  the  direct controls,  and  to develop  a  system by 
which the control was  indirect and  in which the banks  were  free  to 
compete  against each other.  Further,  the practice  of regular 
intervention by the  Bank  of England  to prevent  any  substantial 
movements  in the  medium  or long-term rates of interest was  heavily 
modified.  At  the  end  of  the  period,  therefore,  the  instrument the 
government  was  using to  influence  the  supply of credit was  no  longer 
the direct control of bank  advances,  but  the  requirement  on banks to 
deposit certain sums  with the  Bank  of England - a  requirement  which 
could be  appropriately varied. 
Monetary instruments,  therefore,  were  essentially adjuncts 
to fiscal instruments in British economic policy throughout this 
period.  Further,  on  the  whole,  British governments  did not think 
in terms  of  a  specific objective  for  the  money  supply.  They 
calculated in the  annual  Budget  what  adjustments  were  needed to  the 
economy  on the basis of forecasts  of real flows;  ·and  monetary policy 
was  essentially accommodating.  There  were  only  one  or two 
occasions  when  Chancellors of the  Exchequer did indicate  any kind 
of money  supply target;  one  of the  more  important  instances was 
when  the  International Monetary Fund  representatives pressed the 
government  to do  so,  at a  time  when  Britain had  substantial drawings 
outstanding from  the  fund. 1 
1  The  target favoured by  the  IY~ was  actually domestic  credit 
expansion,  which  can be defined as  the  increase in the  money  supply 
nlus the  current  and  capital balance  of payments deficit or minus  the 
current  and capital balance  of payments  surplus.  However,  by 1971 
when  there  was  a  balance  of payments  surplus,  the  authorities 
indicated that domestic  c·redit  expansion was  no  longer in their view 
an  appropriate  indicator;  from  1971  such official references  as 
there have been to monetary targets have  concerned the  money  supply. 
135 There  are  two  other general comments  to  make  on the types 
of instruments which were  used:  the first concerns  exchange  rates, 
and  the  second  concerns  the  setting up  of  new  institutions. 
Throughout  most  of this period,  the  exchange  rate  was  an  instrument 
of last resort;  in the postwar period up  to 1970,  it was  only 
used twice.  Indeed,  through most  of the period it could more 
properly be  regarded as  an objective  of economic  policy,  rather 
than as  an  instrument;  certainly from  1964  to  1967 it would  be 
right to  say that a  very large part of economic  policy was  directed 
to the  defence  of the  exchange  rate.  The  situation changed with 
the  move  to  a  floating exchange  rate in July 1972;  from  then on,  it 
was  open to  the  government,  within limits,  to manage  the  movement 
of the  exchange  rate,  and  so  to  use it to  a  limited extent as  an 
instrument  of  economic  policy. 
Finally,  economic  policy is not  just concerned with the 
operation of the  traditional policy instruments;  economic  policy 
makers  during the  postwar period have  spent  an  appreciable part 
of their time  in devising and  establishing new  imtitutions of  one 
kind or another.  Indeed this was  probably increasingly true 
throughout  the postwar period.  As  the  following sections make 
clear,  governments  in their anti-inflation policy began during the 
the  1960s  to give  less prominence  to  demand  management  and more 
prominence  to institutional  change;  so  from  1960  onwards  the 
history of anit-inflation policy is quite largely the history of the 
attempts  to devise  effective  incomes policy institutions.  In much 
the  same  way,  new  institutions were  also  set up  in the hope  that  they 
would  serve  to  stimulate Britain's rate of economic  growth- first, 
the National Economic  Development Council;  then the  Department  of 
Economic  Affairs,  with the National Plan and,  at much  the  same  time, 
the  Industrial Reorganisation Corporation,  in an attempt to  increase 
British industrial efficiency by promoting mergers  where  considered 
desirable.  It is of course  much  more  difficult to  evaluate  the 
effects of institutional change  than it is to evaluate  the effects 
of the  operation of  some  well established instrument of policy;  for 
this reason institutional changes  tend  sometimes  to be  omitted from 
analyses,  and  indeed  from  descriptions,  of  economic  policy.  They 
none  the  less constitute  a  very important part of the  whole. 
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It is perhaps useful to describe  first  a  typical  'policy cycle'  in 
Britain;  and  secondly to describe  also  some  of  the  policy attempts 
to break out  of this cyclical pattern. 
We  can begin the description of the  policy cycle  at the 
end  of  a  period of  stagnation;  say,  at the  end  of  ~958 or  ~962. 
The  trigger for  goverment  action is usually that it becomes 
disturbed  about  the  rising figure  of  unemployment;  it then takes 
steps to  stimulate  demand  - by removing restrictions on  consumer 
credit  (as in  ~958),  or by tax reductions,  or by public  expenditure 
changes.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of time  lags before these 
measures become  effective;  and  consequently,  it may  often appear 
that the first  'injection'  of purchasing power is not  working.  As  a 
consequence  there  may  be  a  slight panic and the  government will move 
to pull out  more  stops,  perhaps with encouragement  to nationalised 
industries or local authorities to  accelerate their spending plans. 
Eventually the  stimulus will take  hold;  output will begin 
to rise  and,  after a  lag,  unemployment  will begin to fall.  The  first 
signs  of  a  revival in private  investment will appear in 
manufacturers'  declarations of their investment intentions;  however, 
the  actual turning point in private  investment  expenditure is 
probably some  way  off. 
Within  a  year,  the first signs will begin to  appear of  a 
worsening in the balance  of payments.  In the  early months  when  this 
is happening,  it may  well be  that the  gold  and  foreign currency 
reserves  do  not  fall,  since  some  of  the  countries with whom  we  are 
increasing our trade deficit allow their own  reserves to be built up 
in the  form  of sterling balances.  Then at some  point along the 
road - quite  often in the  early summer,  which is an unfavourable  time 
of the year for  sterling,  there is a  speculative  run against sterling. 
This,  in the  fixed  exchange  rate period,  forced  the  government  to 
take  severe  deflationary action,  which it normally did in the  form 
of  a  •package'  of measures;  this package  tended not to be  carefully 
constructed,  but rather a  hasty collection of measures  which,  it was 
hoped,  would  restore  confidence  among  foreign bankers.  So  the boom 
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well  as  the  imposition of  government restraints, which  served to 
slow  down  the rise in output.  Supply side  constraints would be 
beginning to appear,  since  the  economy had moved  closer to full 
capacity working.  On  the  demand  side,  the  peak figure  for 
stockbuilding would probably have  been reached,  and  from  then  on 
there  would be  no  further demand  stimulus  from that source.  So  it 
happened  on more  than  one  occasion that  government  restraints were 
imposed  on  an  economy  where  the  rise in output  was  already slowing 
down. 
At  this point in the  policy cycle,  the period of relative 
stagnation in output begins.  After a  time  lag,  unemployment begins 
to rise.  With the very  slow rise in output,  there is also  a 
slowing down  in the  rise in the  volume  of imports.  Again after a 
time  lag,  the  increase in private investment is checked  and 
reversed.  The  balance  of payments  gradually moves  back into surplus; 
and  the  stage is set for the  next episode  of policy-induced 
expansion. 
4.  ATTEMPTS  TO  BREAK  THE  PATTERN 
The  course  of postwar- economic  policy can be  seen both as  a 
repetition of the pattern described  above,  and  as  a  series of 
attempts to break out of the pattern;  these  attempts  are  very 
briefly described here. 
Beginning in the  1960s,  a  number  of new  institutional 
devices  were  tried in an  attempt to raise  the underlying growth-rate 
of the British economy.  One  of the  ideas behind the  attempt  was 
that, if a  sufficient number  of major industrialists could be 
persuaded that  a  faster growth-rate  was  indeed likely,  then they 
would undertake  the  investment  prognmmes  which  would  make  this more 
rapid growth-rate possible.  So  the  indicative plans contained both 
in the  early work  of the  National Economic  Development  Council  and 
in the later work  of the  Department  of Economic Affairs incorporated 
a  significant acceleration of past growth-rates in their forward 
plans.  Another  arm  of this policy was  the  increased industrial 
intervention on  the part of  the Labour  government;  the policy 
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Industrial Reorganisation Corporation,  and  subsidies  and  other forms 
of  assistance  at the  frontiers  of  technology.  These  various 
institutiona~ experiments  were  unsuccessful in making  any radical 
change  in Britain's economic  growth-rate  and  the  idea of national 
planning has fallen into general disrepute. 
At  about  the  same  time  - that is during the  1960s  -
experiments  were  also being made  with new  institutions to deal with 
the  chronic problem of  inflation.  The  Conservative  government  in 
the early 1960s  came  to the  conclusion that demand  management  was 
an unsuccessful method  of dealing with inflationary problems;  and 
towards the  end  of its period of office,  the National Incomes 
Commission  was  set up.  It had  a  rather short life;  it had  few 
powers,  and  also no  trade  union support;  and it disappeannwith the 
end  of the  Conservative  government  in October 1964. 
The  second institutional attempt  to  deal with this problem 
was  that of the  Labour government.  They initiated their incomes 
policy with a  Statement  of Intent,  signed by representatives of the 
Trades Union  Congress,  the Confederation of British Industry  and 
the  government.  The basic principle was  that of  a  'norm'  for wage 
increases,  in line with the  expected increase in output.  Observance 
of this norm  was,  essentially,  to be  voluntary;  but  the  government 
also established the National Board  for Prices  and  Incomes,  which 
was  empowered  to deal with references  made  to it by the  government 
- both on prices  and  on  incomes.  However,  it only had powers  of 
delay.  The  policy proved tobe  a  fairly weak  one,  and it went 
through  a  number  of vicissitudes  during the Labour  government's 
years.  For  a  while,  the  Trades  Union Congress  set up its own 
vetting committee  for wage  claims;  then  - after one  of  the  sterling 
crises which preoccupied the  government  in this period- there  was 
a  wages  and prices freeze  for six months  from mid-1966.  The  freeze 
was  followed by  a  period of  'severe restraint';  but,  here  again, 
the  only power  the  government  possessed was  the  power  of postponement 
of a  wage  award,  on  the  recommendation  of the National Board for 
Prices  and  Incomes.  In the  final period of incomes policy,  a  good 
deal  of  emphasis  was  given to productivity agreements  as  a 
justifiable exception from  the basic  'norm', and  a  great many  awards 
139 were  dressed up  as productivity agreements.  By  1969,  the 
government  was  coming  to  the  conclusion that the potentialities of 
incomes  policy w:ere  more  or less exhausted  ,  and  the  focus  of 
attention was  shifted to  the  problem  of unofficial strikes.  It 
decided that it might be  a  more  promising  approach if it found  ways 
of outlawing unofficial strikes;  it therefore  proposed  to 
introduce  a  bill to reform industrial relations.  It was  faced  with 
such strong opposition from  the  Trades Union Congress  and  from  the 
Labour Party itself that it  was  forced  to  drop this legislation in 
exchange  for  a  'solennand binding'  agreement  that  the  Trades Union 
Congress  would  do  something  about it. 
The  Conservative  government  came  to  power  in mid-1970 
opposed  to  any  form  of formal  incomes policy.  It abolished the 
National Board  for Prices  and  Incomes.  It also proceeded  to attempt 
to bring the  trade  unions  • within the  framework  o.f  the  law'  by an 
Industrial Relations Bill;  at the  same  time it was  careful to  avoid 
any vigorous  inflationary action to bring unemployment  down,  and  in 
the  public  sector it pursued  a  policy which became  known  as  the 
'N-1'  policy,  under which it attempted to  ensure  that  each  successive 
settlement was  1  per cent lower than the  previous  one.  This policy 
in effect broke  up  in early 1972.  First of all, the  government 
failed just to hold unemployment  at the  relatively high level it 
inherited;  right through  1971  unemployment  rose  rapidly,  to pass 
the  million mark  in early 1972,  yet it seemed  to have  little effect 
in moderating  the  size  of wage  awards.  Secondly,  the  policy of 
bringing down  the  size  of  settlement in the  public  sector was  broken 
by  the miners'  strike in early 1972,  which in effect forced  a 
government capitUlation. 
In 1972,  therefore,  the  government  introduced  a  very 
expansionary Budget;  it attempted in the  middle  of that year to 
reach  a  com ensus  agreement  with trade  union leaders, but failed;  and 
in November it adopted  a  statutory prices  and  incomes policy.  This 
began with  a  90-day freeze  on  wages,  prices,  rents  and  dividends. 
This  was  followed by Stage  Two,  which  was  to last from  the  end  of 
March  through  to  the  autumn.  Pay  increases were  limited to £1  plus 
4  per cent  of the  total wage  bill in the  previous year,  with  an 
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increases could be  passed  on  in the  form  of higher prices.  A Pay 
Board  and Price  Commission  were  set up,  much  on the United States 
model  - with more  stringent requirements  on reporting and  the 
obtaining of approval  for large  firms  than for  small  ones.  The 
third stage  of  the  Conservative  government's  incomes policy was 
in~roduced in October 1973.  This  included  a  7  per cent  'norm'forpay 
increases,  with various flexibility allowances;  it also  included  a 
threshold provision by which flat sum  increases of 40p  a  week  would 
be  payable if the  increase  in the retail price  index  (based  on 
October 1973)  reached  7  per cent.  Under  the  provisio~of 
Stage  Three,  the National Coal  Board offered the  miners  increases 
rangingfrom £2.30  to £9.37  a  week.  A miners'  overtime ban was 
followed by a  strike to start on  10  February 1974;  a  general 
election was  called;  the Conservative Party faled to get  a  majority, 
and  was  succeeded by  a  Labour government. 
The  Labour  government  proceeded to dismantle  the 
statutory incomes  policy,  although the  threshold provisions remained 
in force  and raised wage  rates considerably in the  period up  to 
October 1974.  The  statutory policy was  replaced by  a  'social 
contract'  between  the  government  and  the  Trades Union Congress.  This 
rather vague  document  does not  give  quantifications, but  commits 
the  Trades Union Congress  to  urge moderation  on its members  in their 
framing  of wage  claims. 
Finally,  an  attempt  was  made  to  weaken  the  dominance  of 
balance  of payments  considerations in British economic  policy by the 
move  to  a  floating  exchange  rate in July 1972.  This has  so  far 
undoubtedly helped to  avoid the  short-run crises of  runs  on the 
reserves which previously had  led to the  adoption of packages  of 
deflationary measures.  In 1972,  the  government  hope  then was  that 
it might be  possible to move  on  to  a  more  rapid long-term growth 
path,  with a  combination of normal  reflationary action in the  Budget 
and  a  floating  exchange  rate which  would help the  government 
to  avoid  the  usual~op imposed by the balance  of payments. Howe~, tlds 
particular experiment  was  caught up  in the  consequences  of  the  world 
commodity price boom  of  1973  and  the unilateral action of the  oil-
producing countries in raising the  price  of oil;  whether it might 
under more  propi~us circumstances have  been successful is still an 
open  question. 
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